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Since the Global Financial Crisis, the literature of financial networks analysis has 
been trying to investigate the changes in the financial networks structure, that led to the 
instability of the financial system. The Global Financial Crisis followed by the Great 
Recession costed taxpayers an unprecedented $14 trillion (Alessandri and Haldane, 
2009), austerity and downturns in GDP.  The dynamics of the financial networks 
transferred the collapse of a US housing market bubble into a large meltdown of the 
financial systems globally. 
The study of systemic risk and macro-prudential policy has come to the forefront to 
model and manage the negative externalities of monetary, fiscal and financial sector 
activities that can lead to system wide instabilities and failure. The dimensions of crisis 
propagation have been modelled as those that can spread cross-sectionally in domino 
like failures with global scope, or build up over time, as in asset bubbles. The cross 
sectional propagation of shocks that occur due to non-payment of debt or other financial 
obligations with the failure of a financial intermediary or a sovereign leading to the 
failure of other economic entities, is called financial contagion. Cross sectional analysis 
of financial contagion can be done using statistical methods or by network analysis. 
The latter gives a structural model of the interconnections in terms of financial 
obligations. This dissertation uses both approaches to model financial contagion. The 
applications include the study of systemic risk in Eurozone Sovereign crisis, the US 
CDS market and the global banking network. This is organized in three self-contained 
chapters 
Our contribution to the literature begins with the study of the dynamics of the market 
of the Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts for selected Eurozone sovereigns and the 
UK. The EWMA correlation analysis and the Granger-causality test demonstrate that 
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there was contagion effect since correlations and cross-county interdependencies 
increased after August 2007. Furthermore, the IRF analysis shows that among PIIGS, 
the CDS spreads of Spain and Ireland have the biggest impact on the European CDS 
spreads, whereas the UK is found not be a source of sovereign contagion to the 
Eurozone. 
Next we perform the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS network based on the 
real-world data obtained from the FDIC Call Reports, and study the propagation of 
contagion, assuming different network structures. The financial network shows a highly 
tiered core-periphery structure. We find that network topology matters for the stability 
of the financial system. The “too interconnected to fail” phenomenon is discussed and 
shown to be the result of highly tiered network with central core of so called super-
spreaders. In this type of network the contagion is found to be short, without multiple 
waves, but with very high losses brought by the core of the network. 
Finally we study a global banking network (GBN) model based on the Markose 
(2012) eigen-pair approach and propose a systemic risk indices (SRI) which provide 
early warning signals for systemic instability and also the rank order of the systemic 
importance and vulnerability of the banking systems. The empirical model is based on 
BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics for the exposures of 19 national banking systems 
to the same number of debtor countries and the data obtained from Bankscope for the 
equity capital of these 19 national banking systems. The SRI is based on the ratio of the 
netted cross-border exposures of the national banking systems to their respective equity 
capital. The eigen-pair method stipulates that if the maximum eigenvalue of the network 
exceeds the capital threshold, there is cause for concern of a contagion. This is 
compared with the loss multiplier SRI proposed by Castrén and Rancan (2012). The 
latter is found to have no early warning capabilities and peaks well after the onset of 
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the crisis in 2009 while the eigen-pair SRI gives ample warning by late 2006 that the 
cross border liabilities was unsustainable in respect of the equity capital of the national 
banking systems. We contribute to the literature by highlighting the efficacy of the 
network approach to systemic stability analysis of GBNs. In particular we develop an 





I would like to thank foremost my supervisor prof. Sheri Markose, whose constant 
support, patience and insights were vital for completion of this thesis. She has been very 
supportive and her enthusiasm for research were lifting me up in the moments of doubts 
and personal difficulties. 
Thanks to my colleagues and friends Ali Rais Shaghaghi, Simone Giansante, Alesia 
Kalbaska, with whom I had a pleasure to work with. I am especially indebted to Ali, 
for countless hours of discussions over the research and his valuable insights and for 
simply being a good friend. Thanks also to my other friends at The Centre for 
Computational Finance and Economic Agents (CCFEA): Neil Rayner and Imon Palit 
who helped make CCFEA and Essex a pleasure. 
Many thanks to Marisa Bostock, Sheila Pill and other staff from the CSEE 
Department and the Registry, the director of CCFEA prof. Edward Tsang and the Head 
of my Supervisory Board dr. Anthony Vickers, all of whom have been very helpful in 
the moments of personal difficulties, when the administrative support was needed. 
This thesis would have not been completed without patient and unquestioning 
support of my parents: Antoni and Maria, and my sister Joanna. This is by no means an 
exaggeration if I say that they have actually carried me through the difficulties. I want 
to mention also my uncle prof. Eugeniusz Rosołowski, who’s been a rolemodel of a 
professor for me.  
I will be eternally indebted to Agata Borek, my love, who had to go through a lot 
with me, when I was writing the thesis. She never complained, was cheerful and full of 
hope, even in the moments of my doubts. She has been patiently waiting for me to finish 
and putting her own plans aside. Thank you! 
6 
 
I have received also invaluable support from Cichecki family, during the last year 
they have created a home for me in the UK and a proper environment for work. My 
dear friend Kacper Cichecki, has been to me like a brother during the years in Essex. 
There is a long list of friends who’s been important for me in the years of the doctoral 
research. It’s impossible to list all of them but I must mention, in a random order: 
Danuta Dróżdż, for her support in all areas, everlasting smile and humour; Magdalena 
Jeżewska-Lewińska, for her professionalism and support; Robert Małyniak, who spend 
long days with me in the less cheerful moments; Tomasz and Gosia Jarzębowicz, who 
often hosted me in London for almost two years, and proven themselves to be amazing 
friends; Łukasz Polański, for his goodness, smile, good word and hospitality in Rome 
and for always being there for me; Marek Dietl for his professionalism and being a role 
model of a young researcher, who has been able to successfully merge the business, 
academia, family and spirituality in one and consistent picture; all the friends from 
expedition to Puna de Atacama (Dominik, Iwona, Andrzej, Rafał, Michał, Wojtek 
Lewandowski and Wojtek Jankowski, Jacek, Piotrek, Edek, Tomasz); Anna 
Karbownik, for giving me a push forward; Jagoda Mytych, for her uncompromising 
attitude and faith, and many, many others. 
I also want to commemorate late Jose Cordoba – a friend from the doctoral 
programme at CCFEA and late Tomasz Kosicki – who died before finishing his 
doctoral degree, he was my climbing partner and dear friend for the last 4 years. 
Finally, as Emilio Previtali in his acknowledgements speech said (Previtali, 2014) – 
“when you already thank to everybody, you take a step back and in silence you think 
gratefully about all of those who did not believe in you and this way motivated you to 
go forward”. 




The work presented in Chapter 2 was published in collaboration with Alesia 
Kalbaska, in a paper published at: 
 Kalbaska, A., Gątkowski, (2012) M., Eurozone sovereign contagion: Evidence 
from the CDS market (2005-2010). Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 83(3), 657-673. 
The results presented in Chapter 3 were published as a working paper in University 
of Essex, Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series in collaboration with 
prof. Sheri Markose, Simone Giasnante and Ali Rais Shaghaghi.  
 Markose, S., Giansante, S., Gątkowski, M., Shaghaghi, A. R. (2010). Too 
interconnected to fail: financial contagion and systemic risk in network model 
of CDS and other credit enhancement obligations of US banks. University of 
Essex, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper Series, 683, February 2010. 
The work on this paper has been funded from the EC COMISEF project FP6-
034270-2. 
For the research for Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I use the network simulator developed 





Table of contents 
 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... 5 
Declarations .................................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 11 
Chapter 2 Eurozone Sovereign Contagion: Evidence from the CDS Market (2005-
2010) ............................................................................................................................ 16 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Data Analysis ................................................................................................ 22 
2.2.1 The BIS data on cross-border exposures ............................................... 26 
2.3 Econometric Analysis of CDS Spreads ......................................................... 29 
2.3.1 EWMA Correlations of CDS Spreads ................................................... 29 
2.3.2 Granger-causality analysis ..................................................................... 35 
2.3.3 Impulse Response Analysis ................................................................... 39 
2.3.4 Adjusted Correlation Analysis of CDS Spreads Before and After the 
Greek Bailout ........................................................................................................ 45 
2.4 Concluding remarks ...................................................................................... 50 
Chapter 3 Financial Contagion: Evidence From the US CDS Market (2007) ............. 54 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 55 
3.1.1 Financial Networks Approach ............................................................... 55 
3.1.2 CDS Market Analysis of Financial Contagion ...................................... 58 
3.2 Financial Networks: Theory and Empirics for the US CDS Obligations ..... 62 
9 
 
3.2.1 Some Properties of Socio-Economic Networks ..................................... 62 
3.2.2 Some technical notes on network statistics and stability analysis ......... 65 
3.2.3 May Condition for Network Stability .................................................... 69 
3.3 The Network Topology of US CDS Financial Interrelations ........................ 71 
3.4 Model Stress Tests ........................................................................................ 77 
3.4.1 Model Stress Tests Results .................................................................... 80 
3.4.2 Comparisons of Contagion between a CDS Network with Clustered 
Small World Properties and a Random Graph ..................................................... 82 
3.1 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 86 
Chapter 4 Network Analysis of Core Global Banking System: Systemic Risk, 
Vulnerabilities and Early Warning Indices .................................................................. 89 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 90 
4.2 Literature review on Global Banking Networks, systemic stability and early 
warning signals ......................................................................................................... 93 
4.3 Description of the network model ................................................................. 99 
4.3.1 Eigen-Pair Method for systemic risk analysis ..................................... 101 
4.4 Description of data ...................................................................................... 105 
4.4.2 Data on equity of banking systems ...................................................... 106 
4.5 Description of the topology of the Core Global Banking Systems Network
 111 
4.5.1 Network statistics ................................................................................. 116 
4.6 Cross-border exposures in the Core Global Banking System Network ...... 120 
4.6.1 Cross-border exposures of PIIGS and the rest of Eurozone ................ 125 
4.7 Stability Analysis of the Core Global Banking System Network ............... 128 
4.7.1 Maximum eigenvalue and network stability ........................................ 128 
4.7.2 Stability analysis .................................................................................. 130 
4.7.3 Ex-post structural break test ................................................................. 132 
10 
 
4.7.4 Systemic Risk Index with Greek bankruptcy ....................................... 135 
4.7.5 Systemic importance and vulnerability of nodes in the Core Global 
Banking System Network ................................................................................... 136 
4.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 145 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................ 148 
Appendix B ................................................................................................................ 154 
Appendix C ................................................................................................................ 157 
Appendix D ................................................................................................................ 162 
Appendix E ................................................................................................................ 168 
Appendix F ................................................................................................................. 170 
Appendix G ................................................................................................................ 171 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................... 172 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................ 176 





Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The research on financial networks gained the momentum after a catastrophic Global 
Financial Crisis. The crisis cast waves of shock through financial markets, brought 
many banking superpowers to its knees and threatened the solvency of others. It was a 
shock therapy for the supervisory authorities who did not pay enough attention to the 
structure of financial networks and were concentrated on solvency of individual 
financial intermediaries. Both financial market practitioners and economists working in 
academia largely failed to predict such a disastrous course of events perhaps lulled by 
the “volatility paradox” of the type envisaged by Minsky (1986), who argued that 
markets become tranquil before the burst of volatility. The state of complacency was 
dubbed The Great Moderation by Stock and Watson (2003) and most probably the 
authors of the term were surprised as the most of economists by what had happen. 
Financial markets are prone to crises, and this was already brought to public attention 
by the Minsky’s (1982) comments on the “disruptive internal processes of the 
economy”. This does not mean, however, that the crises cannot be foreseen or, at least, 
that some early warning signals of the building-up market instability cannot be found.  
As Alan Kirman noticed: “The economic crisis is also a crisis for economic theory. 
Most analyses of the evolution of the crisis invoke three themes – contagion, network 
and trust – yet none of these play a major role in standard macroeconomic models” 
(Kirman, 2011). Since the Global Financial Crisis the research on systemic risk 
measures brought to attention of macro-prudential profession many competing models 
(see Markose (2013) for the review of the literature of the systemic risk metrics), some 
of which are based on the analysis of financial networks. 
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We believe that data-driven approach to the macro-prudential questions is the correct 
way of dealing with these challenges. The analysis of the system as a whole gives us an 
insight into the complex dependencies between economic agents. Recreating the 
network of financial intermediaries or banking systems from the real world data we 
make a small step towards the modelling of economy as a complex adaptive system, 
which is the way the economy should be modelled as noted by Kirman (2011).  
This thesis contains three interrelated papers organized into chapters, which are 
self-contained. Each chapter incorporates abstract and all of the necessary literature, 
data analysis, results and conclusions needed for the full coverage undertaken for the 
research question in hand. 
Firstly in Chapter 2 we analysed the Eurozone Sovereign Contagion by looking at 
dynamics of the credit default swaps (CDS) market of PIIGS, France, Germany and the 
UK for the period of 2005-2010. We employ econometric methods such as 
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average analysis, the Granger-causality analysis and 
the Impulse Response analysis in order to answer the question about the causality of 
the contagion effect in the network of sovereigns. We discover that: 
• Sovereign risk mainly concentrates in the EU countries. 
• France, Germany and the UK are heavily exposed to PIIGS. 
• The Global Financial Crisis triggered the sovereign debt crisis. 
• PIIGS have lower capacity to trigger contagion than core EU countries. 
• Portugal is the most vulnerable, whereas the UK is the most immune to shocks. 
We are the first in the literature of the topic to combine the real world datasets from 
different sources and to use a wide array of different statistical methods to analyse it. 
Secondly in Chapter 3 we reconstruct the US CDS network based on the FDIC 
2008Q4 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests to investigate the consequences 
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of the fact that top 5 US banks constitute 92% of the CDS activity of US banks. We 
also construct a random graph which is equivalent to the empirically based CDS 
network in terms of connectivity and the same aggregate gross CDS buy and sell levels 
as given by the data. Next we use the Furfine (2003) approach to model the cascade of 
bank failures for both, the actual small world topology of the CDS network and for the 
equivalent random graph. Our results show that the propagation of the shock in both 
types of network is radically different and the less interconnected system is in some 
respects more dangerous. The contribution to the literature of this chapter is the 
confirmation of differences in contagion characteristics in different network topologies. 
It is based on real world data from the FDIC, it shows that the CDS market has core-
periphery structure. 
Finally in the Chapter 4 we recreate the Core Global Banking Network of cross-
border exposures of the BIS reporting banking systems to the counterparty countries 
and collect the data on the total equity of the banking systems from Bankscope. We 
investigate the empirical topological structure of global banking by focusing on the 
foreign claims. We use the eigen-pair approach introduced in Markose (2012) and 
Markose et al. (2012) and develop systemic risk early warning indices, that combine 
the assessment of the banking network structure with the banking systems’ total equity, 
which acts as a buffer against negative shocks in the system. The proposed indices are 
one of the major contributions of this study, providing a single and elegant metric for 
global systemic risk with early warning capability. The indices are then used to assess 
the stability of the Core Global Banking System Network. Our main findings are, that 
the proposed indices have early warning capabilities: 
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• We show that the Core Global Banking System Network was increasingly 
unstable before the Global Financial Crisis, with systemic risk index peaking by the end 
of 2006. 
• We detect the vulnerability of the Portuguese banking system at the end of the 
2013, that is when our data set finishes. The vulnerability has been confirmed in 2014 
by the bankruptcy of Espirito Santo, the major Portuguese bank. 
• The proposed vulnerability index peaks for Belgium well in advance of the 
Global Financial Crisis and bankruptcy of the Fortis Group and Dexia. 
Moreover our findings indicate that French, Spanish, Dutch and Swiss banking 
systems are found to be most vulnerable banking systems and potential propagators. 
There can also be seen a growing systemic threat from other countries like India and 
Turkey. Findings of the network analysis performed in Chapter 4 confirm and broaden 
the results of Chapter 2. We find that the core Eurozone countries more vulnerable than 
they seem when analysing information from the market-price based source, which are 
CDS premia.  
With network analysis the CGBSN we are able to detect the overexposure of the 
European (mainly core Eurozone) banking systems to the US. The amount of exposure 
was called “surprising” by authors of the report on cross-border banking in Europe 
(Allen et al., 2011), who recommended the inclusion of this problem into an agenda of 
the European Systemic Risk Board. 
The novelty of approach used in the last chapter, with respect to the existing literature,  
relies on combination of an extensive data analysis of the real world datasets from BIS 
and Bankscope and systemic risk application involving the bank capital and exposures 
of banking systems. We are performing analysis on the true network of cross-border 
exposures, with the true, not reconstructed topology and heterogeneity of the network 
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and links’ weights. We propose systemic risk indices: Systemic Importance, Systemic 
Vulnerability and Systemic Risk Index, measures, we claim, provide early warning 
signals for the distress of the dynamic systems based on the networks of cross-border 




Chapter 2  
Eurozone Sovereign Contagion: Evidence 
from the CDS Market (2005-2010) 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the dynamics of the credit default swap (CDS) market of PIIGS, 
France, Germany and the UK for the period of 2005-2010. The study is performed on 
the basis of the Datastream and DTCC data on CDS spreads and the BIS data on cross-
border exposures. The EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Moving Average) correlation 
analysis and the Granger-causality test demonstrate that there was contagion effect 
since correlations and cross-country interdependencies increased already after August 
2007. Furthermore, the IRF analysis shows that among PIIGS the CDS markets of Spain 
and Ireland have the biggest impact on the European CDS market, whereas the CDS 
market of the UK does not cause a big distress in the Eurozone. The adjusted correlation 
analysis confirms that Greece and other PIIGS (even Spain and Italy) have lower 
capacity to trigger contagion than core EU countries. Besides, Portugal is the most 
vulnerable country in the sample, whereas the UK is the most immune to shocks.  
2.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 led to the demise of several global banks 
and institutions. Some of the banks that were “protagonists” of the crisis were so called 
“too big and too interconnected to fail”. Therefore, states all over the world “sponsored” 
them by taking on the risk in the banking system and for a year they contained it. Yet, 
insolvencies that marked the crisis were passed on to sovereign states because of their 
17 
 
excessive debt issue to save the financial industry. Thus, the global financial crisis has 
grown into a full sovereign debt crisis. 
In 2010 the Eurozone became strongly distressed by the series of events starting with 
the problems of Greece being unable to repay its debt and eventually being bailed out 
by the EU and the IMF. Greek problems fostered the fear about the fate of other 
European economies, especially heavily indebted countries such as Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy and Spain that along with Greece are usually referred to as PIIGS. Eventually, the 
EU and the IMF agreed on the bailout packages for Ireland and Portugal and one more 
bailout package for Greece. However, these bailouts do not make the risk disappear. 
They simply transfer the risk to the governments and taxpayers of other European 
countries. Thus, the current sovereign debt crisis for the first time seriously tests the 
Eurozone since its start in 1999. 
Our study focuses on the credit default swap (CDS) market of PIIGS along with so 
called “core” countries such as France, Germany and the UK since they bought a large 
share of the debt of PIIGS. CDS spreads are a good data source to test for contagion as 
they can serve as a proxy for the default probability of a counterparty on which a CDS 
contract is written. Observing co-movements of CDS spreads of different countries can 
help to understand how the market estimates correlations of their default probabilities 
and also the direction of future defaults. 
The major studies on the sovereign CDS market were performed by Longstaff et al. 
(2011) and Pan and Singleton (2008), however, they were not focused on the Eurozone 
countries. Recently, as a result of the rapidly worsening situation in the Eurozone the 
focus has changed dramatically and a number of empirical papers have addressed the 
issues of the sovereign risk in the Euro area. We touch upon a few contributions made 
by Alter and Schuler (2011), Aizenman et al. (2011), Acharya et al. (2011), Dieckmann 
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and Plank (2011), Delatte et al. (2011), Fontana and Scheicher (2010), Ejsing and 
Lemke (2009). 
One strand of the recent empirical literature focuses on the joint dynamics between 
the sovereign and bank CDS market. Thus, Alter and Schuler (2011) study the 
relationship between the sovereign CDS of seven EU countries and the CDS of their 
banks. The authors analyse the period between June 2007 and May 2010 and look at 
differences in the market before and after government interventions. They find that 
before the government rescue interventions contagion spills over from the banking 
sector to the sovereign CDS market, whereas after the interventions sovereign CDS 
spreads largely determine the price of banks’ CDS series. The authors also highlight 
the short-term impact of the financial sector on sovereign CDS spreads and its 
insignificance in the long run. 
Dieckmann and Plank (2011) also find evidence for a private-to-public risk transfer 
in the countries with government interventions. Moreover, the authors argue that this 
transfer is larger for the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries that are more 
sensitive to the health of the financial system than non-EMU states. 
Ejsing and Lemke (2009) examine co-movements between CDS spreads of ten Euro 
area countries and CDS of their banks for the period from January 2008 to June 2009. 
The authors find that the government rescue packages led to a decrease in the CDS 
spreads of the banking sector at the cost of the increase in the price of sovereign CDSs. 
Furthermore, the bailout schemes made sovereign CDSs even more sensitive to any 
future shocks. Likewise, Acharya et al. (2011) find empirical evidence for the direct 
two-way feedback between the banking and sovereign CDS market of the Eurozone 
countries for the period of 2007-2011.  
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Another strand of the recent empirical literature investigates the relationship 
between the sovereign CDS and bond market. Fontana and Scheicher (2010) identify 
the main determinants of the bond and CDS spreads of ten Euro area countries and 
explain which factors drive the differences in pricing between the two markets. The 
authors suggest that “flight to liquidity” effects and limits to arbitrage may explain why 
CDS spreads exceed bond spreads. They also show that common factors are the main 
reason for the repricing of sovereign credit risk.  
Similarly, Delatte et al. (2011) use a non-linear approach to analyse the influence of 
CDS premia on underlying bond spreads for PIIGS and five core European countries. 
The authors conclude that CDS spreads are a better indicator of the probability of 
default during the periods of turmoil.   
Furthermore, there are studies that investigate the relationship between the sovereign 
CDS market and economic fundamentals. Thus, Aizenman et al. (2011) compare the 
market pricing of CDSs in the Eurozone (and PIIGS in particular) and the pricing of 
risk in the rest of the world. They find evidence that in 2010 CDSs of PIIGS are priced 
much higher than CDSs of other countries with similar fundamentals. As a possible 
interpretation the authors suggest negative expectations of the market about the future 
fundamentals of PIIGS and their exchange rate inflexibility. 
Thus, the research to date has tended to focus either on interactions between the 
sovereign CDS market and the financial sector or on the joint dynamics between the 
CDS and bond markets. However, far too little attention has been paid to the discussion 
of contagion between sovereigns. 
The aim of this study is to examine sovereign risk and the occurrence of financial 
contagion in Europe. In order to explain the long-term dynamics of the CDS market of 
PIIGS and core EU countries we carried out our analysis on an extended time period 
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spanning from August 2005, well before the global financial crisis, until September 
2010. In the literature there is a considerable amount of ambiguity concerning the 
precise definition of contagion and how we should measure it. There exists no 
theoretical or empirical definition on which researchers agree. Broadly contagion can 
be referred to as the cross-country transmission of shocks or general cross-country 
spillover effects. However, in order to capture the phenomenon of contagion 
quantitatively we used a very restrictive definition suggested by the World Bank. It 
assumes that contagion occurs when cross-country correlations increase during “crisis 
times” relative to correlations during “tranquil times”1. The relation between contagion 
and correlation has to be understood properly: contagion indicates that the cause of a 
shock in one country is the shock in another country and correlation – co-movement of 
markets in two countries can be result of a common shock, i.e. both movements can be 
triggered by an external, common cause.  
This study contributes to the empirical literature in several ways. Firstly, we used 
the multiple sources of data. The Datastream, DTCC2 and BIS3 data analysis showed 
that investors protected themselves from the possible adverse effects that the current 
sovereign debt crisis can have on Germany, France and the UK. Thus, there may be a 
two-tier structure of contagion – problems that emerge on the peripheries of the 
European economy may create a distress at the core of the EU.  
Secondly, we applied a wide array of quantitative methods that provide a more 
complete picture of the situation in the CDS market of the studied countries over long 
period of time.  
                                                          
1http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTMACROE
CO/0,,contentMDK:20889756~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:477872,00.html. 
2 Data are weekly published on the DTCC (Depository Trust and Clearance Corporation) website. 
3 Data on the amount of bank exposures are taken from the Bank for International Settlements. More 
details on BIS data is included in Appendix A 
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The main idea behind Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) is that 
moving average is calculated by weighting components with exponential factor, which 
makes recent values far more important to the final result than the older ones. EWMA 
correlation is a method with which we can see how the correlation between CDS 
spreads of different sovereigns changed in time and see if it increased during the crisis. 
Another employed method is Granger-causality test, which shows causal 
dependence in data. Granger causality is based on the assumption that if additional 
information improves the prediction accuracy of a time series (lowers the mean square 
error) then the additional information causes the original time series. We test if time 
series of CDS spreads of one sovereign Granger-causes the other. Impulse Response 
Analysis permits to analyse the impact of change in one variable on other variables in 
the system. It is a method often combined with Granger-causality test to establish the 
extent to which variables influence each other. 
Finally adjusted correlation can be interpreted as a correlation adjusted for the bias 
resulting from an increase in volatility during crisis period. It is conditional on one of 
the sovereigns in pair being in distress. 
The EWMA correlation analysis found that there were several waves of contagion 
and correlations increased already after the credit crunch in August 2007. Besides, it 
confirmed the role of the global financial crisis in triggering sovereign risk. Similarly, 
the Granger-causality test revealed that cross-country interdependencies increased after 
the global financial crisis as compared to the pre-crisis period. The adjusted correlation 
analysis confirmed that Greece and other PIIGS have lower capacity to trigger 
contagion than core EU countries. Moreover, Portugal is the most vulnerable, whereas 
the UK is the most immune to shocks.  
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the Datastream 
and DTCC data on credit default swaps and the BIS data on cross-border exposures. 
Section 3 describes the main techniques and discusses the empirical results of the 
econometric analysis of CDS spreads. The last section concludes. 
2.2 Data Analysis 
The Datastream data was gathered on five-year CDS contracts issued on the bonds 
of nine sovereigns: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain (PIIGS), France, Germany, 
the UK and the U.S. A credit default swap is a bilateral financial instrument that allows 
lenders to pass on the risk that a borrower will default. CDS spreads are quoted in basis 
points. Higher spreads indicate growing market expectations of a default on the 
underlying debt with a jump to a default spike at the time of the credit event.  
The dataset under study spans from the period of August 2005 until September 2010. 
The first turmoil on credit derivatives markets took place in August 2007. The paths of 
CDS spreads from December 2007  are shown in Figure 2.14.  
It is possible to identify four phases. Between December 2007 and September 2008 
the CDS spreads of different countries were growing simultaneously, even though the 
range remained rather narrow. Between October 2008 and March 2009 the market was 
undergoing the consequences of the collapse of one of the largest American investment 
banks Lehman Brothers. CDS spreads widened considerably since the problems in the 
banking sector started spreading to sovereigns. Between April and September 2009 
CDS spreads were narrowing in response to the taxpayer bailout that subsidized the 
risk. Nevertheless, bad debts of banks led to the rise of sovereign risk and since 
November 2009 CDS spreads were steadily growing again. In March 2010 they jumped 
                                                          
4 The Datastream data for all sovereigns are available from December 2007. 
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to very high levels and the significant differentiation between countries could be 
observed. 
Figure 2.1 CDS spreads of PIIGS, France, Germany, the UK and the U.S. from 
December 2007.  
 
Source: Datastream 
Figure 2.2 presents the movements of CDS spreads for PIIGS and core EU 
economies along with the U.S. from March to September 2010. Investigating the 
development of CDS spreads as the Eurozone sovereign crisis unfolded we clearly see 
that at the moment of the crisis investors were uncertain about the ability of Greece to 
repay its debt and the Greek CDS spreads surged in April 2010. However, investors 
continued valuing the riskiness of the Greek debt at high level even after its first bailout 
in May 2010 since the price of the Greek CDSs started growing again and peaked at the 
end of June 2010. The pattern of the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Irish CDS spreads 
is similar to that of the Greek, but the amplitude of movements is smaller. Moreover, 
since August 2010 with the Irish debt becoming more and more at risk we can see a 
clear rising trend in the Irish and Portuguese CDS markets. 
For core European countries the behaviour of CDS spreads was not uniform. Thus, 
for Germany spreads returned to the previous values, for France they doubled, whereas 
the price of the UK CDS spreads considerably dropped. This may suggest that investors 
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did not worry about the influence of the Greek problems on Germany and the UK, 
whereas they seemed to anticipate some negative changes in France because of the 
turmoil in PIIGS. At the same time, for the U.S. we do not observe any major changes. 
Figure 2.2  CDS spreads of PIIGS (left) and core EU countries and the U.S. (right) 
for March-September 2010.  
 
Source: Datastream 
The gross notional value of CDS contracts is reported on Figure 2.3. It is a sum of 
all notional values of CDS contracts issued on a given underlying asset. It represents 
the number of CDS trades and thus informs about the size of the market. The gross 
notional rose for all PIIGS, but the rise ranged between 10% for Greece and 25% for 
Ireland. The largest gross notional of CDS contracts was written on Italy (around 
$250bn) and Spain ($116bn), whereas the smallest value was recorded on Ireland and 
Portugal. 
Figure 2.3. Gross notional of CDS contracts of PIIGS (left) and core EU countries 






What is interesting is that gross notional for core EU economies grew much stronger 
than for PIIGS. The increase for Germany, France and the UK was 20%, 30% and 38% 
correspondently. The largest gross notional value was recorded on Germany (around 
$80bn) and France ($67bn). What is also noteworthy is that within the same time period 
the gross notional value of the American CDS contracts increased only by 11%. This 
may suggest that Greek problems are mainly confined to the European Union and do 
not seem to cause much fear among American investors. 
Figure 2.4 presents the sum of the net notional (NetN) positions of banks that hold 
CDSs on the underlying sovereign debt from March to September 2010. The net 
notional is calculated summing up the net position in an instrument of a single market 
player. The position is negative when more CDS are sold than bought and positive when 
more CDS are bought than sold. When NetN values grow it means that the positions of 
the market players are more unbalanced and investors increase their exposure to the 
CDS market. On the contrary, falling NetN values indicate that investors try to hedge 
more their positions. 
Figure 2.4. Net notional of CDS contracts of PIIGS (left) and core EU countries 
and the U.S. (right) for March-September 2010. In bn$ 
 
Source: DTCC 
For Greece, Portugal and Ireland the NetN fell after the first bailout decision in May 
2010 by 16%, 15% and 13% correspondingly, whereas for Italy and Spain it first fell 




growing trend for the NetN which ranged between 23% and 33%, whereas for the U.S. 
again there were no considerable changes. 
Thus, it can be observed that the problems of Greece triggered a surge in the CDS 
market activity of almost all of the countries under analysis. However, there are some 
differences between PIIGS, core European countries and the U.S.  
Firstly, we can observe the withdrawal from the excessive exposure of PIIGS to one 
another since the net notional for these countries fell while the gross notional increased. 
This may suggest that the market players tried to hedge their open positions on the 
market by buying reverse contracts, which would decrease the net notional and 
simultaneously increase the gross notional and the number of signed contracts. 
Secondly, investors buy/sell more protection on core EU players. Even though 
between March and September 2010 CDS spreads significantly increased only on 
France, there was a big market demand not only for the French CDS contracts, but also 
the German and the UK CDSs, since investors wanted to insure the debt they hold. This 
led to an increase in the net notional along with a fairly strong rise in the gross notional 
value.  
Thirdly, the American CDS market was not significantly affected by the Greek 
problems – there was no major increase in spreads and gross and net notional values as 
a result of the turmoil in Greece.  
2.2.1 The BIS data on cross-border exposures 
The BIS data on cross-border exposures5 show how much banking systems of 
different countries are exposed to PIIGS and the UK and thus may incur losses as a 
                                                          
5 Bank For International Settlements' Consolidated Banking Statistics. Table 9C  
The analysis of the cross-border exposures derived from the BIS data is pursued also in Chapter 4 
section 4.6, but on a wider time span. The description of cross-border exposures is an important part 
of analysis here and thus is kept in place. 
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result of default of any of them. We use the data on an ultimate risk basis (i.e. 
contractual lending net of guarantees and collateral – see Appendix A for details on BIS 
data).  
From Figure 2.5 we see that PIIGS hold the debt of one another. However, it appears 
that the banking systems that are mostly exposed to them are those of France, Germany 
and the UK. For instance, the joint claims of only these three countries’ banking systems 
on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain constitute 69%, 60%, 71%, 43% and 62% 
of total claims of 24 reporting countries respectively6. We also see that almost all of the 
debt of PIIGS is held by the European banks. Its share ranges between 79% for Ireland 
and 95% for Portugal. The situation is slightly different for the UK where French and 
German banks hold smaller amounts of debt whereas the American banks holds 24% 
of total claims on the UK. 
The exposure of the European banks to PIIGS has been growing since March 2005 
for three consecutive years. After that, especially following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 cross-border lending started decreasing. According to the 
BIS, at the beginning of 2010 for the first time since the Lehman Brothers collapse 
cross-border lending by banks rose again. Nevertheless, in the second quarter of 2010 
it dropped considerably implying the outflow of capital from the European economies 
towards more stable regions. 
                                                          
6 The joint claims of French, German and British banks on Portugal are slightly lower than on other 
PIIGS since Spanish banks are highly exposed to Portugal and hold 42% of total claims on it. 
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Figure 2.5. Cross-border banking sector exposures to PIIGS and the UK on the 
ultimate risk basis (2011Q1) 
 
Source: BIS 
The above findings suggest that the problems of Greece can trigger contagion that 




and British banks are highly exposed to PIIGS. Thus, we may have a two tier structure 
of contagion – problems that emerge on the peripheries of the European economy may 
create a distress at the core of the EU.  
Moreover, the current sovereign debt crisis seems to be entirely European since the 
exposure of American and other countries’ banking systems to PIIGS is not particularly 
high. Besides, as we noticed before, the American CDS market did not significantly 
react to the problems of Greece. For this reason we excluded the U.S. from our further 
analysis. 
2.3 Econometric Analysis of CDS Spreads 
Since the data on CDS premia have a unit root we made them stationary by using 







t ssx          (1) 
where 
i
ts is the CDS spread of country i ,  i =1,…8 in period t and 
i
tx represents log 
returns. 
2.3.1  EWMA Correlations of CDS Spreads 
We started our econometric analysis by estimating correlations of daily CDS spreads 
between countries. The analysis of correlations to test for contagion was employed by 
Caporale et al. (2005). Moreover, several studies (Lopez and Walter (2000), Ferreira 
and Lopez (2005)) suggested that models based on the Exponentially Weighted Moving 
Average (EWMA) perform quite well and can be used instead of other more complex 
methods. Furthermore, Gex and Coudert (2010) showed that there is very little 
difference between EWMA correlations and DDC-GARCH (Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation GARCH) models.  
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The main idea of the EWMA is that the moving average is calculated by weighting 
components with an exponential factor. Recent values are of higher importance in the 
EWMA scheme. Thus, the further the data point is from the time for which the average 
is calculated the less influence it has on its value.   
When the number of periods tends towards infinity the EWMA conditional 
correlations (?̂?𝑡 ) and EWMA variance (?̂?𝑡
2) can be expressed in the following 
autoregressive form: 
?̂?𝑡




t xx 11 
?̂?𝑡−1
𝑖 ?̂?𝑡−1
𝑗 +  ?̂?𝑡−1
𝑖𝑗 ,          (2) 
?̂?𝑡
2 = (1 −  )𝑥𝑡−1
2 +  ?̂?𝑡−1
2 ,                 (3) 
where i is a triggering country; j is a given country in the sample; 𝑥𝑡
𝑖  and 𝑥𝑡
𝑗  are the 
log first differences of CDS premia of country i and country j;   is a parameter between 
0 and 1; t is the EWMA standard deviations of  𝑥𝑡.  
Parameter   is a key parameter in the EWMA scheme as it affects the decay of 
weights. The parameter should be such as to minimize the root mean square errors of 
forecasts. Estimation method for   is suggested in RiskMetrics by JP Morgan7. The 
procedure is following: 
1. Compute returns for each CDS in the sample. 
2. Initialize 0  and compute the EWMA variance for each CDS at each date, using 
0  (unique   for the whole sample). The problem is to compute recursively 
variance on the first date. The solution is to use the squared return on day one 
as a proxy for the variance on day two. This has a drawback that variance has 
                                                          
7 J.P Morgan’s result is  λ =0.94.  
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to stabilize before converging to proper values, thus first few weeks of 
computations should be disregarded. 
3. Compute the forecasting error (using the root mean square errors (RMSE) for 
each CDS in the sample). 
4. Minimize the sum of RMSE using   as a parameter.  
In our case   is equal to 0.939. 
Figure 2.6. EWMA correlations between Greece and other sovereigns (08.2005 – 09.2010) 
Source: own calculations 
Note: Since the data for the UK are available from November 2007 its correlation with Greece is shown 
as a straight line before this date 
From Figure 2.6 we can see that the lowest correlations were observed before the 
“credit crunch” that occurred in August 20078. For pairs “Greece-Spain”, “Greece-
                                                          
8 Since the data for the UK are available from November 2007 its correlation with Greece is shown as 
a straight line before this date. 
32 
 
Ireland” and “Greece-Italy” the correlations were strongly negative in a run-up to the 
financial crisis. This indicates that the CDS spreads of abovementioned spreads move 
in the opposite directions. After the “credit crunch” correlations increased for almost 
all of the pairs. However, the European Central Bank saved the banks that were infected 
by the American “disease”, and thus Europe survived the “credit crunch”. Nevertheless, 
after the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 correlations clearly spiked again. 
This could possibly be explained by the high costs of the financial sector bailout that 
has been transferred to sovereign risk. 
Since November 2009 when sovereign risk increased correlations between CDS 
markets grew further for most of the pairs. Table 2.1 shows that CDS markets of 
Portugal and Spain, Portugal and Ireland, Portugal and Italy, Italy and Ireland, Italy and 
Spain, Ireland and Spain were correlated the most, whereas correlations between CDSs 
of Greece and Germany, Greece and the UK, Ireland and Germany were the lowest. 
The analysis shows that the German CDS market was the most correlated with CDSs 
of France and the UK at the beginning of April 2010 when these core EU countries 
were taking a decision whether or not to bailout Greece. Besides, correlations between 
CDSs of Greece and Portugal, Italy and Ireland, Portugal and Ireland, Ireland and Spain, 
Ireland and Germany reached their maximum values after the bailout of Greece in May 
- June 2010. 
The average values of correlations before the credit crunch were much lower (0.145) 
than after credit crunch (0.314) and again, these were more than twice lower than after 
Lehman Brothers collapse (0.726). Exceptions are correlations for CDS pairs France-
Germany and Greece-France, Greece- Germany that were higher before the credit 
crunch than after the credit crunch. In case of the pair France-Germany this would 
suggest that investors treated the core countries alike before the credit crunch event (the 
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correlation was 0.502 which is relatively high to the average). In case of pairs Greece 
and France and Germany, the differences are not very big between periods (0.222 to 
0.178 and 0.163 to 0.054 respectively), so it is difficult to conclude that differences are 
meaningful. What is important is the hike in all the correlations after the Lehman 
collapse. The significance of the changes can be tested with a model with dummy 
variables.  
Table 2.1 Average correlations between chosen countries for different periods. The 
shaded “Before credit crunch” column is where average correlations are in general 
of lower values 
















Greece-Italy 0.161 0.626 0.85 0.754 
Greece-Portugal 0.219 0.573 0.767 0.791 
Greece-Ireland -0.057 0.077 0.749 0.761 
Greece-Spain -0.021 0.186 0.826 0.768 
Greece-UK9 - 0.218 0.613 0.666 
Greece-France 0.222 0.178 0.688 0.705 
Greece-Germany 0.163 0.054 0.631 0.626 
Italy-Portugal 0.401 0.736 0.841 0.857 
Italy-Ireland 0.032 0.19 0.744 0.834 
Italy-Spain 0.122 0.264 0.872 0.892 
Portugal-Ireland -0.011 0.239 0.737 0.823 
Portugal-Spain 0.163 0.268 0.886 0.879 
Ireland-Spain 0.092 0.559 0.771 0.834 
Ireland-Germany 0.12 0.379 0.61 0.695 
Spain-UK - 0.237 0.638 0.754 
Spain-Germany 0.065 0.31 0.658 0.728 
UK-France - 0.275 0.66 0.718 
UK-Germany - 0.233 0.542 0.706 
France-Germany 0.502 0.358 0.718 0.791 
Average 0.145 0.314 0.726 0.767 
Source: own calculations 
                                                          




In order to see whether there was contagion we have to verify whether correlations 
increased significantly during the crisis. We estimated regressions linking the EWMA 
conditional correlations ( t ) to their lagged values and different crisis dummy 
variables as in Gex and Coudert (2010) and Chiang et al. (2007)10: 
tttt D    2110          (4), 
where t  is normally distributed error term and tD  is a dummy variable for the 
specified crisis period (equal to 1 during the crisis and 0 before):  
1
tD  = 1 after 13.11.2007, 
1
tD  = 0 elsewhere; 
2
tD = 1 after 12.09.2008, 
2
tD = 0 elsewhere;  
3
tD = 1 after 02.11.2009, 
3
tD  = 0 elsewhere; 
4
tD   = 1 after 15.04.2010, 
4
tD  = 0 elsewhere  
The first dummy represents a hypothesis that the crisis started after the “credit 
crunch” in August 200711. The second dummy states that the crisis started after the 
Lehman Brothers collapse. The third dummy assumes that the crisis period started when 
sovereign risk increased in November 2009. The fourth dummy states that the crisis 
started shortly before the EU-IMF bailout of Greece in May 2010. Using various 
dummy variables allows us to identify which of the above periods is the most 
significantly represented as the crisis period in the data.  
The 2R  coefficient for all regressions we estimated with OLS methods remains 
above 90%. The coefficient for the lagged endogenous variable is always significant 
                                                          
10 It is important to underline that with the equation (4) we use following the abovementioned 
papers, we can theoretically obtain estimates outside the range [-1, 1], which is a range within which 
the correlation values are kept.  
11 Since we have data for all the sovereigns starting from 13.11.2007, we used this date as a starting 
point for Dt1. 
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and close to 1 – this corresponds to the high value of   we used12. The most interesting 
result is the behaviour of the dummy variables as their statistical significance confirms 
the contagion effect13. 3D  and 4D  are the most significant (in 10 and 12 out 28 
experiments respectively) which assumed that the crisis started in November 2009 and 
when the problems of Greece worsened respectively. 1D  is significant only in six cases, 
whereas 2D is significant in eight cases.  
Taking into account 28 experiments pursued for each dummy variable we can draw 
a conclusion that there were several waves of contagion defined in terms of an increase 
in conditional correlations14. Firstly, the global financial crisis played its role in passing 
on the risk in the banking system to sovereigns, even though PIIGS and core EU 
countries survived the “credit crunch” and the default of the financial giants like 
Lehman Brothers. Secondly, the persistent transfer of the costs of the financial sector 
bailout to the sovereign risk led to the high debt and deficit in the Eurozone and thus 
created a new wave of contagion in November 2009. Thirdly, the further deteriorating 
situation in Greece in March - April 2010 made financial markets extremely nervous 
and finally led to the EU-IMF bailout first of Greece and later of Ireland and Portugal.   
2.3.2  Granger-causality analysis 
In order to identify a causal relationship and its strength between CDS markets of 
different countries we constructed a vector autoregression (VAR) model. We applied 
the Granger-causality test and analysed impulse responses to see how long a shock 
introduced into the system may persist and what influence it has on the countries that 
are not directly affected by the shock. The analysis of VAR and Granger-causality to 
                                                          
12 By definition of moving averages EWMA correlations are strongly autocorrelated. 
13 Results and significance levels can be found in Appendix D, Table D.6 
14 In our case correlations increased significantly by less than 1 %. 
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assess financial spillovers was applied by Galesi and Sgherri (2009), Gray (2009), 
Khalid and Kawai (2003) and Sander and Kleimeier (2003). 
The main idea of the Granger-causality test is the assumption that if one variable 
causes the other it should help to predict it, by increasing the accuracy of forecasts. In 
mathematical terms we may say that y fails to Granger-cause x if: 
MSE[𝐸(𝑥𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−1, … )] =MSE[𝐸(𝑥𝑡+1|𝑥𝑡, 𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡, 𝑦𝑡−1, … )]    (6) 
In order to test for the existence of Granger-causality we need to estimate an 
autoregressive model with lag p: 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝛼𝑝𝑥𝑡−𝑝 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡
15       (7) 
and then do an F-test of the null hypothesis: 
𝐻0 ∶  𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝑝 = 0 
If coefficients by y are not statistically significant, it means that y does not bring any 
new information into forecasting of x and thus is not Granger-causing x16. 
One of the important issues in constructing a VAR model is a proper choice of the 
lag length. Some researchers choose it arbitrarily allowing just enough lags to ensure 
that the residuals are white noise but maintaining the precision of estimates. There are 
also some procedures that determine the appropriate lag length such as the Akaike 
information criteria (AIC), the Schwartz information criteria (SIC) and the likelihood 
ratio (LR) test17. In our case the LR test is inconclusive, whereas the AIC and SIC tests 
find different optimal lag lengths to be employed. We think that just one lag suggested 
by the SIC test may not be enough to investigate the causal relationship over long 
periods. Therefore, we used the lag length suggested by the AIC test (three lags for the 
period before the crisis and six lags for the period after the crisis). In order to better 
                                                          
15 Our diagnostic tests reveal that the series have unit roots but are not cointegrated. Thus, we 
perform the analysis on first differences of CDS spreads. 
16 The idea of Granger-causality is explained further in Hamilton (1994). 
17 For more information about tests please refer to Lütkepohl, 2005. 
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check for the robustness, the test of the model with different lag values should be 
considered as well. 
In order to see changes in the existence of causality between CDS markets of 
different sovereigns we investigated two periods: a pre-crisis period (August 18, 2005 
– August 15, 2007)18 and a crisis period (November 14, 2007 – September 29, 2010)19.  
Figure 2.7 presents the results of the Granger-causality test. In the pre-crisis period 
we identify 13 cross-country causations. There are three interesting findings here. 
Firstly, changes in the Greek CDS market cause changes in the CDS markets of other 
Southern European countries (ex. Portugal and Spain), whereas the CDSs of Greece are 
not Granger-caused by CDSs of any other country. It can thus be suggested that the 
Greek CDS market could be the source of the problems even before the crisis started. 
Secondly, the CDSs of Spain affect the CDSs of Portugal but with no reciprocal effect. 
Thirdly, in the pre-crisis period there is a significant interdependence between the CDS 
markets of France and Germany. 
In the crisis period interdependencies between countries increased compared with 
the pre-crisis period (27 statistically significant casual relationships, at a probability 
level 0.1)20. It is interesting to note that during the crisis changes in the CDS spreads of 
Greece affect not only the CDS markets of Portugal and Spain as in the pre-crisis period, 
but also the CDSs of Ireland. The pre-crisis CDS market of Ireland Granger-causes only 
the CDSs of core EU countries with no reciprocal effect. Unexpectedly, changes in the 
Irish CDSs do not cause changes in the CDS markets of other PIIGS and only CDSs of 
Portugal and Greece have a significant causal effect on the Irish CDS market.  
                                                          
18 Since the data for the UK are available only for the period after November 2007 we did not perform 
the test on the UK for the pre-crisis period.  
19 To have a greater number of observations to determine causality we considered that the crisis 
period started after the credit crunch in August 2007 through the sovereign debt crisis. 
20 Results and significance levels can be found in Appendix D, Table D.7 and Table D.8 
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Figure 2.7. Granger-causality for the pre-crisis (left) and crisis period (right) 
Source: own calculations 
What is surprising is that among PIIGS the Portuguese CDS market Granger-causes 
changes in the CDS spreads of all the countries in the sample apart from France and 
Germany. The pre-crisis CDS spreads of Spain cause changes in the Italian, Portuguese 
and French CDS spreads. Besides, in contrast to the pre-crisis period the test reveals 
Granger-causality between CDS spreads of Portugal and Spain in both directions in the 
crisis period (one-third of the Portuguese debt is held by Spain).  
Among core EU countries the German CDS market exerts the highest impact and 
Granger-causes the CDSs of all the countries apart from Italy and Portugal. The CDS 
market of France affects only the CDSs of Ireland and Germany which along with Spain 
and the UK Granger-cause the French CDS market. The CDSs of the UK have a 
significant effect on the CDSs of Spain, France and Germany with the reciprocal effect 
of the German CDS market on the UK. The CDSs of the UK are also affected by some 






2.3.3 Impulse Response Analysis 
Impulse response analysis is often combined with Granger causality in order to 
understand the impact of one variable on the rest of variables in the system. In impulse 
response we introduce a shock to one of the variables of the model and examine how 
this shock spreads throughout the system in consecutive periods of time. In other words 
we are trying to understand the response of variables of the model to a shock on the 
value of a particular variable. In our case impulse response analysis can be informative 
in terms of understanding which country’s CDS market has the biggest impact on the 
rest of the countries and when the impact lasts the longest. 
We start from stationary K-dimensional VAR(p) model21, where p is a number of 
lags and number of dimensions (k) is equal to the number of countries in the sample, 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡,    (8) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a (K x 1) vector of observable time series variables, the 𝐴𝑗 (j = 1…p) are (K 
x K) coefficient matrices and 𝑢𝑡 is (Kx1) error term with 𝑢𝑡 ~ (0, Σ𝑢), where Σ𝑢 =
{𝜎𝑖𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2… ,𝐾}. When we represent the above process as a MA process we can 
obtain so called forecast error impulse responses 𝜙𝑠. 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜙1𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜙2𝑢𝑡−2 + ⋯,    (9) 
where: 
𝜙𝑠 = ∑ 𝜙𝑠−𝑗
𝑠
𝑗=1 𝐴𝑗 , 𝑠 = 1,2….       (10) 
and 𝜙0 = 𝐼𝐾   (11) 
 
                                                          
21 The classic handbook about the time series analysis, where a VAR models are well explained is 
Hamilton, J. D., 1994. “Time Series Analysis”, Princeton University Press 
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If we introduce a shock to the system by setting jth variable to a unit and the rest of 





]), then  𝜙𝑠 tells us the 
response of the whole system in the sth period after the introduction of the shock to the 
jth variable22.  
The main problem of the above approach to the impulse response function is the 
assumption that we introduce a shock only to one variable at a time. This assumption 
disregards possible correlations between shocks in variables and as we investigate 
contagion, cross-correlations are essential to us by definition. Thus, the problem is how 
to isolate the effect of a shock on a variable of interest from the influence of all other 
shocks. The most common approach is an orthogonalisation of a covariance matrix of 
error terms Σ𝑢.  By orthogonalisation we obtain a new matrix, which has zero non-
diagonal elements and thus solves the problem of the correlation of errors between 
variables.  
Unfortunately, simple orthogonalisation, such as the most common procedure – 
Choleski factorisation, cannot be a solution in our case as it is sensitive to the ordering 
of variables23. The first variable of the system, by construction, explains the other 
variables and hence the variable the least influenced by other variables should be 
chosen. Problem arises in case of contagion and financial systems as we assume that 
they constitute a highly interconnected network and it is very difficult to conclude a 
priori which country is the least influenced by the others. There is also a weak 
assumption that a shock hits the system only through a triggering variable and that there 
is no correlation between the initial shock in one country and another. 
                                                          
22 Forecast error impulse response is treated thoroughly in Lütkepohl (2005). 
23 More on Choleski orthogonalisation and non-orthogonal impulse response analysis in: Wang (2009), 
and Hans (1998). Orthogonalised Impulse Response is described in Lütkepohl (2005). 
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To address this issue we use the generalized impulse response function (GIRF) 
developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998), which is invariant to changes in ordering of 







), n=0,1,2….      (12) 
which is a (K x 1) vector of response to the shock in the jth equation at time t on xt+n , 
where 𝜙𝑛 is the n
th forecast error impulse response. If we set the shock in jth 
 variable to 
𝛿𝑗 = √𝜎𝑗𝑗, then the scaled generalized impulse response function shows the effect of 
this shock to expected value of the xt+n : 
𝛹𝑗
𝑔(𝑛) =  √𝜎𝑗𝑗𝜙𝑛 ∑𝑢𝑗, n = 0,1,2….     (13) 
An interesting feature of generalised impulse response is that it is equivalent to an 
orthogonal impulse response function for the first equation. This permits to calculate 
𝛹𝑗
𝑔(𝑛), j=1,2…K by calculating orthogonalized impulse response with each variable as 
a leading one. 
We calculated the generalized impulse response for the crisis period (November 14, 
2007 – September 29, 2010) and used six lags as in the Granger-causality test performed 
for the crisis period. We introduced a positive shock of one standard deviation to the 
spread of CDS of each country and observed changes in basis points. The positive shock 
to CDS spreads means an increase of the risk of default on the sovereign debt. The 
shock in GIRF is not independent for all variables. It hits the whole system according 
to correlations between CDS spreads of all countries. In general we can observe that 
the effect of the shock lasts for around 15 days and after that the whole system 
converges to the initial state. Below we present chosen results. 
From Figure 2.8 we can see that the response of the system is relatively strong to a 
shock in the Spanish and Irish CDS markets (in comparison with a similar shock in the 
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CDS markets of other PIIGS). A shock in Spain causes a turmoil in the CDS spreads of 
PIIGS, whereas it does not strongly affect core countries. Besides, the shock to the core 
transmits with some delay.  







Source: own calculations 
The response of the system to a shock in the French and German CDS markets is 
also strong, which is understandable considering the size of these economies. 
Interestingly, a shock in the Portuguese CDS market causes a strong response for 
PIIGS, whereas the response is rather weak for the core, which confirms the results of 
the Granger-causality test for Portugal. 
At the same time, the IR to a shock in the CDS market of Italy and the UK is 
relatively weak (with the exception of the Italian CDS market that reacts relatively 
strongly to shocks in the UK). Similarly, the response to a shock in the Greek CDS is 
weak, especially for Germany, France and the UK (Figure 2.9).  
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Figure 2.9. GIRF after one standard deviation shock in the Greek CDS 
 
Source: own calculations 
The Italian CDS market reacts to shocks stronger than the CDS markets of other 
countries in the sample, whereas the CDS market of the UK has one of the weakest 
responses. The latter could be explained by the fact that investors perceive the UK as 
the most immune to the Eurozone problems among the examined European countries. 
We performed a robustness test of the results of the impulse response analysis. 
Unfortunately, the strength and the persistence of responses are not robust to changes 
in the number of lags in the VAR model, however, the relative differences between 




2.3.4  Adjusted Correlation Analysis of CDS Spreads Before and After the 
Greek Bailout 
The Granger-causality test and the IR analysis were informative in studying the 
relationship between CDS markets of the countries in the sample. However, a VAR 
model requires a sufficient number of observations in order to determine causality. 
Therefore, for the VAR model we studied a longer crisis period that spanned from the 
credit crunch in August 2007 through the sovereign debt crisis until September 2010. 
Since the problems of Greece in March-April 2010 made financial markets extremely 
nervous it is also important to have a closer look at the relationship between CDS 
markets just around the period of the Greek bailout in May 2010. 
The unconditional Pearson correlation coefficient increases automatically with a 
surge in volatility during crisis times and, therefore, can provide misleading results24. 
Boyer (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggested the adjustment that considers 
















 is a Pearson coefficient that is calculated for each pair of 
sovereigns X and Y (we assume that sovereign X is a trigger); 𝜎X
#2and 𝜎X
𝐶2 are the 
variances of CDS spreads of the triggering sovereign before the crisis and during the 
crisis respectively. 
Inspecting equation (5) we see that the conditional correlation coefficient can 
increase because of the change in the underlying relationship between sovereigns and/or 
because of the change in volatility. Since we are interested in the increase in the 
                                                          
24 Discussion on this can be found in Kat (2002). 
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relationship itself we control for volatility by deriving the adjusted correlation 











                 (6) 
𝜌𝐴𝑑𝑗 can be interpreted as the correlation coefficient adjusted for the bias resulting 
from an increase in the volatility of CDS spreads during the crisis period. It is 
coefficient conditional on one of the countries in a correlated pair being in distress (in 
crisis). 
Corsetti et al. (2005) criticized this method of coefficient adjustment. They showed 
that if the data generating process includes a common factor (ex. interest rates or oil 
price increase) the adjustment also should depend on the common factor. However, we 
used the adjustment on the time series between August 2009 and September 2010 and 
thus eliminated the possible influence of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in our further analysis.  
In order to calculate the variance before the crisis 𝜎X
#2 we used the time series 
between August and October 2009 when the volatility and CDS spreads were quite 
low25. The variance during the crisis 𝜎X
𝐶2was calculated for two samples: the period 
before the first Greek bailout (November 2009 – April 2010) and after (May – 
September 2010)26.  
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 show adjusted correlation coefficients between CDS spreads 
of the studied countries. These tables are not symmetric because the value of the 
correlation depends on which sovereign is a trigger. For example, in Table 2.2 the 
                                                          
25  Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) warn against the use of long reference periods as this may bias 
the results. 
26  On May 2, 2010 Eurozone finance ministers approved a 110-billion-euro loan package for Greece 
over three years, with 80 billion euros coming from the bloc and the rest from the IMF. 
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correlation between CDS spreads of Greece and Italy is equal to 0.408 if Greece is a 
triggering country and 0.617 if it is Italy.  
1  is a triggering capacity of each sovereign. It is the sum over rows excluding the 
sovereign for which the value is calculated (i.e., the sum over rows minus one). n  is 
a vulnerability of each sovereign to a joint trigger of all other sovereigns. It is the sum 
over columns excluding the country for which the value is calculated (i.e., the sum over 
columns minus one).  
 Figure 2.10. Triggering capacity before and after the Greek bailout 
Source: own calculations 
 Figure 2.10 presents the triggering capacity 1  of each sovereign against its GDP. 
GDP serves as a proxy for the relative economic size and strength of each country in 
the sample. Thus, Germany is the powerhouse of Europe followed by France, the UK 
and Italy27. Besides, both before and after the Greek bailout the triggering capacity of 
Germany, France and the UK was considerably higher than that of PIIGS. Moreover, 
correlations of the CDS markets of Germany and France with the CDS markets of other 
                                                          
27 The ranking of countries may be different depending on which method to measure GDP is used. We 
use the World Economic Outlook Database of the IMF. We chose the GDP statistics calculated using 





sovereigns grew further after the Greek bailout. A possible explanation for this might 
be that these countries were the main sponsors of the Greek debt.  
Table 2.2 Adjusted correlations before the first Greek bailout. Triggering country 
is in column (November 2009 - April 2010) 
 Greece Italy Portugal Ireland Spain UK France Germany n
  
Greece 1 0.617 0.543 0.633 0.527 0.576 0.573 0.563 4.033 
Italy 0.408 1 0.651 0.615 0.72 0.743 0.688 0.66 4.485 
Portugal 0.429 0.741 1 0.657 0.708 0.655 0.666 0.668 4.524 
Ireland 0.461 0.656 0.603 1 0.585 0.595 0.546 0.58 4.026 
Spain 0.413 0.8 0.707 0.639 1 0.698 0.626 0.646 4.53 
UK 0.295 0.65 0.46 0.455 0.504 1 0.621 0.65 3.636 
France 0.329 0.637 0.518 0.454 0.478 0.668 1 0.791 3.876 
Germany 0.29 0.565 0.477 0.445 0.457 0.654 0.755 1 3.643 
1  2.625 4.667 3.96 3.898 3.979 4.59 4.475 4.558  
Source: own calculations 
 
Table 2.3. Adjusted correlations after the first Greek bailout. Triggering country 
is in column. (May - September 2010) 
 Greece Italy Portugal Ireland Spain UK France Germany n
  
Greece 1 0.427 0.554 0.488 0.451 0.483 0.625 0.58 3.608 
Italy 0.391 1 0.549 0.648 0.639 0.649 0.705 0.761 4.342 
Portugal 0.527 0.562 1 0.678 0.604 0.623 0.692 0.696 4.383 
Ireland 0.435 0.632 0.65 1 0.666 0.634 0.698 0.735 4.45 
Spain 0.431 0.658 0.609 0.699 1 0.591 0.678 0.75 4.416 
UK 0.273 0.438 0.403 0.439 0.371 1 0.652 0.7 3.276 
France 0.34 0.446 0.421 0.454 0.403 0.602 1 0.803 3.468 
Germany 0.271 0.457 0.38 0.444 0.428 0.601 0.762 1 3.343 
1  2.67 3.621 3.565 3.85 3.562 4.183 4.812 5.025  
Source: own calculations 
 
Ireland had the highest triggering capacity among PIIGS after the Greek bailout. It 
may be due to the unprecedented help of its government to the banking sector in 
September 2010. This pushed the Irish budget deficit up to around a third of GDP and 
later led to its EU-IMF bailout in November 2010. The triggering capacity of Italy 
before the Greek bailout was as high as that of core European countries but it dropped 
after the bailout to the levels of Spain and Portugal. Surprisingly, both before and after 
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the Greek bailout Greece had the lowest triggering capacity among countries in the 
sample. This result may possible be explained by the fact that once it became obvious 
that the Greek crisis is the European Union crisis the CDS market of Greece stopped 
being the only cause of the problems in the European CDS market. At the same time, 
the CDS markets of core EU countries became more important since the decisions of 
investors were mainly based on the probability of a bailout and the willingness of the 
core to rescue Greece. 
Overall, with the exception of Greece each of PIIGS has a triggering capacity of a 
similar strength. However, taking into consideration GDP levels we should bear in mind 
that Italy and Spain are much bigger economies than Greece, Ireland and Portugal and 
thus may pose a greater threat to the EU in case of default.  
Figure 2.11 displays the vulnerability n  of each country to a joint trigger against 
each country’s banking assets. Assets from the BIS data28 serve as a proxy for the 
capacity of each country in the sample to sustain the shock if it is triggered by any other 
sovereign. Here we see the opposite situation. Overall, in both periods PIIGS are more 
vulnerable to shocks than core European countries. Besides, the assets of PIIGS are 
considerably lower than those of the core to be able to absorb the shock from other 
countries. 
What is interesting is that both before and after the Greek bailout Greece was less 
vulnerable than other PIIGS. Vulnerability of Ireland before the bailout was at the same 
level as that of Greece but Ireland’s assets are considerably higher. Nevertheless, after 
the Greek bailout Ireland became more vulnerable. The most vulnerable country in the 
                                                          
28 We used the BIS data from March 2010 for the analysis before the Greek bailout and June 2010 for 




sample is Portugal which is both susceptible to shocks and has low assets to absorb 
them if it is triggered. 
Figure 2.11. Vulnerability to a joint trigger before and after the Greek bailout 
Source: own calculations 
Among core European countries France is the most vulnerable, with Germany not 
being far from French result, whereas, the UK has the highest assets (with London being 
one of the world’s largest financial centres) which makes it the least vulnerable to 
shocks. 
Thus, the adjusted correlation analysis confirms that core EU countries (Germany, 
France and the UK) have both high capacity to trigger other sovereigns and extensive 
assets to sustain the shock if they are triggered by other countries. On the contrary, 
Greece and other PIIGS (even Spain and Italy) have lower triggering capacity and 
considerably lower assets to absorb the shock. Hence they are more fragile to a 
worsening situation in other countries. The results also suggest that Portugal is the most 
vulnerable and the UK is the least vulnerable country in the sample. 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
This study was designed to examine sovereign risks and the occurrence of financial 
contagion in PIIGS, France, Germany and the UK. In order to explain the long-term 




extended time period spanning from August 2005, well before the global financial 
crisis, until September 2010. The analysis of the data showed that sovereign risk mainly 
concentrates in the EU countries and that core countries are heavily exposed to PIIGS. 
Since contagion is often characterized by increasing correlations we conducted the 
EWMA correlation analysis. We studied changes in correlations between CDS premia 
of countries in the sample after the “credit crunch” in August 2007, after the Lehman 
Brothers collapse, after the sovereign risk in Europe increased in November 2009 and 
shortly before the EU-IMF Greek bailout in May 2010. We found that there were 
several waves of contagion. The estimated EWMA correlations increased significantly 
already after the “credit crunch” and also confirmed the role of the global financial 
crisis in triggering the sovereign default risk. Similarly, the Granger-causality test 
revealed a huge rise in cross-country interdependencies after the global financial crisis 
as compared with the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, the IRF analysis showed that 
among PIIGS the CDS market of Spain and Ireland has the biggest impact on the 
European CDS market, whereas the CDS market of the UK does not cause a big distress 
in the Eurozone.  
In order to have a closer look at the behaviour of the CDS market before and after 
the first bailout of Greece in May 2010 we conducted the adjusted correlation analysis. 
It confirmed that in both periods Greece and other PIIGS (even Spain and Italy) have 
lower capacity to trigger contagion than core EU countries (Germany, France, the UK). 
Besides, Portugal is the most vulnerable country in the sample, whereas the UK is the 
most immune to shocks. 
Both descriptive and model-based evidence point to the fact that the Eurozone CDS 
market encountered more turbulence during the post-crisis period than before. No 
doubt, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 played its role in triggering the sovereign 
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default risk. Nevertheless, financial stability in the Eurozone was also undermined by 
the specific features of its institutional setup. Being left with no room for manoeuvre in 
setting their monetary and fiscal policy, Eurozone countries had to compete by 
adjusting their labour markets. Since historically core EU countries had higher real 
wages and stronger social policies they managed to shrink their unit labour costs better 
(with Germany in the lead) than the periphery. As a result, the core accumulated current 
account surpluses and dominated trade and capital flows in the Eurozone, whereas 
PIIGS experienced significant erosion of competitiveness leading to substantial current 
account deficits. These deficits were financed from abroad primarily in the form of 
lending by core Eurozone banks that laid the grounds for the excessive indebtedness of 
periphery to the core (Lapavitsas et al. (2010a, 2010b)).  
Accordingly, PIIGS had to deal with large fiscal imbalances already before the crisis. 
However, the weaknesses of the EU monetary and fiscal integration became even more 
apparent following the onset of the financial crisis as the situation in the triplet of 
current account deficit, budget deficit and debt to GDP ratio of PIIGS aggravated 
further. Since credit default swaps are written on government bonds the CDS market 
quickly reacted to a significant deterioration in the domestic fiscal metrics of PIIGS 
with wider and more diverse spreads. However, markets reappraised the risks not only 
for PIIGS, but also for core EU economies as the Eurozone countries are highly 
integrated economically and financially (via national banking systems). It resulted in 
stronger causalities between CDS markets in the Eurozone during the post-crisis period.  
We have to bear in mind that the empirical results presented in this paper considered 
changes that happened only in the CDS market. This means that there could be other 
channels through which contagion could spread. Moreover, our analysis was performed 
only on the time series until September 2010. Since the situation in the Eurozone is 
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constantly changing it would also be interesting to look at the behaviour of the CDS 
market of studied countries after that period. Furthermore, the analysis can be easily 
extended to a larger set of the European Union countries (for instance, new EU 
members) and thus the findings of this chapter leave room for future research.  
Though informative, the applied methods are insufficient to clearly answer the 
question which country would be the next weakest link in case of default of some 
country. We believe that the use of the network approach may further clarify the issue. 
In future work we will conduct stress tests on the financial network among sovereigns 
interconnected according to their debt relationships. It will help us to understand the 
impact of a possible credit event on the structure of the network and the survival of all 




Chapter 3  
Financial Contagion: Evidence From the US 
CDS Market (2007) 
Abstract 
Credit default swaps (CDS) which constitute up to 98% of credit derivatives have 
had a unique, endemic and pernicious role to play in the current financial crisis. 
However, there are few in depth empirical studies of the financial network 
interconnections among banks and between banks and nonbanks involved as CDS 
protection buyers and protection sellers. The ongoing problems related to technical 
insolvency of US commercial banks is not just confined to the so called legacy/toxic 
RMBS assets on balance sheets but also because of their credit risk exposures from 
SPVs (Special Purpose Vehicles) and the CDS markets. The dominance of a few big 
players in the chains of insurance and reinsurance for CDS credit risk mitigation for 
banks’ assets has led to the idea of “too interconnected to fail” resulting, as in the case 
of AIG, in having to maintain the fiction of non-failure in order to avert a credit event 
that can bring down the CDS pyramid and the financial system. 
Quantitative analysis is confined to the empirical reconstruction of the US CDS 
network based on the FDIC Q4 2008 data in order to conduct a series of stress tests that 
investigate the consequences of the fact that top 5 US banks account for 92% of the US 
bank activity in the $34 tn global gross notional value of CDS for Q4 2008. The May 
stability condition for networks is considered for the hub like dominance of a few 
financial entities in the US CDS structures to understand the lack of robustness. We 
also construct a random graph which is equivalent to the empirically based CDS 
network in terms of connectivity and the same aggregate gross CDS buy and sell levels 
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as given by the data. Next we use the Furfine (2003) approach to model the cascade of 
bank failures for both, the actual small world topology of the CDS network and for the 
equivalent random graph. We propose a Systemic Risk Ratio calculated for each 
financial intermediary as the percentage loss in aggregate core capital of the whole 
system as a result of the failure of a given bank or non-bank CDS market participant. 
Our results show that the propagation of the shock in both types of network is radically 
different and the less interconnected system is in some respects more dangerous. 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Financial Networks Approach 
Theoretical and empirical studies of financial networks for purposes of analysing 
systemic risk implications of the banking sector have progressed somewhat.29Typically 
in a financial network, the nodes are the financial institutions and there are in-degrees 
representing obligations from others and out-degrees represent a financial entity’s 
obligations to others. Financial networks have small world network properties like other 
real world socio-economic, communication and information networks such as the 
www. These manifest in what is regarded to be a statistical signature of complex 
systems, namely, high concentrations of in or out degrees to and from a few members 
with a so called skewed or power law degree distribution and high clustering 
coefficients which are brought about by many connected via a few hubs with high 
interconnectivity between the hubs.30 The consequence of this is short path lengths 
between a node and any other node in the system. This is efficient in terms of liquidity 
and informational flows in good times but equally pose fragility in bad times when so 
                                                          
29 Allen and Babus (2008) give a survey of the use of network theory in finance.  
30 Giansante (2009) uses an agent based evolutionary framework to show how the dynamics of financial 
network formation starting with undifferentiated traders results in high clustering and a hub formation 
of a few agents who acquire distinct characteristics of financial intermediaries. 
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called hub banks fail or suffer illiquidity. In other words, the hub banks certainly 
accelerate the speed of financial contagion among themselves. But structurally, as we 
will see, they can contain the liquidity shocks and prevent them from going to the 
extremities, but only if there are adequate buffers. Haldane (2009) calls such hub banks 
‘super-spreaders’ and we will retain this epithet in the financial network modelling that 
follows. Haldane (2009) recommends that super-spreaders should have larger buffers.31 
He notes that the current system does the reverse. The presence of highly connected 
and contagion causing players typical of a complex system network perspective is to be 
contrasted with what economists regard to be an equilibrium network. Recently, Babus 
(2009) states that in “an equilibrium network the degree of systemic risk, defined as the 
probability that a contagion occurs conditional on one bank failing, is significantly 
reduced”. Indeed, the premise of “too interconnected to fail” which we find to be the 
empirical characteristic of the network topology of the CDS market involving US banks 
indicates that the drivers of network formation in the real world are different from those 
assumed in economic equilibrium models. 
Other aspects of the Haldane (2009) contagion perspective while interesting are of 
less practical use. He uses the physical manifestations of epidemics as an analogy for 
financial contagions and focuses on contagion spreading and contagion inhibiting 
characteristics (in the forms of “hide” or “flight”) that are found in epidemiology as 
being applicable to a financial contagion. While cash hoarding (“hide”) and fire sales 
(“flight”) are individually rational behaviour to rectify a bank’s balance sheet under 
threat of losses in asset value, they halt the contagion by system failure which is unlike 
the case with the “hide” and “flight” responses in the spread of disease. Further, these 
                                                          
31 This is one way to interpret, as Haldane (2009) did, the parable of the two watch makers, Horus and 
Tempus, in Herbert Simon’s classic on the Sciences of the Artificial.  The capacity of the system not to 
unravel fully every time there is a liquidity shock, may have to brought about by design.  
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are too generic in terms of bank behaviour and do not address the unique developments 
that correspond to the CDS obligations. On dwelling on the physical manifestations of 
epidemics as an analogy for financial contagions, what is obscured in the Haldane 
(2009) narrative is the underling Red Queen like arms race, we discussed above, 
between the virus/parasite and the host and their respective capacities to mutate and 
produce countervailing measures of resistance. Level pegging at this underlying level 
of the arms race will produce premptive containment before any symptom of an 
epidemic. Also to complete the epidemiological analogy of viruses attacking beyond 
known hosts, we have infectious jumps across asset classes with the crisis having started 
in the credit system and moving to the equity market and vice versa are well known. 
Thus, in the design of robust regulatory systems, there are no obvious regulatory 
boundaries. In summary, the most important aspect of Haldane (2009) is on the 
implications of the network topology for the spreading of contagion and is in keeping 
with the approach in this paper. We will sharpen the stability analysis of the empirical 
financial network linkages for US banks from CDS networks using the May criteria. 
It must be noted that the financial network approach has actively been studied 
especially in the case of interbank markets for their role in the spread of financial 
contagion (see, Freixas et. al. (2000), Furfine (2003), Upper (2007)) and Nier et.al. 
(2007). However, some of the earlier work remained cursory exercises on abstract 
models of financial networks. Further, the use of the maximum entropy method32 for 
the construction of the matrix of bilateral obligations of banks which results in a 
                                                          
32 The maximum entropy method is explained in Upper and Worms (2004) and in Castrén and Rancan 
(2013). In general it is based on the principle of maximum entropy, which states that the best solution 
to the optimisation problem, in our case of reconstructing the weighed adjacency matrix of financial 
network, is the one where entropy (i.e. the amount of possible information, uncertainty) is maximal 
of all other possible solutions. This, unfortunately leads to the most uniform possible (under given 




complete network structure for the system as a whole, greatly vitiates the potential for 
network instability or contagion.33 This is a far cry, as we will show, from the sparse 
matrices implied by complex system real world network structures with highly skewed 
operational characteristics of participants. Latterly, there has been a number of studies 
which conduct an empirical mapping of interbank markets for their propensity for 
financial contagion in different countries (see, Wells (2004) for the UK, Iyer and 
Peydro-Alcade (2005), Iyer and Peydro-Alcade (2006) for India, Müller (2006), 
Sheldon and Maurer (1998) for Switzerland, Boss et al. (2004) for the Austria). The 
discussion in this area can be found in Chapter 2 ‘Assessing the systemic implications 
of financial linkages’ by Jorge Chan-Lau et al. (2009) who cite the work at the Bank of 
Mexico (Marquiz-Diez-Canedo and Martinez-Jaramillo (2007)), and the forthcoming 
risk assessment model for systemic institutions (RAMSI) at the Bank of England 
(Aikman et al. 2009). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that till very recently, neither 
regulators nor academics have identified the significance of modelling and monitoring 
inter-institutional financial exposures, using the financial networks involved for stress 
tests for financial stability. This is particularly pertinent for new financial institutions 
such as the CDS market actively being promoted for interbank risk management in the 
Basel II regulation. 
3.1.2 CDS Market Analysis of Financial Contagion  
The CDS market premia integrate market expectations on solvency conditions of 
reference entities and hence the study of correlations of CDS premia across different 
classes of firms such as non-financial, financial and also sovereign debt can give an 
indication of the extent to which the economic contagion has spread and also the 
                                                          
33 For a recent criticism of the entropy method in the construction of networks, see, the 2010 ECB 
Report on Recent Advances in Recent Advances in Modeling Systemic Risk Using Network Analysis.  
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direction of future defaults. However, there are few papers which study the role played 
by CDS in financial contagion and the main ones of Jorian and Zhang (2007) and Gex 
and Coudert (2010) use correlation as a measure of contagion in the CDS market. Gex 
and Coudert (2010)  study the evolution of correlations between CDS premia of 226 
five year maturity contracts on major US and European firms that constitute the 
respective CDX and ITraxx CDS indexes. They aim to see if the crisis experienced by 
General Motors and Ford in May 2005 had repercussions for the corporate CDS market. 
Gex and Coudert (2010)  use a dynamic measure of correlations across CDS premia of 
obligor firms in the form of the Exponentially Weighted Moving Averages (EWMA) 
and Dynamic Conditional Heteroskedasticity (DC-GARCH). They find evidence that 
crisis surrounding the big car manufacturers did affect the CDS premia for other 
corporate entities in both the US and Europe for a limited period of a week. As noted 
in a recent talk, Gex (2009) indicated that the detection of a structural break with an 
upward jump in sovereign CDS premia post the Lehman debacle (something which did 
not occur at the time of the above mentioned GM crisis in the corporate sector) is 
evidence that the moral hazard costs of tax payer bailouts of the financial sector have 
now transferred in a persistent way to sovereign risk. The 2009 ECB CDS report has 
also identified so called wrong way risk which is measured as the correlation in the 
CDS spreads of CDS sellers and their respective reference entities, and finds this has 
grown for sellers of CDS which rely on government bailout and then sell CDS with 
their respective sovereigns as reference entities.   
The distress dependence approach, Chan-Lau et al (2009), and the distress intensity 
matrix approach, Giesecke and Kim (2009), are also noteworthy as important 
complimentary means of monitoring the direction in which a financial contagion is 
likely to spread. 
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Econometric model of CDS use by US banks by Minton et. al (2005) covers the 
period of 1999 to 2003. They regress CDS (buy/sell) on a number of bank balance sheet 
items. Econometric analysis is hampered by a lack of enough time series data. They 
conclude that banks that are net CDS protection buyers are also likely to engage in asset 
securitization, originate foreign loans and have lower capital ratios. However, structural 
systemic risk implications to banks from the CDS market are hard to assess within such 
econometric models. 
The full structural mapping of the network interrelationships between banks in terms 
of their balance sheet and off balance sheet activities would need network modelling 
especially to bring about the endogenous dynamic network link attachment and 
breaking that characterizes the different phases of boom and bust cycle. The dynamic 
changes in interlinkages signalling successful or failed payments and the dynamic 
matrix thereof is an essential part of estimating bank failure from contagion arising 
from an initial trigger event. Ball park figures of net core capital losses for each 
financial institution involved can be obtained for different scenarios. In contrast, the 
complementary approaches for assessing systemic risk discussed by Jorge Chan-Lau 
et. al. (2009) such as the co-risk model (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008)), the distress 
dependence approach (Chan-Lau et al (2009)) and the distress intensity matrix approach 
(Giesecke and Kim (2009)) while useful in a diagnostic way have the disadvantages of 
reduced form models. That is, unravelling and changed behaviour of institutions under 
stress which set in motion non-linear negative feedback loops are impossible to track 
in frameworks other than a network one. 
In the recent years the literature on measuring the systemic risk has grown 
significantly, most of the research effort has been put to market price based methods, 
although some has been developed on basis of financial network analysis. Segoviano 
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and Goodhart (2004) proposed a CDS premium based banking stability index. Some 
other methods of systemic risk measures are: Castrén and Kovonius (2009) proposed 
distance to distress (DD) measure, Marginal System Expected Shortfall presented in 
Acharya et al. (2010), Shapley-Value based measure by Tarashev et al. (2010), Distress 
Insurance Premium (Huang et al. (2012)) and Macroprudential capital by Gauthier et 
al. (2012). An example of systemic risk measure based in network framework is Debt 
Rank developed by Battiston et al. (2012). 
The chapter has been published as a part of  Markose et al. (2010), which presents 
broader analysis of the implications of crisis on the CDS market and shows lack of 
robustness of the CDS financial network in the context of Basel II regulations. This 
chapter focuses on the importance of different topologies of CDS financial network. 
The ideas presented here were deepen by Markose et al. (2012), where the super-
spreader tax for the too-interconnected-to-fail institutions is proposed. The tax is based  
on idea of the eigenvector centrality and is proportional to the systemic importance of 
the financial intermediary. 
In the context of needing to monitor the financial sector for systemic risk 
implications on an ongoing basis, without a multi-agent simulation framework capable 
of digitally recording fine grained data bases of the different financial players involved 
and also mapping the links between sectors, we are condemned to sector by sector 
analysis or a simplistic modelling of interrelations between sectors often assumed for 
analytical tractability. The empirical mapping of the US CDS obligation in CDS banks 
undertaken in this chapter is part of a larger EC COMISEF project which is concerned 
with developing a multi-agent based computational economics framework that can 
articulate and demonstrate the interrelationships of the financial contagion with a view 
to aid policy analysis. 
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3.2 Financial Networks: Theory and Empirics for the US 
CDS Obligations  
The core thesis of the diversification claims for credit risk transfer of underlying 
default risk on bank loans by using CDS credit derivatives has been found not to have 
delivered in practice. It is the purpose of this section to see to what extent this is due to 
the typical structures of real world financial networks which imply vulnerability of the 
system from hub like core banks and hence of highly correlated pathways emanating 
from them to the rest of the system. The term ‘too interconnected to fail’ has entered 
the lexicon of the recent crisis. We will also briefly discuss the technical aspects of 
network topology and their stability conditions as studied by May (May, 1972, 1973) 
and recently extended by Sinha (2005) and Sinha and Sinha (2006). A digital and 
empirical map of the highly interconnected links from CDS obligations among US 
banks is constructed to highlight issues relating to a structural model of financial 
contagion, systemic risk and the extent to which the delivery of promised protection via 
CDS and credit risk transfer is feasible.  
3.2.1 Some Properties of Socio-Economic Networks 
Considerable empirical work has been done by physicists, econo-physicists and 
biologists on the network properties of the world wide web (www) (Watts and Strogatz 
(1998), Watts (1999), Newman (2003)), socio-economic networks on chains of 
influence and co-authorships (Jackson and Watts (2002), Jackson (2005)) and 
biological networks, Montoya and Solé (2001). These networks have been found to 
have so called “small world” network structures which though distinct from those for 
text book prototypes of random, regular and scale free networks, share important 
properties with them. Networks are mainly characterized by - (a) the density of 
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connectivity between nodes with high local interconnectivity called clustering; (b) the 
links between nodes measured in terms of path lengths; and (c) when direction of links 
matter differentiated as in degrees and out degrees, the so called degree distribution in 
either direction represents distribution of links to and from nodes. Small world networks 
have dense local clusters as in regular networks but globally have properties of a 
random network with short path lengths between one node and any other node. 34 
Note in a random network and a small world one, the average shortest path between 
any two randomly chosen agents is found to be “small” and bounded by the logarithm 
of the total number of nodes in the system. In contrast, in regular networks while nodes 
are highly interconnected locally, the distance in terms of average links needed between 
a given node and another node randomly selected from the system is high. 
Finally, small world networks are characterised by a highly skewed fat tailed or 
power law distribution in terms of large number of connections (in-degrees and out 
degrees), market share and payoffs concentrated amongst a relatively few nodes, 
Barabási and Albert (1999). This makes small world networks structurally different 
from the random and regular networks. In the latter all nodes have equal numbers of 
links to and from them, while in a random network the degree distribution is 
exponentially or Gaussian distributed. To generate power law statistics for nodes either 
in terms of their size or the numbers of links to/from them, Barabási and Albert (1999) 
propose a process called preferential attachment, whereby nodes acquire size or 
numbers of links in proportion to their existing size or connectivity. In the context of 
the CDS market, a key role is played by AAA rated CDS sellers within the Basel II 
framework. Further, we propose to model the connectivity of each CDS participant 
                                                          
34  This is named after the work of the sociologist Stanley Milgram (1967) on the six degrees of 
separation in that everybody is linked to everybody  else in a communication type network by no 
more than six indirect links. 
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using the market share data in the CDS market. Due to the asymmetry in market shares 
and hence in the degree distribution, these highly connected nodes have the potential to 
be greatly disruptive for the system as a whole. In the context of banks and their 
interrelations such highly connected nodes become “super-spreaders” (see Haldane, 
2009) during contagion like situations. Despite the potential for instability of highly 
connected systems, as we will see, the strength of clustered hub like structures as 
opposed to their randomly connected counterparts appears to be that the rate of 
deterioration leading to full demise of the system as whole is more gradual in clustered 
structures than in the random networks. 
The properties of the broad classes of networks are summarized in Table 3.1. The 
diagonal elements describe the small world networks and note how they share some 
features with text book network prototypes, but also differ from them.  Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2 show the hub like structures of a small world network and also the contrast 
between the exponential degree distribution of a random graph and the skewed degree 
distribution of a small world network.  
Table 3.1. Properties of Networks: Diagonal Elements Characterize Small World 
Networks  





Average Path Length 
Degree 
Distribution 
Regular High High 
Equal and fixed 
In/Out degrees to 
each node 
Random Low Low Exponential 
Scale Free / Power 
Law 
Low Variable Fat Tail Distribution 
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Figure 3.1. A graphical representation of random graph (left) and small world 
graph with hubs (right) 
 
Source: Markose et. al. (2004) 
Figure 3.2. Degree distributions 
 
Source: Markose et. al. (2004) 
3.2.2 Some technical notes on network statistics and stability analysis  
As the phenomena of too interconnected to fail and the speed of systemic collapse 
depend on the network topology, the technical definitions for the network properties of 
A graphical representation of random graph 
and small world graph with hubs, Markose et. al. 
2004
Degree distributions, Markose et al 2004
Degree distribution 






of the network with 
fat tails; 20% has 
80% of in degrees
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the bilateral relations given by the adjacency matrix, connectivity, clustering and path 
length will be given here.  
In financial networks, nodes which will be generically referred to as agents stand for 
financial entities such as banks, other intermediaries and/or their customers. The edges 
or connective links represent flows of liquidity and/or obligations to make payments 
and receive payments. There is a fixed and finite set of such players, N={1,2,3,…..,n}, 
with n > 3. We can consider all manner of groupings i.e. subsets of N, {S  N, S  }. 
The network structure will be denoted as gt as at each time t, t=1,2,….., the network 
can be altered by exogenous circumstances or by agents making and breaking links.  
Let i and j be two members of the set N. When a direct link originates with i and 
ends with j, viz. an out degree for i, we say that it represents payments for which i is 
the guarantor this will be denoted by ( ji, ). A link from j to i yields an in degree for i 
and represents cash inflows or financial obligations from j to i. If vice versa, we have  
( ji, ). The latter yields an in degree for i from j. If the links exist in both directions we 
will denote it as ),( ji . Note, an agent’s out degrees corresponding to the number of its 
immediate neighbours is denoted by ki. We will use directed graphs, as we aim to model 
agents as having complete discretion over the initiation of any link that they may choose 
to form. In a system of linkages modelled by undirected graphs, the relationships 
between N agents when viewed in NxN matrix form will produce a symmetric matrix 
as a link between two agents will produce the same outcome whichever of the two 
partners initiated it. In contrast, directed graphs are useful to study relative asymmetries 
and imbalances in link formation and their weights.  
Key to the network topology is the bilateral relations between agents and is given by 
the adjacency matrix. Denote the (N+1) x (N+1) adjacency matrix X = (xij)




1, for short ) if there is a link between i and j and xij=0, if not. The N+1th agent in 
our model will represent the non-bank participants in the CDS market. The set of agent 
i’s ki direct neighbours i = { j, j  i, such that xij = 1} gives the list of those to whom 
which i has to make payments or other financial obligations. The adjacency matrix can 
give the gross financial obligations between N+1 financial entities in terms of 
proportions of their respective total gross obligations as follows:  








0 𝑥12 ⋯ 𝑥1𝑗 ⋯ 𝑥1𝑁+1 
𝑥21 0 ⋯ 𝑥2𝑗 ⋯ 𝑥2𝑁+1 
⋮ ⋮ 0 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯
𝑥𝑖1 ⋮ ⋯ 0 ⋯ 𝑥𝑖𝑁+1 
⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋯ 0 ⋯









Θ = ∑ 𝐵𝑗       𝐵1        ⋯         𝐵𝑗       ⋯         𝑗 𝐵𝑁+1 
,








The summation for each row across the columns, Gi = 
j
ijx , represents the gross 
payment obligations that i is guarantor for. In the CDS market, Gi represents i’s 
obligations as a CDS protection seller. The summation of each column j across the row 
entries 
i
ijj xB  represents payments from i for which j is the beneficiary or j’s 
exposure to all other i banks. In the CDS market, Bj, represents the CDS cover j is 
entitled to from others as a CDS buyer. The zeros along the diagonal imply that banks 
do not lend to themselves or self-insure (see, Upper, 2007). There can be asymmetry of 
entries such that for instance B1 need not equal G1. For example, in the case where bank 
1 is only a CDS buyer, G1 is zero while B1 is not. Section 3.4 discusses how entries for 
matrix X is obtained for the CDS obligations of the 26 US banks.  
3.2.2.1 Connectivity of a network: 
Connectivity is a statistic that measures the extent of links between nodes relative to 
all possible links in a complete graph. For a directed graph, denoting the total number 
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 and N is the total number of nodes, connectivity of a 




3.2.2.2 Clustering Coefficient: 
Clustering in networks measures how interconnected each agent’s neighbours are 
and is considered to be the hallmark of social and species oriented networks. 
Specifically, there should be an increased probability that two of an agent’s neighbours 
are also neighbours of one another. For each agent with ki neighbours the total number 
of all possible directed links between them is given by ki (ki-1). Let Ei denote the actual 
number of links between agent i’s ki neighbours, viz. those of i’s ki neighbours who are 
also neighbours. The clustering coefficient Ci for agent i is given by 






The clustering coefficient of the network as a whole is the average of all Ci’s and is 
given by 







Note that the clustering coefficient for a random graph is  
  Crandom = p. 
                                                          
35 Numerically, Ei  is calculated as follows.  Using the NxN adjacency matrix X = (aij)N with aij=1 (aij1 , for short) if there is a link 
between i and j and aij=0, if not.   Agent i’s ki neighbours  i   =  {  j , j  i, s.t aij = 1} ,  Ei   for a directed graph is calculated as Ei = 

 i ij m
jma
1
 , j  m.      
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This is because in a random graph the probability of node pairs being connected by 
edges are by definition independent, so there is no increase in the probability for two 
agents to be connected if they were neighbours of another agent than if they were not.  
3.2.2.3 Average Path Length: 
A useful measure of the distance between two agents is given by the number of 
directed edges that separate them and this is referred to as their path length. In a random 
graph, the average shortest path length between all (i,j) pairs denoted by 








If we keep the average number of degrees constant, i.e. Np = z, we see that the 
average path length increases logarithmically with the size N of the network. Random 
networks have quite a short path length which is due to the fact that many “shortcuts” 
between nodes arise from the random nature of the connections. In small world 
networks, the possibility of random reconnections enable two randomly chosen nodes 
in a network to have short path lengths. Regular networks miss these shortcuts and 
hence the average path length between an agent and a far flung one will be significantly 
longer. The exact path length depends crucially on the form of the network generated. 
Scale-free networks show an average path length which in most cases is also 
proportional to the logarithm of the network size, but the details depend on the way the 
preferential attachment is modelled. 
3.2.3 May Condition for Network Stability 
The analysis of stability of highly clustered networks has been influenced by the 
work of Robert May, in his papers (May 1972, 1974) May seminally extended the 
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Wigner stability condition. The work was the first to show that stability of dynamical 
system based on the network will dependent on the size, density and connections 
strength of the network. This work can be extended to financial networks (see Markose 
et al. (2012)). 
Here we will give a brief discussion of the May condition for network stability in 
the context of small world networks. May (1972, 1974) derived the critical threshold 
below which any random network has a high probability of stability in terms of 3 
parameters, N, the size of the network in terms of the total number of nodes, density of 
connections, D, and the strength of average interactions between nodes,  The network 
stability condition can be given equivalently as : 
.1ND  
The May stability condition implies that on increasing the complexity of a network 
measured by its size (N), density of connections (D) and the strength of average 
interactions between nodes () increases the instability of the network. This created 
controversy as complexity is associated with diversity and the latter is understood to be 
tantamount to stability. However, this condition was originally shown in May (1972) to 
be true for a random graph. As the random graph construction in May (1972) does not 
have the high clustering that is associated with complex small world networks which 
manifest the property that interactions between species and social interactions are not 
random, it became important to demonstrate what bearing the small world network 
properties of clustering and hub formations will have on the May stability condition for 
networks. Sinha (2005) and Sinha and Sinha (2006) found that the transition point 
between stability and instability with respect to the given parameters (N, D and  does 
not differ between random and small world networks. However, they found that the 
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speed and manner in which these different network systems transited into instability 
differed. An unstable clustered network system will disintegrate much less 
comprehensively than an unstable random network system. These aspects of network 
stability will be investigated for the US CDS network for banks. As far as the authors 
are aware, this may be the first analysis of the May type stability properties of financial 
networks.   
3.3 The Network Topology of US CDS Financial 
Interrelations 
The key to constructing the network interrelationships between the 26 US banks in 
their CDS activity is the relative CDS market shares of the banks involved. This reflects 
the notion of preferential attachment that Barabási and Albert (1999) and others relate 
to power law outcomes in complex systems. From Table 3.2 columns 2 and 3, we see 
that the top 3 banks ranked in terms of their dominance in this market (JP Morgan, 
Citibank and Bank of America) account for 83% of the total CDS purchases (and sales) 
for US banks. Note, this also follows the same rank in terms of the value of their assets. 
Goldman Sachs is the 4 largest CDS player and with its inclusion,36 these 4 banks 
account for about 92% of CDS activity for US banks. The CDS network is a directed 
graph with inward links (in degrees) representing purchases and out-going links (out 
degrees) representing the cover provided by the bank. As already discussed, the role of 
non-bank CDS providers in the form of the Monolines, hedge funds and other non-US 
bank insurers is important in that not all of the $7.89 tn CDS cover bought by US banks 
is from within the US banking sector.  We refer to the non-US bank components as the 
‘outside entity’.  
                                                          
36 Note, in terms of assets, Goldman Sachs is ranked 11 and Wells Fargo which is the 4 th largest in terms of assets (now that 
Wachovia has been taken over),  ranks only 13 in terms of CDS activity. 
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Table 3.2. US Banks CDS Market Share as CDS Buyer and Seller; Gross 
(Net)Notional CDS on Reference Entities (DTCC, Q4 2008) 
 Bank  
CDS Market Share   
(1)Buy 





(3)Buy Side (% 
26 banks and 
outside entity) 
(4)Sell Side 
(% 26 banks 
and outside 
entity) 
(5)DTCC Data on 
Gross37 (Net) 
Notional Value 
CDS on a 
Reference Entity 
(Nov. 2008) $ bn 
JP Morgan 0.53 0.54 0.38 0.39    63.358 (4.457) 
Citibank 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.12    66.637 (4.461) 
Bank of America 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09    51.947  (3.965) 
Goldman Sachs USA 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06     94.039 (6.203) 
HSBC USA 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04     26.600 (2.086) 
Wachovia 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01     45.921 (3.401) 
Morgan Stanley 0.003 0 0.002 0     93.274 (4.457) 
Merrill Lynch USA 0.0011 0 0.0008 0     95.031 (6.183) 
Keybank 4.91E-04 4.28E-04 0.0004 0.0003      0 
PNC 2.53E-04 1.36E-04 0.0002 0.0001      0 
National City  1.63E-04 1.22E-04 0.0001 0.0001      0 
Bank of New York 
Mellon 1.49E-04 2.59E-07 1.08E-04 1.84E-07      0 
Wells Fargo 1.31E-04 6.31E-05 9.51E-05 4.48E-05      45.18  (3.441) 
SunTrust 7.41E-05 2.53E-05 5.37E-05 1.80E-05      0 
                                                          
37 The DTCC CDS data on single name reference entities is obtained from http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/ 
 In terms of gross notional CDS values reported for reference entities, the Monolines, Ambac accounts for $34.573 bn, FSA for 
$22.960 bn and MBIA for $53.274 bn.  The Monoline/insurance company share is roughly 30% of the total financial non US 
bank CDS sector which we have estimated to be around $369.357 bn.   
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Northern Trust 2.98E-05 0 2.16E-05 0      0 
State Street and Trust 1.84E-05 0 1.33E-05 0      0 
Deutsche Bank 
Americas 1.27E-05 0.00E+00 9.18E-06 0      68.48 (8.608) 
Regions 9.70E-06 5.26E-05 7.03E-06 3.74E-05      0 
U.S. Bank 8.04E-06 0 5.83E-06 0      0 
Commerce 2.20E-06 3.93E-06 1.60E-06 2.79E-06     0 
MERCANTIL 
COMMERCEBANK 1.33E-06 0 9.64E-07 0     0 
Associated Bank 9.50E-07 1.56E-05 6.88E-07 1.11E-05     0 
Comerica 6.68E-07 5.89E-06 4.84E-07 4.18E-06     0 
Signature 3.80E-07 0 2.75E-07 0     0 
RBS Citizens 0 7.18E-06 0 5.09E-06     0 
Mitsubishi UFJ 0 6.47E-06 0 4.59E-06     0 
Outside Entity (Non 
US Banks) -- -- 0.2755 0.2904 
    369.357 
(31.693) 
Source : FDIC 2008 Q4 for data in columns 1 and 2;  columns 3 and 4  are  computed using the  
algorithm in text; column 5 reports DTCC data on gross notional (net notional) on single name 
reference entities as it applies to these 26 US banks and the NDFIs such as Monolines      
Our algorithm assigns in degrees and out degrees for a bank in terms of its respective 
market shares for CDS purchases and sales. Thus, JP Morgan with a 53% share will 
approximately have direct links (in and out) with 14 banks and these are arranged 
assortatively, i.e. 14 banks are chosen from the largest to the smallest in terms of their 
CDS activity. The following describes the algorithm that creates the CDS network and 
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the CDS values being bought and sold between banks and the non US bank entity. Here, 
N banks are indexed as i = 1, 2, … N. The N+1 agent is the ‘outside’ non-US banks and 
NDFIs. 
Gi :  Gross Notional Amount of CDS for which Banki is guarantor 
Bi :  Gross Notional Amount of CDS for which Banki is beneficiary 
SGi = 
G
G i  : Banki  market share on the sell side of CDS 
SBi = 
B
Bi  : Banki  market share on the buy side of CDS 
Let ijj
G
i   where 
G
i  refers to bank i.’s direct ‘neighbours’(counterparties 
here) to whom it supplies (or buys from, 
B
i ) CDS. The number of banks j that a bank 





. The algorithm then 
allocates to each of bank i’s counterparties, ijj
G
i  , a value of CDS sales equal 







j GGS , then bank i sells the remaining to the external non-
US bank entity which is the N+1 agent.  To satisfy the demand for CDS cover, Bj for 











remaining is bought from the external entity.  
The adjacency matrix (see,  Table F.1 in Appendix F for 2008 Q4) so constructed using 
the above algorithm will have CDS sales Gi along the rows and the columns give the 
purchases Bj.  The bilateral exposures between a pair of banks can be read off 
accordingly xij denotes gross CDS protection from i to j and xji is gross protection cover 
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from j to i. Hence, the size of bilateral net sell amount is given by (xij - xji) >0.  The 
algorithm also determines the US CDS market share of the outside entity to be 29.04% 
as CDS seller and 27.5% as CDS buyer, see Table 3.2. The matrix in Table A.2 is a 
sparse matrix with a very high concentration of activity. This is graphed below in Figure 
3.3. 
In Figure 3.3, the largest pink node represents JP Morgan as dominant net seller in the 
system. The pure blue circles are banks that are sole buyers (these include Morgan 
Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Northern Trust, State Street and Trust, Deutsche Bank, US 
Bank and Signature), while the light blue nodes are net buyers and the larger of these 
represent Bank of America and Citigroup. An entity that is exclusively a CDS 
protection seller is marked in red (there are no such entities) while net sellers are marked 
in light pink. The pink triangular node represents the ‘outside entity’ constituted by 
NDFIs and non US banks involved in the CDS market and is a net seller as is required. 
On the buy side, the outside entity accounts for about $3 tn of CDS sold to it by the US 
banks and on the sell side it accounts for about $3.2 tn (see   Table F.1 in Appendix F) 
and hence in terms of dominance, the non-US CDS bank sector comes second after JP 
Morgan.  
We also generate a random graph with the same aggregate gross CDS buy and sell 
amounts as in the empirically constructed CDS network. In the random graph the 
connections and the weight of the connection is randomly assigned to the node. The 
edges are created with probability equal to the connectivity of the empirical network. 
More details on the random network algorithm is given in the Appendix G. 
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Figure 3.3 The Empirically Constructed CDS Network for US Banks and Outside 
Entity(Triangle): Empirical Small World initial network. 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
The algorithm that assigns network links on the basis of market shares can be seen 
to reflect the very high concentration of network connections among the top 6 banks in 
terms of bilateral interrelationships and triangular clustering which marks small world 
network structures (see Figure 3.3). This is also underscored by the large cluster 
coefficient of 0.92 given in Table 3.3. In contrast with a random network of the same 
connectivity38, the clustering coefficient is close to the connectivity parameter. The 
highly asymmetric nature of the empirical CDS network is manifested in the large 
                                                          
38 Note the random graph variant for the CDS network system has the same aggregate gross CDS buy 





kurtosis or fat tails in degree distribution which is characterized by a few (two banks in 
this case) which have a relatively large number of in degrees (up to 14) while many 
have only a few (as little as 1). Note the asymmetries are greater in the out degree 
distribution in terms of bank activity as CDS protection sellers.  
Table 3.3 Network Statistics for Degree Distribution for CDS Network: Small 















In Degrees CDS  
Buyers 
3.04 4.44 3.13 9.12 0.12 0.92 7.814  
Out Degrees CDS 
Sellers 
3.04 5.34 3.60 14.12 0.12 0.92 9.432 
Random Graph 3.48 1.50 0.70 0.04 0.12 0.09 2.64 
Source: own calculations 
Using the May network stability criteria given in Section 3.2.3, we note from Table 
3.3 that both the empirically constructed CDS network and the random graph with the 
same connectivity are unstable. These parameters have to be less than one for stability. 
Also, given the important role of CDS protections sellers, the greater instability of this 
side of the network is to be noted. In what follows, we will see the elucidation of the 
epithet “too interconnected too fail” and the grim consequences of the excessive size of 
the gross CDS obligations in the hands of few banks and non-banks. 
3.4 Model Stress Tests  
We will now discuss the main stress tests that we conducted to understand the 
implications of trigger events such as the failure of a large bank or an external non-US 
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bank CDS provider which is assumed to be the N+1 agent (we assume 30% default of 
the extant non-US bank CDS provider which approximates the US NDFIs) on the 
solvency of remaining banks.  
The stress tests conducted involved the failure of the following banks: JP Morgan, 
Citibank, Bank of America, HSBC, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, National City and 
Comerica. We follow the round by round or sequential algorithm for simulating 
contagion that is now well known from Furfine (2003). Starting with a trigger bank i 
that fails at time 0, we denote the set of banks that fail at each round or iteration by Dq  
q= 1,2, …  .  Note the superscript q shows the qth iteration. The cascade of defaults 
occur in the following way:  
i. Assuming tear ups, but no novation of CDS contracts and zero recovery rate 
on the trigger bank i’s liabilities (a full LGD) bank j fails if its direct bilateral 
net loss of CDS cover vis-à-vis the trigger bank i taken as a ratio of its capital 
is greater than or equal to ρ of its core capital (reported in the third column 





A threshold ρ is a percentage of banking capital which can be regarded 
as a sustainable loss. It is assumed to be equal for all banks. We assume ρ 
at the level of 20% of core capital as a sustainable loss may be too high 
during crisis periods. In the Reserve Bank of India (2011), the level of the 
threshold has been found at 25% in Indian banking system (see footnote 
49), but we assume smaller value of ρ, as CDS contracts are more likely, 
then traditional assets, to trigger the collateral damage. Experiments with 
lower sustainable losses such as 15%, 10% or 5% of core capital of the bank 
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should also be considered in order to check the model for the sensitivity to 
changes in ρ. We present here experiment only for losses of 20% of capital. 
Another assumption is that with the sudden loss greater than share ρ of 
its core capital the bank will be unable to meet its obligations and will 
default. It will be impossible for the bank to recapitalise without a bail-out 
and the fire sale of assets will further lower the accessible capital. 
ii. A second order effect of contagion follows if there is some bank z D 1 , 
i.e. that did not fail in round 1, loses proportion ρ of its core capital:  
(𝑥𝑖𝑧 − 𝑥𝑧𝑖)
+ + ∑ (𝑥𝑗𝑧 − 𝑥𝑧𝑗)𝑗∉𝐷1
𝐶𝑧
> 𝜌 
            The summation term aggregates the net loss of CDS cover to z 
from all banks j, j  i , which demised in the first iteration.  
iii. This then iterates to the qth round of defaults if there is a bank 
v{D1  D2 …  Dq-1} , i.e. which has not failed till q-1, such that  
(𝑥𝑖𝑣 − 𝑥𝑣𝑖)
+ + ∑ (𝑥𝑗𝑣 − 𝑥𝑣𝑗)𝑗∉⋃ 𝐷𝑠𝑞−1𝑠=1
𝐶𝑣
> 𝜌 
iv. The contagion is assumed to have ended at the round q# when there are no  
            more banks left or none of those that have survived fail at q#.  
Note, following the adjacency matrix given in Appendix F, as xij denotes gross CDS 
protection cover that is lost to j due to the demise of bank i (or N+1 non-bank CDS 
provider), the size of bilateral net amount, (xij - xji)
+, depends on the dominance of i as 
the CDS protection seller. Hence, dominant protection sellers are major potential 




3.4.1 Model Stress Tests Results  
The network simulator monitors and outputs the reduction of CDS cover for each 
bank and in aggregate to the loss of the core capital for the 26 US banks. The main 
results of the stress tests of the two experiment are summarized in Table 3.4 in terms of 
net core capital and percentage of loss of core capital for the 26 US banks.39 The 
Systemic Risk Ratio (SRR) of each trigger bank is reported in the last row of the table 
and it estimates the percentage loss in aggregate core capital as a result of the failure of 
a given bank or non-bank CDS market participant (that is why it’s reported as a negative 
value). Grey tabs are applied in the Table 3.4 to those banks that fail (i.e. their losses 
exceed 20% of core capital) in the given stress test.  
The Systemic Risk Ratio is a simple and straightforward measure based on the 
potential distress caused by the failure of the node for which the SSR is calculated. It’s 
main advantage is simplicity, together with its ability to capture the systemic threat. On 
the other hand it requires the good quality data to perform the stress test, being based 
on the Furfine (2003) methodology it does not take into account the real dynamics of 
the system – it takes the snapshot of the financial network and assumes a collapse. In 
our setup the SRR does not account for the maturity structure of the CDS contracts (due 
to the lack of data), it also requires assumptions on the size of loss given default (LGD). 
Here we first and foremost confirm the idea about the role of ‘super spreaders’ of 
contagion in terms of their network connectivity and dominance as CDS protection 
sellers. JP Morgan has a SRR40 of -46.96% implying that in aggregate the 26 US banks 
                                                          
39 Net core capital is given as the core capital less the losses entailed from the stress tests.  
40 Note the Systemic Risk Ratio for a financial institution can be given in a ‘marginal’ form (MSSR). 
MSSR is estimated with the loss of aggregate core capital not to include the 100% loss of core capital 
assumed with the stress event of failure of the trigger bank. For instance in the MSSR variant for JP 
Morgan we have -26% impact as opposed to -46.96% given above once the $100.61bn. core capital, 
that is assumed to be lost when JP Morgan fails as the trigger bank, is not included  in the aggregate 
loss of core capital of other banks.  As a result, we find that the failure of a sizeable non-bank CDS 
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will lose this percentage of core capital with Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley 
and Merrill Lynch being brought down. The highly likely scenario of the demise of 
30% of a non-US bank CDS protection seller (such as a Monoline or hedge fund) has a 
SRR of -33.38% with up to 7 banks being brought down. Bank of America has an SSR 
of -21.5%, followed by Citibank at -14.76% and then Wells Fargo at -6.88%. The least 
connected banks in terms of the CDS network, National City and Comerica have SSRs 
of -2.51% and -1.18%. The premise behind too interconnected to fail can be addressed 
only if the systemic risk consequences of the activities of individual banks can be 
rectified with a price or tax reflecting the negative externalities of their systemic risk 
impact to mitigate the oversupply of a given financial activity.   
The “superspreader” role of JP Morgan in the CDS market can be explained as 
follows. JP Morgan as dominant CDS seller is seen to be a net seller of CDS cover to 
Citibank to the tune of $62.33bn which is over 87.72% of Citibank’s $70.98bn core 
capital. The failure of JP Morgan will lead to the immediate demise of Citibank and as 
net CDS supplier to the tune of $16.83 bn to the Bank of America, it places the latter 
on the brink of failure with a potential 19.03% loss of core capital. Morgan Stanley, 
Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs which are recipients of a high proportion of net CDS 
cover from JP Morgan are all brought down due to their very low core capital relative 
to their CDS positions. In contrast, Mellon Bank though a sole buyer of CDS, and also 
Wells Fargo and other smaller banks survive the pure loss of CDS cover from JP 
Morgan because of their high core capital relative to their CDS activity. 
To understand the somewhat surprising outcome that Citibank which ranks 3nd with 
$1.290 tn in CDS sales after JP Morgan and the non-bank outside entity, has less of a 
                                                          




contagious effect on the system than Bank of America which has CDS sales of 
$1.004 tn. (See column marked G in the Initial Adjacency Matrix,  Table F.1 given in 
Appendix F). The failure of Bank of America, leads to the demise of Goldman Sachs 
and a 16.97% loss of capital for Citibank. The reason why Citibank does not bring down 
other banks in terms of a loss of CDS cover, is because it is a net CDS buyer to the tune 
of $112.354 bn and it sells less to each of its counterparties than it buys. So it simply 
does not propagate contagion in the CDS network. However, when the non-bank 
outside entity fails (see last column of Table 3.4), Citigroup appears to be most exposed 
as a net CDS buyer, losing to the tune of $82.43 bn or 116% of its core capital of $70.98 
bn.  
3.4.2 Comparisons of Contagion between a CDS Network with Clustered 
Small World Properties and a Random Graph  
We also compare the CDS network stability of a random graph of the same size and 
connectivity41to verify what if any consequences the May stability hypothesis has for 
differently structured financial systems. Some very interesting issues are highlighted 
here. As found in Sinha (2005) and Sinha and Sinha (2006), the random graph shows 
worse outcomes in terms of stability and capacity of propagation of the contagion. 
Recall the marked difference in structure is the clustering coefficient of the two 
networks (see, Table 3.3). The high clustering of the small world network in terms of 
what we understand to be the most likely structure for the CDS network along with the 
specifics of what induces loss of CDS cover, appears to show that there are only direct 
failures in a closed sector rather than higher order failures spreading to the whole 
system. It is, of course, cold comfort that the first order shock wipes out the top 4 banks. 
                                                          
41 The Appendix G outlines the algorithm for how the equivalent random graph for the empirically 
based CDS network is produced. 
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In contrast, in the random graph, while no node is either too big or too interconnected, 
the whole system unravels in a series of multiple knock on effects. This can be seen by 
comparing the last columns, in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, on the number of demised 
banks as a result of the failure of the trigger bank listed in bold in the same row. In the 
random graph case not only do more banks fail for the same stress event, also the 
connectivity of the network collapses substantially after the stress from about 12% to 
about 2%. This is shown in Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4. Instability propagation in Clustered CDS Network and in Equivalent 
Random Network NB: Black denotes failed banks with successive concentric 
circles denoting the q-steps of the knock on effects  
 
Source: own calculations 
The nature of contagion propagation given in Figure 3.4 poses interesting and subtle 
issues on how to improve the stability properties of the empirical CDS network with 
small world properties. This will be tackled in future research. 
 
Contagion when JP Morgan Demises in Clustered CDS Network ( Left
4 banks fail in first step and crisis contained) v
In Random Graph (Right 17 banks fail !! Over many steps)
Table 3.4 20% Net Core Capital Post Contagion Loss of CDS Cover Only: Stress test from defaulting bank or 30% outside entity ($bn) 
(Trigger entity top row; Net Core Capital, CC, in $ bns ;  % loss of capital), Systemic Risk Ratio is reported as a percentage in the last 
row 
 
Source own calculations 
Note: Net Core Capital = Core Capital – Losses.; : OE Outside Entity 
JPMorgan 100.61 0.00% 0.00 -100.00% 100.61 0.00% 100.61 0.00% 93.75 -6.82% 100.6 0.00% 100.61 0.00% 100.61 0.00% 100.58 -0.02% 74.81 -25.64%
Citibank 70.98 0.00% 8.64 -87.82% 0.00 -100.00% 58.93 -16.97% 61.84 -12.87% 70.98 0.00% 70.98 0.00% 70.98 0.00% 70.98 0.00% -11.45 -116.13%
Bank of America 88.50 0.00% 71.67 -19.03% 88.50 0.00% 0.00 -100.00% 88.50 0.00% 88.5 0.00% 88.50 0.00% 88.50 0.00% 88.50 0.00% 68.14 -23.01%
Goldman Sachs 13.19 0.00% -8.98 -168.09% 13.19 0.00% 10.35 -21.54% 13.19 0.00% 13.19 0.00% 13.19 0.00% 13.19 0.00% 13.19 0.00% 9.16 -30.57%
HSBC 10.81 0.00% 10.81 0.00% 10.81 0.00% 10.81 0.00% 0.00 -100.00% 10.81 0.00% 10.81 0.00% 10.81 0.00% 10.81 0.00% 7.98 -26.18%
Wachovia 32.71 0.00% 27.45 -16.07% 32.71 0.00% 32.71 0.00% 32.71 0.00% 32.71 0.00% 32.71 0.00% 32.71 0.00% 32.71 0.00% 26.52 -18.93%
Morgan Stanley 5.80 0.00% -5.93 -202.31% 5.80 0.00% 5.80 0.00% 5.80 0.00% 0 -100.00% 5.80 0.00% 5.80 0.00% 5.80 0.00% -6.07 -204.66%
Merrill Lynch 4.09 0.00% -0.64 -115.67% 4.09 0.00% 4.09 0.00% 4.09 0.00% 4.092 0.00% 4.09 0.00% 4.09 0.00% 4.09 0.00% -0.70 -117.01%
Keybank 8.00 0.00% 7.69 -3.94% 8.00 0.00% 8.00 0.00% 8.00 0.00% 8.005 0.00% 8.00 0.00% 8.00 0.00% 8.00 0.00% 7.67 -4.24%
PNC Bank 8.34 0.00% 7.83 -6.09% 8.34 0.00% 8.34 0.00% 8.34 0.00% 8.338 0.00% 8.34 0.00% 8.34 0.00% 8.34 0.00% 7.82 -6.24%
National City 12.05 0.00% 11.86 -1.54% 12.05 0.00% 12.05 0.00% 12.05 0.00% 12.05 0.00% 0.00 -100.00% 12.05 0.00% 12.05 0.00% 11.85 -1.61%
New York Mellon 11.15 0.00% 10.52 -5.60% 11.15 0.00% 11.15 0.00% 11.15 0.00% 11.15 0.00% 11.15 0.00% 11.15 0.00% 11.15 0.00% 10.52 -5.66%
Wells Fargo 33.07 0.00% 32.78 -0.89% 33.07 0.00% 33.07 0.00% 33.07 0.00% 33.07 0.00% 33.07 0.00% 0.00 -100.00% 33.07 0.00% 32.77 -0.91%
SunTrust 12.56 0.00% 12.36 -1.65% 12.56 0.00% 12.56 0.00% 12.56 0.00% 12.56 0.00% 12.56 0.00% 12.56 0.00% 12.56 0.00% 12.35 -1.68%
Northern Trust 4.39 0.00% 4.39 0.00% 4.39 0.00% 4.39 0.00% 4.39 0.00% 4.385 0.00% 4.39 0.00% 4.39 0.00% 4.39 0.00% 4.38 -0.03%
State Street&Trust 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 0.00% 13.42 -0.01%
Deutsche Bank 7.87 0.00% 7.87 0.00% 7.87 0.00% 7.87 0.00% 7.87 0.00% 7.872 0.00% 7.87 0.00% 7.87 0.00% 7.87 0.00% 7.87 -0.01%
Regions 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00% 9.64 0.00%
U.S. Bank 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00% 14.56 0.00%
Commerce 1.37 0.00% 1.37 0.00% 1.37 0.00% 1.37 0.00% 1.37 0.00% 1.368 0.00% 1.37 0.00% 1.37 0.00% 1.37 0.00% 1.37 -0.01%
MERCANTIL 0.54 0.00% 0.54 0.00% 0.54 0.00% 0.54 0.00% 0.54 0.00% 0.538 0.00% 0.54 0.00% 0.54 0.00% 0.54 0.00% 0.54 -0.01%
Associated 1.58 0.00% 1.58 0.00% 1.58 0.00% 1.58 0.00% 1.58 0.00% 1.577 0.00% 1.58 0.00% 1.58 0.00% 1.58 0.00% 1.58 0.00%
Comerica 5.66 0.00% 5.66 0.00% 5.66 0.00% 5.66 0.00% 5.66 0.00% 5.661 0.00% 5.66 0.00% 5.66 0.00% 0.00 -100.00% 5.66 0.00%
Signature 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00% 0.76 0.00%
RBS Citizens 8.47 0.00% 8.47 0.00% 8.47 0.00% 8.47 0.00% 8.47 0.00% 8.468 0.00% 8.47 0.00% 8.47 0.00% 8.47 0.00% 8.47 0.00%
Mitsubishi UFJ 0.70 0.00% 0.70 0.00% 0.70 0.00% 0.70 0.00% 0.70 0.00% 0.696 0.00% 0.70 0.00% 0.70 0.00% 0.70 0.00% 0.70 0.00%
Aggregate CC 480.80 0.00% 255.00 -46.96% 409.82 -14.76% 377.41 -21.50% 454.00 -5.57% 475.00 -1.21% 468.76 -2.51% 447.73 -6.88% 475.12 -1.18% 320.31 -33.38%
Original
Net Core Capital (loss CDS Cover only)
JPMorgan Citibank Bank of America HSBC Morgan Stanley National City Wells Fargo Comerica 30% off OE
Table 3.5  Clustered Small World Empirical CDS Network: Statistics  in case of failure 
of trigger banks given in Column 1 
 
Source own calculations 
Note: Num DB stands for number of demised banks during the stress test (note includes the trigger bank) 
The first row corresponds to the initial state with no failed banks 
Table 3.6 Random Graph With Same Connectivity As Empirical CDS Network: 
Statistics 1 in case of failure of trigger banks given in Column 1 
 
Source own calculations 
Note: Num DB stands for number of demised banks during the stress test (note includes the trigger bank). 
The direct failure versus multiple order failure can be illustrated in the Figure 3.5 and 
Figure 3.6 when JP Morgan fails in the stress test. In the clustered network case, this leads 
to the direct failure of 5 banks in the first round while in the random graph case, it leads to 
the collapse of 17 banks over multiple orders (up to 12) of contagion. 
mean std skewness kurtosis connectivity cluster coeff %loss CDS Cover num DB
no 3.04 5.34 3.60 14.12 0.12 0.92 0.00% 0
JPMorgan Chase Bank 1.33 3.96 5.07 26.07 0.05 0.96 94.24% 5
Citibank 2.67 5.10 3.78 15.30 0.10 0.93 30.84% 1
Bank of America 2.52 4.88 3.79 15.57 0.10 0.93 35.77% 2
HSBC Bank USA 2.81 5.11 3.66 14.58 0.11 0.93 10.16% 1
Wachovia Bank 2.89 5.12 3.59 14.20 0.11 0.93 2.85% 1
National City Bank 2.89 5.12 3.59 14.20 0.11 0.93 0.03% 1
Wells Fargo Bank 2.89 5.12 3.59 14.20 0.11 0.93 0.01% 1
Comerica Bank 2.93 5.20 3.51 13.36 0.11 0.93 0.00% 1
30% off OE 1.19 3.60 5.03 25.84 0.05 0.96 99.37% 7
Out Degrees (loss CDS only)
mean std skewness kurtosis connectivity cluster coeff %loss CDS Cover num DB
no 3.48 1.50 0.70 -0.04 0.13 0.09 0.00% 0
JPMorgan Chase Bank 0.59 0.89 1.30 0.63 0.02 0.81 73.26% 17
Citibank 3.33 1.71 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.12 5.59% 2
Bank of America 0.44 0.80 1.89 3.17 0.02 0.89 79.70% 17
HSBC Bank USA 0.52 0.85 1.97 3.85 0.02 0.93 81.83% 17
Wachovia Bank 0.37 0.74 2.32 5.60 0.01 0.93 86.14% 20
National City Bank 0.44 0.75 1.97 4.22 0.02 0.93 83.49% 18
Wells Fargo Bank 3.33 1.71 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.12 5.59% 1
Comerica Bank 0.44 0.75 1.97 4.22 0.02 0.93 85.05% 18
30% off OE 0.37 0.74 2.32 5.60 0.01 0.93 86.56% 19
Degrees (loss CDS only)
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Figure 3.5. Trigger: JPMORGAN DEFAULTS: Clustered Small World Empirical 
CDS Network 
 
Figure 3.6. Trigger: JPMORGAN DEFAULTS: Random Network  
 
3.1 Conclusion 
In the rest of this section we will discuss some further issues about the network tools 
and stress test scenarios in order to address the lack of stability of the CDS network. The 
network framework used to build an empirically based network for the CDS obligations 
between US banks and non-banks reveals the high clustering phenomena of small world 
networks that are known to characterize real world networks. We used the market share of 
CDS activity by banks to determine the network structures as discussed in Section 3. In 
future work, we aim to calibrate the adjacency matrix based on the market share algorithm 
with the correlation matrix of CDS spreads to better inform the pathways by which the 
contagion spreads. 
The CDS network is found to be unstable by the May criteria. However, the equivalent 
random network for CDS obligations with no banks which are too interconnected (see 
Figure 3.4) endured a worse case of financial contagion and unravelling than did the highly 
clustered empirically based CDS network. This being the case, it is not obvious how 
regulators should alter the topology of the financial network. It is known from the work of 
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Sinha (2005) that a clustered small world network structure has some capacity for 
containment and in complex system terms these highly interconnected multi-hub based 
systems can have some stabilizing effects compared to the unstructured random 
graphs. However, it is clear that the increased capacity to bear the first order shocks by the 
hub entities could only be achieved by installing ‘super-spreader reserves’ overturning the 
current practice of leniency in this direction. We identified so called ‘super-spreaders’ 
(these include JP Morgan and large non-bank CDS protection sellers) in the CDS financial 
network and the systemic risk consequences of their failure is quantified in terms of a 
Systemic Risk Ratio which indicates how much core capital is lost collectively due to failure 
of the trigger entity. A strong case is made that such large CDS sellers who in the past have 
been exempt from initial collateral requirements should instead provide sufficient collateral 
in keeping with their super-spreader status to mitigate the tax payer bailout costs. An urgent 
requirement of the continued activity of non-bank CDS protections sellers toward the credit 
risk mitigant scheme is that they increase their capital reserves by a minimum of 33% which 
should be sequestered in this super-spreader fund. This requires more experimentation.  
The proposal of a more transparent clearing house for CDS contracts is a way forward. 
However, there is no silver bullet regarding its success. The clearing house itself should 
have access to sufficient capital or liquidity to alleviate concentration and systemic risk. In 
order to fulfil the major role of a Centralized Clearing Platform (CCP) for CDS to minimize 
contagion within the inter-dealership and systemic fall outs, it has to provide adequate 
liquidity that a decentralized system based on individually optimal calculations will not 
provide. We recommend that a super-spreader fund is established which reflects the 
systemic risk posed by network impacts of key participants in it. This fund can also add a 
more equitable dimension to the mutualisation of losses in the CCP that counterparties in 
the CDS settlement system may have to bear in the face of default by large players. The 
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additional liquidity needed is also related to our measure of concentration risk. We have 
identified a trade-off that exists between the network topology that minimizes ex ante 
liquidity and its stability vis-à-vis the demise of hub agents. Further, as the structure of the 
inter-dealer network will continue to be driven by the liquidity minimizing factors we 
discussed in Section 3, even in the presence of the CCP, it is important to model this and 
to get an empirical ‘handle’ on the consequences of concentration risk.  
A major policy imperative for the fully fledged quantitative analysis in a fine grained 
data based way at disaggregated level using multi-agent models of the banking and 
financial sector requires that the all credit extensions should be electronically tagged so that 
their circulation in the system can be traced electronically within a publicly available 
repository. Model verité or full digital rebuilds is possible for many banking and financial 
systems and also of electronic markets. This ‘information gap’ on gross inter-institutional 
exposures, cross market, cross currency and cross country linkages has been highlighted in 
Chan-Lau et al. (2009). It has been argued that such digital mapping of institutional details 
with automatic updates from data feeds is essential as the starting point for stress tests of 
the systems. The development of state of the art simulators based on a digital mapping of 
actual financial systems is essential to understand their potential vulnerabilities and also to 
give quantitative analysis of contagion. Study of network connectivity of financial systems 
can illuminate potential areas of fragility. In contrast, current reliance on analytical or 
equation based models which have to make simplifying assumptions for purposes of 
tractability may often fail to high light the positive feedback loops that arise from network 
asymmetries over multi period runs. This network framework is both radically and subtly 




Chapter 4  
Network Analysis of Core Global Banking 
System: Systemic Risk, Vulnerabilities and 
Early Warning Indices 
Abstract 
Global financial interconnectedness is increasingly being viewed as a crucial factor for 
systemic risk and macroeconomic instability. This paper provides a specific systemic risk 
measure for assessing the network instability and early warning signals of the global 
exposures of 19 national banking systems (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States). 
We follow the eigen-pair method introduced by Markose (2012) and Markose et al. 
(2012) by characterizing financial network stability in terms of the stability of an 
appropriately defined dynamical network system. We construct Systemic Risk Index (SRI) 
for the Core Global Banking System based on the maximum eigenvalue of the stability 
matrix constructed from the global financial exposures relative to the banking systems 
capital. We use right and left eigenvectors corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue to 
produce a Systemic Importance Index and Systemic Vulnerability Index respectively. We 
find that proposed indices have early warning capacities in contrast to market-price based 
indices or loss multiplier index. The proposed Systemic Risk Index based on maximum 
eigenvalue peaks a way before financial crisis of 2007. We are able to see the systemic 




We also study the Eurozone crisis in terms of the network of cross-border exposures 
between PIIGS and the remaining Eurozone countries. 
The novelty of this research is in application of the Markose (2012) method to the cross-
border finance. Proposed SRI’s exhibit early warning properties in comparison to other 
methods. Their main drawback related to this methodology is a necessity of good quality 
data on cross-border exposures as well as information on banking system capital. Due to 
the unavailability of precise data the method gives results quarterly only. SRI’s are based 
on cross-border exposures, the they do not include information on the national financial 
markets. 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the foremost reasons for a banking and financial crisis which can result in deep 
recessions is the excessive issuance of credit by banks which typically fuel housing or stock 
market bubbles (Geanakoplos et al., 2012; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). During the last decade, financial innovations and inadequate regulatory 
oversight in the advanced economies led to a highly leveraged banking sector that was 
mostly funded from wholesale money markets using short-term bank liabilities such as 
asset-backed commercial paper. The latter were based on securitized mortgages that had 
stoked up the US housing bubble. Having started in the US as the bursting of a housing 
bubble, the 2007 financial crisis that spread globally has underlined the importance of 
banking system stability in terms of cross-border propagation of contagion. The excessive 
growth of the financial sector and household credit within some countries (Stockhammer, 
2011; Moosa, 2010; Schularick and Taylor, 2012) has also been found to have cross border 
implications (Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012).  
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The subprime mortgage crisis in the US turned into a global banking crisis through 
foreign claims of banking systems based on these securitised assets.42 This was 
significantly different from past externally propagated crises.43 Cross-border banks have 
been noted to play a central role in the dynamics of the global crisis of 2007-2009 (Allen 
et al., 2011).  Highly integrated international financial markets, which can be seen as a large 
complex network through cross-border exposures of banks, have brought the “too 
interconnected to fail” phenomenon into the scene, and has become a leading catalyst for 
global financial crisis (Haldane, 2009; Alessandri and Haldane, 2009; Markose, 2012, 
Markose et. al., 2012). Shocks that deteriorate the proper functioning of this densely 
interconnected network of activities involving cross border banks affect not only the banks, 
but also the economies they operate in (Degryse et al., 2010). Therefore, it is vital to 
investigate the topological structure of global banking activities and their vulnerability to 
liabilities of debtor countries. 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, network analysis of financial markets has 
increasingly been adopted in macro-prudential policy. Neglecting the risks imposed by 
interconnectivity of financial players, especially in a cross-border dimension (Allen et. al. 
2011, Castrén and Rancan, 2013), can result in an inadequate macro-economic policy 
framework. Just as considering only those risks faced by individual financial institutions 
from their own investments under micro-prudential policies suffers from fallacy of 
composition, so did the individual level risk sharing strategies such as those encouraged by 
                                                          
42 Allen et. al. (2011) found that “European banks had a surprisingly large exposure to US securitized asset 
markets”. The IMF (www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf) estimates that the banking 
systems of Western Europe had sustained a 50%  equity capital loss (worth $1.6 trillion) from the toxic and 
impaired Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS). 
43 Traditionally, economic crisis arising from external factors were considered to follow from balance of 
payments deficits and currency collapses for which large foreign currency reserves was considered to be a 
panacea. See Eichengreen et. al (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for the classic findings, and Frankel 
and Saravelos (2012) for a recent assessment of the variables identified in these papers on early warning 
crisis signals for the 2007 crisis. 
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Basel 2 on synthetic securitization using credit default swaps.44 In the lead up to the 
financial crisis, it was held that modern risk management techniques involving derivatives 
and credit risk transfers undertaken by individual financial institutions had enabled them to 
diversify their financial exposures sufficiently and that the likelihood of systemic failure 
was negligible. 
We investigate the empirical topological structure of global banking in all its aspects by 
focusing on the foreign claims. There are few and quite recent studies dealing with the 
global network of banking activities. In this field, we can differentiate contributions aiming 
to address the issue of the topology of the global network over time in relation with the 
magnitude of global liabilities and those aiming of assessing the resilience of banking 
systems to shocks and risk of contagion on similar networks. 
We develop a systemic risk early warning indices based on work presented in Markose 
(2012) and Markose et al. (2012), that combine the assessment of the banking network 
structure with the banking systems’ total equity, which acts as a buffer against negative 
shocks in the system. The proposed indices are one of the major contributions of this study, 
providing a single and elegant metric for global systemic risk with early warning capability. 
We use the indices to assess the stability of the Core Global Banking System Network 
(CGBSN). Our main findings confirm the early warning capabilities of systemic risk 
indices. We show the growing instability of the global network before the financial crisis 
of 2007, we are able to detect the vulnerability of the Portuguese banking system half a 
                                                          
44 Under synthetic securitization, banks must transfer significant credit risk associated with the underlying 
exposure to third parties. In the run up to the Basel 2, Markose (2012, et. al.) find that individual banks 
could retain mortgage backed securities on their balance sheets and secure reduced capital by buying 
credit default swaps from AAA rated credit default swap (CDS) sellers.  The concentration of risk at the 
system level (as the numbers of CDS sellers were limited), was not adequately mapped and monitored by 




year before one of its major banks collapsed, our indices provide warning about 
vulnerability of Belgium long before the demise of Dexia and Fortis Group. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the related 
literature, Section 3 sets out the network methodology behind the model, Section 4 
describes the data. Description of the topology of the CGBSN is shown in Section 5, and 
Section 6 gives a description of cross-border exposures in the network of examined banking 
systems. Stability analysis of the Core Global Banking System Network is performed in 
Section 7. Finally Section 8 sums up. 
4.2 Literature review on Global Banking Networks, systemic 
stability and early warning signals 
Network analysis is a powerful tool for holistic visualisations and systemic risk 
analytics. Allen and Babus (2009) emphasize that how financial institutions form 
connections is crucial to assess financial stability, particularly in the context of externalities, 
created by a single institution, that affect the entire system. In this respect, most studies 
focus on interbank markets (Craig and von Peter, 2010; Fricke and Lux, 2012; Bech and 
Atalay, 2010; Soramäki et al., 2007; Iori et al., 2008). Craig and von Peter (2010) provide 
evidence that interbank markets are tiered rather than flat, and most banks realize their 
lending transactions (credit extensions) through the help of few money centre banks acting 
as intermediaries. This intermediation is the unique result of a core-periphery structure 
which basically calls for a dense (highly connected) core and a sparse (less connected) 
periphery and contradicts the theoretical network models of bilateral interbank transactions 
of Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), Leitner (2005) and Babus (2009) that ignore 
the tiered structure of intermediation (assuming a flat relationship) and underestimate the 
“too interconnected to fail” phenomenon. Fricke and Lux (2012) find a significant and 
persistent core-periphery structure in the Italian interbank market as well. Empirical studies 
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also scrutinized other important global characteristics of the interbank markets. Bech and 
Atalay (2010) investigate the topology of the federal funds market (overnight interbank 
money market) in the United States from 1997 to 2006 in which banks are nodes and loans 
from one bank to another bank constitute the link formation. Soramäki et al. (2007) provide 
a fully-fledged topology of the interbank payment system in the US by using actual flows 
transferred over the Fedwire (a settlement system operated by the Federal Reserve System). 
Iori et al. (2008) investigate the heterogeneity of an Italian banking system in terms of fat-
tailed degree distribution and suggests that it is the result of a natural tendency of big banks 
to borrow from a high number of smaller counterparties. 
To our best knowledge, there are only few papers dealing with the topology of global 
banking. Von Peter (2007) and Minoiu and Reyes (2013) analyse the topological properties 
of the global banking network using BIS locational banking statistics spanning over 30 
years. The latter, which is closely related to the network analysis section of our study, uses 
BIS locational statistics for 15 reporting countries and analyse the topology of global 
banking activity in terms of cross-border banking flows. They focus on connectivity and 
density of transactions during 1978-2010 and find supporting evidence that the global 
banking system is much more connected during 2000s when compared with 1980s and 
1990s, following a pro-cyclical path with the global capital flows. Minoiu and Reyes (2013) 
conclude that this is the basic result of forming the network of global banking in terms of 
flows of claims rather than stocks. Von Peter (2007) explores even further the topological 
properties of the global networks provided by the same BIS locational statistics data with 
more emphasis on centrality measures of reporting banking systems to the more than 200 
peripheral countries. He constructs a banking centre measure, or “global hub”, by 
considering both unweighted node properties like degree, closeness and betweenness and 
weighted centrality measures he called “intermediation” (based on weighted node degrees) 
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and “prestige” (based on a weighted centrality indicator). His results rank UK and US as 
the main international banking centres that can explain the market share dominance in 
attracting foreign deposits. Contributions to global flows analysis can also be extended to 
the global network provided by Hale (2012). She tracks the dynamic formation of bank-to-
bank lending and borrowing using syndicated loans data of almost 8000 banks spanning 
more than 140 countries during 1980-2009, providing supporting evidences on the pro-
cyclical behaviour of global connectivity discussed in Minoiu & Reyes (2013), with 
increasing density and skewness in links distribution over time. 
Procyclicality of mainstream risk management models has recently been referred to as 
the so called “paradox of volatility” (Borio and Drehmann, 2009) wherein volatility, the 
key measure of risk, is underestimated during market price booms when systemic risk is 
building up on balance sheets of banks and non-bank sectors. The volatility paradox can be 
seen in publicly available volatility indexes, such as the VIX and the V-FTSE in that they 
are extremely low during market booms and are at a local minimum just before the market 
crashes45 (at the highest point of the boom in the stock price index).  Many, practitioners 
and regulators, who interpret low VIX volatility as the absence of risk were, and continue 
to be, lulled into a false state of complacency.  This underestimation of risk by markets also 
permeates implied probability of default derived from credit default swaps on financial, 
non-financial corporate and sovereign reference entities which typically show jump to 
default characteristics that are contemporaneous with the crisis (see, Goodhart, 2011).   
Hence, many statistical market price-based systemic risk measures are at best 
contemporaneous with the financial crises, and at worst, peak after the crisis (Markose, 
2012, 2013). The lack of early warning capabilities of market price based SRIs have 
                                                          
45 Markose (2012) give one of the earliest explicit demonstration of how a market price based systemic 
risk index, for instance, the Segoviano and Goodhart (2009)  banking stability index has no more early 
warning  capabilities than the publicly available stock index option implied volatility indexes which are 
contemporaneous with the crisis. 
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resulted in these being referred to as being “Coincident and Near Coincident” indexes in a 
recent IMF study (Arsov et al., 2013).  
This phenomenon  was presaged by Minski (1986) who claimed that asset price bubbles 
mask the growing system wide financial fragility as the enhanced market values for assets 
and the perception of low risk from volatility measures encourage pro-cyclical excessive 
growth of leverage of banking systems with a commensurate growth of both their exposures 
and liabilities within interbank and with non-bank sectors. In due course, this can result in 
systemic collapses. Notwithstanding the introduction of countercyclical capital 
requirements in Basel 3, it is difficult to undo the damage of risk weighting of bank assets 
and the RWA capital requirements which help to exacerbate pro-cyclicality in the risk 
management in financial entities. The idea on the pro-cyclicality of leverage is now 
acknowledged to be a major source of systemic risk and is well articulated in Adrian and 
Shin (2010, 2011).   
Given the ease of publicly available market price data for assets and financial entities, 
in most non-cross border settings, measures of systemic risk have relied on statistical 
models using market price data and thereby significantly lack early warning capabilities 
(see, Arsov et. al 2013).  In contrast, the availability of BIS consolidated banking statistics 
data on the liabilities based flows of debtor countries to national banking systems, in 
principle, should give a systemic risk index more in keeping with the Minsky thesis on bank 
leverage as an early warning signal (EWS) for the global banking system. 
Within a larger framework of the study of EWS in a cross border setting, Catão and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2014) pick the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP as being informative 
regarding the onset of economic crisis in a cross border setting.  They find that when this 
ratio exceeds 50% in absolute terms and 20% of country specific historical mean, it 
becomes a good signal for external crisis prediction.  In the empirical study by Gourinchas 
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and Obstfeld (2012) using data from 1973 to 2010, the rapid increase in leverage and a 
sharp real appreciation of the currency are the two factors that emerge consistently as the 
most robust and significant predictors of financial crises. Bruno and Shin (2014) formulate 
a model of international banking systems and identify the bank leverage cycle as a 
determinant of the transmission of financial conditions across borders through banking. 
They identify a local currency appreciation with higher leverage in the banking sector and 
forge a conceptual bridge between exchange rates and financial stability (see, also footnote 
2). In Minoiu et. al (2013), they use network statistics for connectivity and clustering 
coefficient as explanatory variables in prediction models for early warning signals for cross 
border financial crisis. They find that these GBN network statistics improve the 
performance of EWS compared to more traditional macro-economic variables.   
As of now, Hattori and Suda (2007),  Degryse et al. (2010) and Castrén and Rancan 
(2013) are amongst the few contributions on testing the risk of contagion and the stability 
of cross-border flows. Hattori and Suda (2007) analyse the global banking network on BIS 
locational statistics for 16 reporting countries during 1985-2006 by focusing on stocks of 
banking claims. Their analysis is based on a time-varying connectivity pattern of global 
banking. They find that global banking became more interconnected and clustered with 
passing time along with short average path length. They also state that the global banking 
system has not been much affected by financial turmoil in terms of connectivity, finding 
supporting evidence that the global banking system is much more connected during 2000s 
when compared with 1980s and 1990s as later confirmed by Minoiu and Reyes (2013).  
Degryse et al. (2010) was among the first to analyse the systemic importance of countries 
such as the US with large global liabilities using the BIS consolidated banking statistics on 
17 reporting countries and to conduct Furfine (2003) style contagion losses for national 
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banking systems from country specific defaults over the period 1999-2006. High level of 
liabilities coming from UK and US can pose a huge threat on the rest of the global system. 
A liabilities based framework of global systemic risk assessment permits a thorough 
analysis of the role of leverage in destabilizing the system, once this is extended to the 
sectorial breakdowns that BIS cross border consolidated data has started giving since 2010.  
The notion of global macro-nets has been pioneered by Castrén and Rancan (2013). It 
combines cross border exposures of banking systems of countries to the liabilities of the 
different sectors of countries with the flow of funds between sectors within countries. 
Castrén and Rancan (2013) have quantified the extent of contagion losses as a result of a 
failure of key debtor countries and of sectors within them with a loss multiplier metric being 
given as a systemic risk index. 
Economists often refer to systemic risk in financial systems in terms of instability of 
such network systems. Terms such as tipping points are used and quantification of the 
actual domino failures from the failure of a “trigger” bank an exercise first undertaken by 
Furfine (2003) are popular in what is called financial contagion analysis. However, few 
have acknowledged that stability is a property of dynamical systems and universally needs 
to use some spectral or eigenvalue analysis as seminally given in the May stability condition 
of an appropriate dynamical characterization of the networked system (Markose, 2013; 
2012). Some details for the eigen-pair framework for systemic risk analytics designed by 
Markose (ibid) will be given below.  
This chapter aims to fill this gap by developing a systemic risk early warning index for 
global banking stability based on the eigenvalue analysis of the BIS consolidated banking 
exposure statistics. We develop an early warning index that allows us to quantify the level 
of instability of the global banking system as well as to identify vulnerable banking systems 
and systemically important economies during the period 2005-2013. We do so by 
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computing the maximum eigenvalue and corresponding left and right eigenvectors as 
presented in Markose (2012) and Markose et al. (2012). We specify the matrix of foreign 
liabilities of countries to major country banking systems, relative to their bank equity 
capital, and use the maximum eigenvalue of this matrix to yield the global network stability 
index. The results reveal that the network of global banking becomes markedly unstable 
doubling in value in the first quarter of 2007, well before the global financial crisis giving 
early warning, remaining generally unstable in the post-crisis. We compare our index with 
the only other systemic risk metric proposed by Castrén and Rancan (2013) for the core 
global financial system. Their so called “loss multiplier” systemic risk index (SRI) fail to 
provide any early warning signal in the run-up to the crisis, and it peaked only at the end 
of 2008 and in 2009. The main insight here is the far too elevated liabilities of countries 
vis-à-vis notional banking systems and their equity capital. Furthermore, the corresponding 
right and left eigenvectors are used to target systemically important countries and 
vulnerability of national banking systems respectively.  
4.3 Description of the network model 
The banking system network of cross-border exposures is recreated following the setup 
proposed by Markose (2012) with necessary changes. The focus is only on the core of the 
global banking system (19 reporting countries - Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States), hence the name: 
Core Global Banking System Network (CGBSN) will be used. The data is described in 
Section 4.4. 
Every network is defined by two sets: set of n nodes, or in graph theory terms vertices, 
N, and set of links between the nodes (edges), E. The Core Global Banking System Network 
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consists of set of countries, represented by nodes, and obligations of countries to banking 
sectors of reporting countries, represented by linkages.  
The CGBS network is a simple directed weighted network (i.e. non reciprocal, with 
unique directed links between two given nodes, without multiple links), the direction of a 
link represents obligation that residents of a country (later on referred to as “country” for 
simplicity) at the start of an arrow has towards the banking system of the country at the end 
of the arrow. Links are weighted by the amount due. Let’s define xij as the amount of the 
abovementioned obligation of a country i to the banking system of country j. 
The adjacency matrix of the CGBS network is defined as: 








0 𝑥12 ⋯ 𝑥1𝑗 ⋯ 𝑥1𝑁
𝑥21 0 ⋯ 𝑥2𝑗 ⋯ 𝑥2𝑁
⋮ ⋮ 0 ⋯ ⋯ ⋯
𝑥𝑖1 ⋮ ⋯ 0 ⋯ 𝑥𝑖𝑁
⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋯ 0 ⋯









,  (4.1) 
where X is a N x N matrix, and xij represents the amount of debt from country i to 
banking system j. In the CGBSN case N = 19. The sum of an i-th row ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  represents 
the total amount payable by a country i. The sum of an j-th column ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1  represents the 
total amount receivable of a banking system j. Note that xii=0. 
Following the design proposed in Markose (2012) each node in the CGBS network is 
provided also with information about the capital of banking sector in a given country. The 
setup of the model is as follows: (N,E,C), where N = {1,2,3….n}, is a set of nodes, E is a 
set of links with maximum number of elements n(n-1) and C is a vector of n elements with 
i-th element being information on capital46 of i-th country’s banking system. 
Subsequently we net the cross border exposures between countries and banking systems 
calculating (𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝑖)
+ for each i and j, which is a function which takes only positive 
                                                          
46 The capital is proxied by equity of the banking system – more information is provided in section 4.4.2 
"Data on equity of banking systems”. 
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values and is equal to zero if the net exposure is negative. As xij is a gross payable from 
country i to the banking system of country j and xji is a gross payable from country j to the 
banking system of country i. Hence (𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝑖)
+ represents net receivables of a country’s j 
banking system from country i and relies on the equity capital of the banking system of 
country j which protects it from the default of the debtor. 
The lack of appropriate data makes accounting for the maturity structure in the netting 
procedure impossible. Nevertheless, as our analysis is performed in time, the maturity is 
partly reflected in changes in exposures between the periods. 
We construct stability matrix Θ, which elements are the ratios of the net exposures of 
country’s j banking system to its equity capital: 
































































,   (4.2) 
where (𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝑖)
+ the is the net exposure of banking system j to country i, and cj0 >0 is 
an initial capital of banking system j and is assumed to be positive. The matrix Θ is crucial 
to the stability analysis. 
4.3.1 Eigen-Pair Method for systemic risk analysis  
The eigenvector centrality measure (Newman, 2010) of the matrix Θ is found by 
Markose (2012) and Markose et al. (2012) to be the best correlated with the contagion 
losses created by the Furfine (2003) type of stress test47. It was found that the higher the 
                                                          
47 Furfine (2003) is a popular methodology of assessing contagion (used for instance in seminal papers by 
Upper and Worms (2004), Degryse et al. (2010)). It is based on assuming that a country (originally a 
financial institution) defaults and is unable to pay its cross-border liabilities imposing the loss on a 
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centrality measure of a node (an agent – for example a financial institution), the larger the 
losses caused by the triggering economic agent on others during the contagion. This finding 
is in line with the nature of eigenvector centrality, which is based on the principle that the 
centrality score of a node is higher if the neighbouring nodes are high-scoring nodes 
themselves, which translates, in case of financial contagion, into the following: the higher 
the systemic threat posed by the neighbours of a node, the higher is its centrality score (and 
its systemic importance). 
The matrix Θ has two sets of eigenvectors corresponding to the highest eigenvalue: right 
(𝑣𝑅 ) and left (𝑣𝐿 ). Since the ith  node’s centrality is proportional to the centrality measure 
of all its neighbours, then denoting the right eigenvector centrality of ith  node as the i
th 
element of the right eigenvector (𝑣𝑖





𝑗=1 , (4.3) 
where 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the largest eigenvalue and 𝑣
𝑅 , the corresponding eigenvector as the 
eigenvector centrality is proportional to the leading eigenvector of the adjacency matrix 
(see section 7.2 of Newman, 2010). Translating (4.3) into matrix form we obtain: 
Θ𝑣𝑅 = 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣
𝑅. (4.4) 
Similarly for the 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 there exists a corresponding eigenvector 𝑣
𝐿 , which by the 
definition of eigenvector is a transpose of the right eigenvector of the transposed matrix 
Θ𝑇, viz.: 
𝑣𝐿 Θ = Θ𝑇𝑣𝐿 = 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣
𝐿. (4.5) 
                                                          
counterparty, if the capital cushion of the counterparty is not enough to cover the losses, the counterparty 
becomes insolvent and its default triggers the second wave of contagion. 
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The matrix Θ is non-negative and has real entries, hence 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is a real positive number. 
The Perron-Frobenious theorem guarantees a positive eigenvectors 𝑣𝑅  and 𝑣𝐿  under the 
assumption that Θ represents the irreducible network48. 
Taking the systemic risk perspective again, the right eigenvector centrality measure of a 
matrix Θ will be taken as a measure of the systemic importance of a respective country and 
will be referred to as the Systemic Importance Index. Moreover, the left eigenvector 
centrality is expected to be correlated with the vulnerability of a respective banking system 
to the contagion losses across all the triggering scenario of a Furfine (2003) algorithm and 
will be referred to as the Systemic Vulnerability Index. 
Failure of a national banking system to its cross-border exposures is usually determined 
by the criteria that losses exceed a predetermined buffer ratio, ρ, of equity capital. In the 
epidemiology literature, Chakrabarti et al. (2008), ρ is the common cure rate and (1 - ρ) is 
the rate of not surviving in the worst case scenario. 
The dynamics of the contagion and the rates of failure of country i’s banking system 
from default of debtor countries can be given as: 





1 ,  (4.6) 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑞, gives probability of banking system i being “infected” at the q-th iteration 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑞
1  represent the banking system that fail at the q-th iteration and infect all non-failed 
counterparties with probability 1. The initial probability of failure is assumed to be 
ui0=1/ci0, therefore the probability is determined by the rate at which the banking system of 
country i is depleted by losses from failed countries. In the matrix form the above dynamics 
is given by: 
𝑈𝑞+1 = [Θ
′ + (1 − 𝜌)𝐼]𝑈𝑞,   (4.7) 
                                                          
48 For any randomly selected pairs of nodes (i,j) in an irreducible network, there is a path between them, 
viz. Θ is strongly connected.  
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where Θ’ is the transpose of matrix Θ with each element θ’ij= θ’ji and I is identity 
matrix. The system stability of equation (4.7) is evaluated on the basis of the power 
iteration of the initial matrix: 
Q=[ Θ’+(1- ρ)I].   (4.8) 
The Uq takes form:  
𝑈𝑞 = [Θ
′ + (1 − 𝜌)𝐼]𝑞𝑈0 = 𝑄
𝑞𝑈0, (4.9) 
In the framework ρ is the permissible capital loss threshold49 typically determined by 
the regulatory requirements for a bank and hence also for the national banking system. We 
equate failure of the net creditor country with failure of its banking system. In sequence the 
latter triggers failure of its counterparties. 
Using the power iteration algorithm for equation (4.7), it can be shown that the steady 
state potential percentage capital loss for country i can be estimated as the product of 
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥(Θ′) and i’s vulnerability index whilst using the infinity norm, denoted as vi∞
50
. 
𝑢𝑖# = 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥(Θ′)𝑣𝑖∞. (4.10) 
It was shown in Markose (2012) that the stability of the network system involving matrix 
Θ requires that the following stability condition is fulfilled: 
𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥(Θ) <  𝜌, (4.11) 
If this condition is violated, any negative shock, in the absence of outside interventions, 
can propagate through the networked system as a whole and cause system failure.   
                                                          
49 It has been found by Markose (Reserve Bank of India, 2011), that the Basel III capital ratio of 6% for risk 
weighted assets typically implies capital ratio of 25% for total assets. Thus the ρ = 0.25 can be considered a 
proxy for capital adequacy ratios of banking systems.q 
The formula for calculating the threshold is as follows 𝑇𝐶 = 1 − (𝑇𝑅𝑊𝐴 ∗ 𝑅𝑊𝐴/𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙), where 
RWA are Risk Weighted Assets, TRWA is the Basel II criteria for capital adequacy, i.e. Tier1 Capital has to be 
higher than 6% of RWA. TC is the permissible loss in terms of Tier1Capital. 
50 For this analysis, it is important to make sure that the right and left eigenvectors associated with the 
largest eigenvalue are given using the infinity norm. The infinity norm of a vector x denoted as ||x||∞ is 
the largest number in the vector. Hence, the highest ranked country will have an index of 1 in terms of  its 
eigenvector centrality. There is a simple conversion from the eigenvector produced using the Euclidean 
norm to one using the infinity norm. 
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4.4 Description of data 
The data-driven model of the Core Global Banking System Network is based on 
consolidated banking statistics on ultimate risk basis of Bank of International Settlements 
for cross-border exposures (N, E) and information on banking system equity for each 
country is obtained from the Bankscope database (C) – we use equity as a proxy for capital. 
4.4.1.1 Data on cross-border exposures 
A subset of the 19 reporting countries from the BIS dataset of exchange-rate adjusted 
cross-border ultimate risk consolidated statistics is used51. The sample of BIS consolidated 
banking statistics consists of 19 countries and spans quarterly from 4th quarter of 2005 until 
4th quarter 2013 (later, time periods will be referred to as for instance 2005Q4 to indicate 
4th quarter of 2005). The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Statistics provide 
information on positions of reporting countries’ banking systems vis-à-vis counterparties 
located outside of the reporting country (BIS, 2013). 
The analysis is made on debts of all the sectors of a country towards a banking sector of 
another country. The BIS commenced to provide information on debts on sector basis 
(banking public, non-bank private sector) from 2010Q4 (BIS, 2013)52.  
4.4.1.2 Locational and consolidated statistics 
The correct choice of data used as an input is of the upmost importance, especially if the 
model is to be used in macroprudential context. The BIS publishes statistics in the form of 
                                                          
51 The full dataset provides exposures of 25 reporting banking systems vis-à-vis counterparties from 219 
countries. Detailed information about the BIS dataset is included Appendix A.1. 




locational or consolidated data. Since the locational data has been collected since 1970’s 
and there are many countries in the sample, the change from locational to consolidated 
statistics has a significant impact on the research. 
Locational statistics measure claims and liabilities of banks’ subsidiaries resident in a 
reporting country. Consolidated statistics report claims and liabilities of banks 
headquartered in a reporting country including their affiliated offices abroad (BIS, 2013). 
As Fender and Mcguire (2010) indicate, the locational data “provide a particular picture of 
geographical interlinkages and the flow of funds between them, but are less well suited for 
more structural balance sheet analysis”. Locational statistics are consistent with balance of 
payment methodology, so are more useful for analysis of the flow of funds between 
countries, while consolidated statistics are built on reports used by banks in their internal 
risk management systems (BIS, 2013) and are more useful for tracking the actual impact of 
inflicted losses.  
Consolidated statistics themselves are gathered on immediate or on ultimate risk basis. 
The former allocates claims to the country of residence of immediate counterparty and the 
latter to the country of  final risk bearer. The ultimate risk basis statistics is used in this 
analysis in order to obtain the best insight into the real cross border bank exposure. It comes 
with a cost of a smaller sample, however. 
4.4.2 Data on equity of banking systems 
The information about the amount of equity, that serves as a buffer for losses is reported 
from Bankscope. Data for “Total equity’ is used, defined as a sum of ‘Common equity + 
Non-controlling interest + Securities revaluation reserves + Foreign Exchange Revaluation 
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Reserves+ Other revaluation reserves” 53. Total equity should be understood in terms of a 
balance sheet equation as total assets less total liabilities. 
Total equity for a given country’s banking system is calculated as a sum of total equity 
of all banks headquartered in the country. It is treated as a proxy for the amount of capital 
in the banking system of the country54.  
A country’s banking system includes only banks active at the beginning of sample period 
(2005Q4), for which total equity was reported at least in one of the sampled quarters (i.e. 
between 2005Q4-2013Q4) and excludes central banks of 19 reporting countries. The 
sample consists of 6427 banks and Eurozone banks make up for the 54% of the sample. 
Table 4.1 presents number of banks that were included in each of the 19 reporting countries. 
Table 4.1 Number of banks from each country included in the sample . 


















Great Britain 467 




                                                          
53 As quoted from the user guide of Bankscope available at: https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com. Total equity 
has the code 11840 in the Bankscope database. 
54 For detailed information and quality assessment of the Bankscope data, please refer to Appendix A.2. 
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Due to many missing data points in quarterly Bankscope data total equity is taken just 
for the end of the year, i.e. data for the fourth quarter of the given year. A linear 
approximation formula (4.12) is used to obtain total equity for each quarter. 
Total Equity (year t, quarter i) = Total Equity (year t, quarter 4) +
+ 
Total Equity (year t+1,quarter 4)−Total Equity (year t,quarter 4)
4
∗ 𝑖 (4.12) 
Table 4.2 Total equity of banking systems of 19 countries 2005-2013 (bn$) 
Country Total bank equity 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Australia 32.3 87.9 122.5 131.8 166.2 208.7 231.9 247.5 235.7 
Austria 63.5 101.4 140.3 132.8 140.1 147.6 140.0 154.1 138.3 
Belgium 110.4 142.0 194.5 129.2 156.4 153.3 126.4 149.3 133.8 
Canada 94.3 105.2 141.3 121.2 145.2 344.2 383.9 428.9 436.0 
France 401.3 599.4 722.6 730.0 903.1 944.2 927.4 992.8 1141.8 
Germany 247.2 439.2 682.4 595.2 869.9 867.0 914.2 1019.1 1161.2 
Greece55 13.1 21.8 37.2 31.9 39.6 33.7 -3.3 -8.2 48.7 
India 49.9 59.1 95.6 90.1 121.3 149.4 155.3 170.2 177.4 
Ireland 37.9 53.7 64.8 46.0 52.8 49.4 77.9 73.9 75.8 
Italy 224.0 321.2 410.7 391.3 447.9 434.0 397.7 423.6 470.7 
Japan 673.1 724.7 953.9 874.3 1239.6 1485.1 1674.0 1644.6 1571.0 
Netherlands 166.6 223.8 320.5 226.2 287.6 282.3 275.8 289.5 335.8 
Portugal 19.4 29.5 35.5 31.3 41.4 36.1 33.5 43.3 45.9 
Spain 124.9 163.4 213.9 239.9 289.8 319.5 323.5 321.8 408.0 
Sweden 49.2 67.8 82.2 75.9 95.4 108.1 112.6 126.0 149.4 
Switzerland 179.7 225.8 258.2 230.6 250.5 288.4 293.9 312.9 366.9 
Turkey 26.1 36.7 65.4 70.2 90.4 105.8 98.6 129.6 72.9 
Great Britain 637.2 816.1 1028.8 756.8 1101.4 1227.2 1311.8 1339.6 1441.6 
United States 1774.5 2022.4 2226.9 2227.0 2902.5 3243.3 3517.6 3765.3 3352.2 
Eurozone56 1408.3 2095.2 2822.3 2553.9 3228.7 3267.1 3213.1 3459.2 3960.0 
Total 4924.5 6240.9 7797.1 7131.9 9341.2 10427.3 10996.1 11631.9 11763.0 
Source: Bankscope 
                                                          
55 In the model it is assumed that for quarters between 2011Q4-2012Q4 Greek total equity is close to zero. 
56 The sample contains 10 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
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Figure 4.1 Total equity of banking systems of 19 countries between 2005-2013 (bn$) 
 
Source: Bankscope 
Table 4.2 presents the total equity of banking systems of countries in the sample between 
2005 and 2013 and Figure 4.1 presents it graphically. The sum of total equity increased 
twofold in the investigated period of time. Although it is difficult to assess to what extent 
the actual level of change is influenced by the issues of data quality, the overall trend is 
undoubtedly upward57. The upward trend broke in 2008 due to the financial crisis, but there 
was a quick recovery already in 2009. The recovery of total equity may have been the result 
of series of bailouts and recapitalization of endangered banks. No reversal of accumulative 
trend in the sum of total capital for all the countries is seen when it comes to Eurozone 
crisis of 2010-2012. The fall of total equity occurred mainly for Eurozone countries, as 
shown in the last row of Table 4.2, there has been a slight decrease of the total equity for 
Eurozone countries (by -2% between 2010 and 2011) and there was no growth for Eurozone 
                                                          
57 First years in the sample present some data quality issues. For detailed information on the Bankscope 
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countries in years 2009-2011 (the average year-to-year change in this period of time was – 
0,8%). The total equity of Eurozone increased again in 2012 and 2013. 
The US banking system has the highest equity capital of all the countries, with around 
one third of sum of the total equity of CGBSN (varying between 29%-36% in time, without 
a visible trend). The second biggest banking system in terms of equity capital is the 
Japanese one with the share varying from 11% to 15% of the total equity of all countries. 
The British banking system is not far from the Japanese but more often comes as the third, 
(it overtakes the Japanese system in 2006-2007) with the share of 11%-13% of the total 
stock of equity.  
The tiered structure of the banking system size in terms of equity can be observed. The 
top three countries amass a fairly large amount of capital (balance sheet equity) – more than 
half of the sum of the equity of 19 banking systems (between 54% and 63%). The top five 
countries (The US, Japan, the UK, France, Germany) represent three quarters of the total 
equity of all countries – between 72%-76%. The remaining 14 countries sums up to around 
25% of the total. 
Between 2011Q4 and 2012Q4 Greek banking system had negative total equity. 
Technically it should be considered bankrupt and indeed it was the period when Greek 
bailout took place58.  
Equity ratio of a banking system calculated as a proportion of total equity to total assets 
of selected countries, Eurozone and for the whole CGBSN. Equity ratio calculated with this 
method is an approximation of the Basel III leverage ratio59, with Basel III definition giving 
smaller results due to the difference in numerator. Basel III regulations require banks’ 
leverage ratio to exceed 3%. As is seen from the picture the equity ratio for CGBSN remains 
                                                          
58 The capital amount has to be positive in the model, so when Greece in included in calculations the total 
equity of the Greek banking system is assumed to be slightly positive – close to zero for 2011Q4-2012Q4. 
59 In Basel III regulations leverage ratio is calculated roughly as Tier 1 Capital/Total Assets. 
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between 4-7%, with a dip in 2008. The Eurozone holds lower proportion of equity to assets 
(4-5.5%), the US ratio is significantly higher (6-9%) but the European financial hub – the 
Great Britain holds even smaller proportion of equity to assets (2.5% - 5%). A sharp fall 
can be observed for Greece in 2011 and 2012, when it was technically insolvent. Since the 
2008 financial crisis, the equity cushion of banking systems is being slowly rebuilt. 
Figure 4.2 Equity ratio (Total Equity/Total Assets) of selected banking systems in time 
(2005-2013). The lower the percentage the more leveraged the banking system is. 
 
Source: Own calculations; Bankscope 
4.5 Description of the topology of the Core Global Banking 
Systems Network 
The dynamics of network topology is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The in three instances of 
CGBSN are presented: first represents situation before the crisis (2006Q1), the middle 
graph is in the midst for financial crisis (2009Q1) and the last one shows the snapshot of 
the network after the crises (2013Q1). Graphs present the financial systems of 19 countries, 
with net cross-border exposures. The size of the node is proportional to the total netted 
positon, the blue nodes are net lenders, the red nodes are the net borrowers. The links are 
weighted and the thicker the edge, the larger the cross-border claim of the node at the end 
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Before the crisis the US is followed by Italy and then UK in net payables. During the 
financial and Eurozone crisis the Italian net position becomes smaller, but is still bigger 
than the British one, after the crises Italy and UK are no longer the top net borrowers, a 
group of new countries moves to the front– Belgium is the second biggest, followed by 
Ireland, India and Turkey. Belgium started as a net lender and after the Eurozone crisis 
became the net borrower. Belgic banking system has suffered huge losses in 2008 when 
Fortis group was sold to BNP Paribas and in 2011 Dexia group was dismantled. 
Before the crisis the biggest net lender is Switzerland followed by Germany and the 
Netherlands, during the crisis France becomes the most exposed to the foreign debt (see 
also Figure 4.8 where an almost triple increase in French receivables before the financial 
crisis and a high exposure in the aftermath of the crisis can be observed), while Switzerland, 
Japan and Germany occupy the second, third and fourth position respectively. 
In 2013, the biggest net lender is Japan – a non-European country, again followed by 
Switzerland, France and Germany, also Canada, which becomes one of the top net lenders. 
The gradual increase of lending activity of Japan can be observed. The Dutch banking 
system was strongly exposed before the crisis, but managed to decrease its exposure from 
almost $0.9 trillion to the “mere” $0.17 trillion. 
Among the PIIGS the biggest borrower is always Italy. Spain is the only banking system 
from the PIIGS that started as a net lender, became a borrower during the crisis but returned 
to the net lender position in 2013 (with net receivables even higher than the Netherlands). 
Ireland started as a small net lender and became gradually more and more indebted in 2013. 
Greece on the other hand, in popular press regarded as “the troublemaker” held net debt of 
$157bn before the crisis, in 2009 its debt increased to a significant $228bn, but in 2013 
became a small net lender with $13bn in net receivables. This can be explained by the bail-
out of Greece where debt towards banking systems became debt to international institutions 
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and other sovereigns, which means that the crediting has been shifted from private to public 
sector. 
The tiered layout in the graphs on Figure 4.3 is constructed according to the gross 
borrowing of the country. The range of gross borrowing of all countries is taken as a ratio 
of each country’s gross payables divided by that of the country with the highest borrowing. 
Countries that are ranked in the top 70 percentile of this ratio constitute the inner core. The 
mid-core is constructed from countries between 70 and 30 percentile and the out-core 
between 30 and 10 percentile. Countries with the lower ratio belong to the periphery. The 
links are colour coded according to the tier membership of the originating node. 
The only country in the inner tier is always the US. We can see that it owes huge amount 
payable to Switzerland and the UK. With the rise of the financial crisis the American 
banking system increased its debts to Japan and France, but in 2013 the exposures of 
European economies become smaller and increase in Japanese and Canadian exposure can 
be observed. 
The mid-core tier is populated initially only by the United Kingdom, joined by Germany 
just during the crisis in 2009. The highest weight of the British out-degree has a link 
between the UK and Germany equal to $551.6bn in 2006 and gradually becoming lower 
($312.9bn in 2009 and $218.7bn in 2013), eventually being overtaken by the debt to Spain 
in 2013 ($304.4bn). The outer-core banking systems are mostly France, Germany, Japan, 
the Netherlands and from the PIIGS: Italy and Spain. One can observe that during the 
financial crisis (2009) and after the Eurozone crisis (2013) Italy holds a significant debt 
towards France. All remaining countries belong to the periphery of the Core Global 





Figure 4.3 Changes of the CGBS network topology. 2006Q1, 2009Q1, 2013Q1 are 
respectively a pre-crisis, intra-crisis (post-Lehman collapse) and post-crisis networks. 
Distance from the centre is proportional to the gross amount payable. Direction of 





Source: Own calculations 
The CGBS network misses out big player from financial markets, which has some 
implications for our analysis. The biggest of these is China. The reason is that China is not 
a BIS reporting country, in general due to the communist dictatorship and lack of free 
market economy in anglosaxon terms, the Chinese financial system is not transparent and 
not all the information are disclosed. Nevertheless we can expect that China to be a big net 
lender with high exposure to the US, Japan and other developed countries. It would 
probably remain in the mid or outer tiers of the network graphs as the gross amount payable 
would not be less than 0.7 of the American exposure. It is very difficult to say what is the 
amount of equity capital in the Chinese banking system, there are several issues: the 
majority of financial system is state controlled, there is very big shadow banking system, 
the rate-exchange of chinese renminbi to dollar is not free floating, so the calculations in 
dollars would be undermined (The Telegraph, 2014). 
116 
 
It can be seen that the network topology becomes more tiered during the financial crisis 
and after the crisis when more banking systems move towards periphery. Nevertheless 
every banking system within the Core Global Banking System can be of a potential threat 
due to the highly interconnected structure of the network, as the sovereign crisis started in 
a peripheral country and created waves throughout the system (Kalbaska and Gątkowski, 
2012; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). The stability of the network will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
4.5.1 Network statistics  
On a basic level a network is characterised by a few simple measures. The simplest are 
in- and out-degrees, i.e. links between nodes, in degrees being edges ending at a node and 
out degrees edges originating from a node. In the terminology of the financial networks in-
degree and out-degree of a node mean lending and borrowing activities respectively. 
Connectedness is the share of number of actual nodes in the network to all the possible 
nodes. Clustering coefficient gives the average probability that two neighbours of a node 
are themselves neighbours (Newman, 2010). The description of the network measures can 
be found in Chapter 3 section 3.2.2. 
Distribution of the node degrees in the network can be obtained, by computing number 
of in or out degrees for a given node and then sorting the nodes according to the number of 
degrees. The network connectivity and density measures do not change significantly in time 
on the global level. Table 4.3 provides network statistics of the CGBSN for selected 
quarters representing pre-crisis period (2006Q1), during the Global Financial Crisis 
(2009Q1) and post-crisis (2013Q1). In the full examined period the number of edges varies 




Table 4.3 Description of global network statistics for the CGBSN for selected quarters 
(2006Q1; 2009Q1; 2013Q1). 
  
2006Q1 2009Q1 2013Q1 
Nodes 19 19 19 
Edges 170 169 169 
CC 0.994 0.988 0.988 
Connect 0.994 0.988 0.988 
Mean in 8.947 8.895 8.895 
Mean out 8.947 8.895 8.895 
Std in 5.169 5.065 4.408 
Std out 5.027 4.852 4.306 
Kurt in -1.184 -1.099 0.175 
Kurt out -1.212 -1.037 0.225 
Skew in 0.169 0.419 -0.169 
Skew out -0.238 -0.483 0.169 
Source: Own calculations 
Notes: CC – clustering coefficient; Connect – connectedness; Mean in/out – mean for in/out degrees; Std 
in/out – standard deviation for in/out degrees; Kurt in/out – kurtosis for in/out degrees; Skew in/out - 
skewness for in/out degrees 
Similarly the Table 4.4 provides information on the local network statistics for particular 
countries in selected quarters. Out-degrees is the number of financial systems the countries 
borrow from, in-degrees is the number of countries the financial system lends to, and CC 
stands for clustering coefficient. Detailed global and local network statistics for each 
quarter can be found in Appendix B. 
Local clustering coefficients for particular nodes (Table 4.4) remain stable both in time 
and across the nodes. It is important to note, that the CGBS network is close to a complete 
network - almost all nodes are connected to all other nodes. The sample consists of BIS 
reporting countries, so network contains information about all cross-border exposures of 
the banking systems to reporting countries. In the core-periphery language (Craig and von 
Peter, 2010) focus is at the core of the worldwide network and it should not come as a 
surprise that all countries in the core have financial linkages between them. The 
completeness of the CGBSN network is the reason why both connectivity and clustering 
coefficient are always close to the maximum value for this type of the network, namely 1. 
In other words there is almost 100% probability that two nodes which are neighbour of a 
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node are also neighbours60. A more informative is investigation of the direction and the 
weight of edges, (viz. the net position and the amount due of the country) than the fact of 
degree existence as such. 
Table 4.4 Statistics of the nodes of the CGBSN for selected quarters (2006Q1; 2009Q1; 
2013Q1).  
  2006Q1 2009Q1 2013Q1 
Country K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC 
Australia 14 3 1 13 5 0.987 13 5 0.987 
Austria 9 9 0.993 8 10 0.987 10 8 0.987 
Belgium 3 15 0.993 5 13 0.987 11 7 0.987 
Canada 9 9 0.993 12 5 0.993 8 10 0.987 
France 4 14 0.993 1 17 0.987 4 14 0.987 
Germany 5 13 0.993 7 11 0.987 7 11 0.987 
Greece 16 1 1 15 2 0.993 10 7 0.993 
India 12 6 0.993 14 3 0.993 12 6 0.987 
Ireland 9 9 0.993 9 9 0.987 18 0 0.987 
Italy 14 4 0.993 11 7 0.987 8 10 0.987 
Japan 3 15 0.993 2 16 0.987 1 17 0.987 
Netherlands 2 16 0.993 5 13 0.987 7 11 0.987 
Portugal 13 5 0.993 12 5 0.993 11 6 0.993 
Spain 11 7 0.993 11 7 0.987 7 11 0.987 
Sweden 6 12 0.993 4 14 0.987 5 12 0.993 
Switzerland 0 18 0.993 0 18 0.987 2 16 0.987 
Turkey 16 2 0.993 15 3 0.987 16 1 0.993 
United Kingdom 10 8 0.993 11 7 0.987 10 8 0.987 
United States 14 4 0.993 14 4 0.987 9 9 0.987 
Source: Own calculations 
Notes: K out – out degree, K in – in degree, CC – local clustering coefficient 
Investigation of the distribution of number of lenders and borrowers (out- and in- 
degrees) (Table 4.3) gives no conclusive results about the shape of the distribution. Third 
and fourth moments of the distribution are sometimes negative, sometimes positive. 
Kurtosis becomes less negative in time, positive after 2012Q1, which can be interpreted as 
“broadening” of the distribution, but skewness does not exhibit visible trend. Distribution 
                                                          
60 Two nodes are neighbours if there is a link between them, regardless of the direction of the link.  The 
clustering coefficient taking into account directions of the edges would be half of the reported one. Due to 




does not resemble the typical degree distribution for the small world network, with tail 
distribution following the power law.  
Figure 4.4 presents frequency of out degrees of the CGBS network for an exemplary 
quarter (2006Q1). Investigation of the chart confirms the conclusion about the lack of 
power law in tail distribution. Distributions is not unimodal, hence the standard description 
of the parameters of the distribution isn’t useful in this case.  
Figure 4.4 Histogram of out degrees of the CGBS network for 2006Q1. 
 
Source: Own calculations 
The power law can be only seen in the tail of the distribution of the cross-borders 
exposures, i.e. the weights of the edges of the CGBSN. We can observe that there is a group 
of edges, for which the amount of the net debt of a country can be exponentially higher than 
for the rest of the CGBSN exceeding even $625bn. We show that on the example of 2013Q1 
on Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.5 Histogram of the cross-border exposures (the weights of the edges) of the 
CGBS network for 2013Q1. 
 
Source: Own calculations 
4.6 Cross-border exposures in the Core Global Banking 
System Network 
An analysis of the dynamics of the degree node centrality can give an insight on the 
changes of interconnectedness in the network. Figure 4.6. illustrates change in time in 
number of out-degrees in the CGBSN. Out-degrees indicate the number of lenders to the 
country. It can be seen that the US and the UK are the countries borrowing from the highest 
number of counterparty financial systems, and, on the contrary, Japan and Switzerland are 
the financial systems, which are lending to the highest number of countries61. 
Change in time in the number lenders for PIIGS is presented on Figure 4.6. PIIGS as the 
countries with the highest debt to GDP ratio in Eurozone62, have high number of out-
degrees, i.e. countries they borrow from. The trend is falling and after the Eurozone crisis 
there is a further drop in number of lenders to the PIIGS, the minimum is reached by the 
end of the 2013. The effect can be attributed to the bailout packages and debt restructuring.  
                                                          
61 Low out-degrees imply high in-degrees (lending), which follows from almost full connectivity of the 
network (see section 4.5.1). 
62 According to Eurostat, the gross debt to GDP ratio in 2013 was equal to: 128% for Portugal and Italy, 
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The only country among PIIGS with a rising trend is Ireland, from the second half of 
2011 throughout the 2012,  the number of lenders to Ireland increased sharply and stabilised 
in 2013. A different path for the Ireland can be explained by the fact, that after the EU-IMF 
bailout at the end of 2010, it went through a successful series of reforms dealing with 
financial crisis and already in 2011, first signs of improvement were visible (The Lisbon 
Council, 2011), and already in 2012 Ireland raised money through the financial markets. 
Figure 4.6 Number of lenders to the US, the UK, Japan, Switzerland and the average 
number of lenders to PIIGS and the remaining Eurozone countries. Out-degrees 
centrality of nodes indicates the nodes with the dominance in borrowing (2005Q4-
2013Q4) 
 
Source: Own calculations; BIS 
Notes: PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain; Eurozone – nonPIIGS: Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria; In 2013Q4 BIS changed the rules for classification of Swiss exposure, thus 
out-degrees for that quarter is removed 
It is informative to see how the number of lenders changed for non-PIIGS Eurozone 
countries. Figure 4.6 reveals that non-PIIGS Eurozone countries (viz. Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria) were in an upward trend, with an acceleration after the 
Eurozone crisis started. Belgium is a stark example of this pattern, it borrowed from around 
3 counterparties in the first years in the sample, but later (staring with the subprime crisis 



























crisis. This, combined with the downward PIIGS trend suggests that the Euro crisis, has 
virtually shifted debts from the PIIGS to the northern Eurozone countries, confirming that 
there is a double tier structure within the Eurozone. 
Figure 4.7 Total cross-border exposure in gross terms and total equity of 19 countries 
(the CGBSN) in $bn (2005Q4-2013Q4). The total equity data is available for end of 
the year only 
 
Source: BIS; Bankscope 
The number of degrees of countries gives just the number of counterparties, without 
taking into account the amount of exposure. Figure 4.7 presents the gross63 total cross-
border exposures of all banking systems in the CGBSN. It reveals that between 2005Q4 
and 2008Q1 total amount borrowed (or lend) grew to the maximum of $22.6bn, which 
represents 75% growth with respect to the minimum of $12.9bn in 2005Q4. Total exposure 
fell by 20% in 2008, when the system experienced a shock, the financial crisis, which 
started a downward trend, with a fall by almost 17% between 2009Q3 and 2013Q4, when 
it reached $16.1bn, back to the 2006 figures. 
                                                          
63 Gross position is the actual amount of cross-border exposure before netting it with the opposite 
positions from the rest of the system 



















































































Whereas the financial crisis of 2008 hit the system in a visible manner, there is not as 
strong evidence in the cross-border exposure gross data of Eurozone crisis in 2010. 
Nevertheless the shock introduced by the Eurozone crisis, albeit smaller seems to be more 
persistent in terms of the total strength and is still ongoing. The strong effect of financial 
crisis on the level of exposure is not explained solely by the inclusion of the US in the 
sample. When the US cross-border exposures are not taken into the account in the whole 
sample the effects of the Sovereign crisis are not well visible either.  
The biggest debtor is the US, in both net and gross terms64. Figure 4.8 presents the gross 
positions of the countries, that borrow the most in gross terms (top chart) and of financial 
systems, that lend the most (lower chart). With respect to gross payables the UK is always 
at the second place, than the Germany and France (dash and dot line on top chart of Figure 
4.8), Italy (dash and double dotted line on top chart of Figure 4.8) comes fifth in the ranking 
of top gross borrowers, being also the biggest borrower among PIIGS. 
 In gross terms initially it is Germany, that is the top gross lender (i.e. with the highest 
receivables), but during the financial crisis years receivables of the UK, Germany, France 
(dash and dot line on lower chart of Figure 4.8) are similar putting these banking systems 
ex aequo at the first place. Eventually, after the Sovereign crisis, the UK is the banking 
system with the highest gross lending, but is closely followed, by Japan, Germany and 
France. An increased lending activity of Japan is clearly seen between 2005Q1 and 2013Q4 
as it moved from the fifth place to the runner-up position, on the other hand Swiss financial 
system has decreased its lending almost twofold from a maximum of $2.3tn in 2007Q1 to 
$1.2tn in 2013Q4. 
                                                          
64 The increase in the American receivables after the financial crisis of 2008 is the result of change of the 
status of investment banks (Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch) into bank holding companies and thus them 
becoming included in BIS statistics. 
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Figure 4.8 Receivables and Payables of top borrowers and lenders of the CGBSN in 
gross terms, in $bn (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
 
Source: BIS; own calculations 
It can be concluded that financial crisis of 2008 was a global phenomenon which saw 
the exposures of the top lenders and borrowers fall, whereas the Eurozone crisis’s 














2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 2008Q4 2009Q4 2010Q4 2011Q4 2012Q4 2013Q4
Top gross borrowers
United States Receivables United Kingdom Receivables Germany Receivables France Receivables
United States Payables United Kingdom Payables Germany Payables France Payables













2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 2008Q4 2009Q4 2010Q4 2011Q4 2012Q4 2013Q4
Top gross lenders
Japan Receivables United Kingdom Receivables Germany Receivables France Receivables
Japan Payables United Kingdom Payables Germany Payables France Payables
Switzerland Receivables Switzerland Payables
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4.6.1 Cross-border exposures of PIIGS and the rest of Eurozone 
In this subsection we want to explore the cross-border exposures of two blocks of 
countries PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) and the remaining Eurozone (non-
PIIGS Eurozone: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria) as a whole to major 
banking systems of the CGBSN. Network in three instances: pre-crisis (2006Q1), during 
the sub-prime crisis (2009Q1) and post-crisis (2013Q1) is pictured on Figure 4.9. Direction 
of arrows points from the borrower to the lender. The structure of the network and 
exposures, represented by the thickness of links can be observed in time.  
Firstly, it can be seen that PIIGS borrow mainly from non-PIIGS Eurozone banking 
systems. The exposure was growing between 2006 and 2009, and was high at the eve of 
Sovereign Crisis: the net payables of PIIGS to the remaining Eurozone were equal 
$1166.8bn in 2009Q1, which was constituted 87% of the PIIGS net payables. In the post 
crisis period the net payables figure fell to $466.91bn. The only other significant lender to 
PIIGS is Switzerland, who decreased its exposure between 2006 and 2013 from $105bn to 
$37bn. In pre-crisis period PIIGS owe small share of debt to non-Eurozone financial 
systems of the Other block (i.e. Australia, Canada, India, Turkey, Sweden) but in 2009 and 
2013 become a net lender to these countries. The UK and the US are net borrowers of PIIGS 
with the UK’s position increasing between each of the examined quarters. 
Another interesting dynamics in the network is the size of net exposure of non-PIIGS 
Eurozone countries, which fell three times between pre-crisis to post-crisis time (from 
$3323bn to $1056bn). At the same time non-PIIGS Eurozone financial systems moved in 
terms of gross borrowing from the mid-core to in-core tier of the network, viz. their gross 
borrowing became higher than 70% of the US (the largest borrower).  
The decrease in net exposure was influenced by the a decrease of the net receivables 
from the US and the UK. From 2006 to 2009 the net receivables fell from $1476bn (US) 
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and $891bn (UK) to $1130bn (US) and $585bn (UK) respectively. The rate of fall of the 
net receivables from the US and the UK increased during the crisis times and in 2013 the 
exposure from the US fell by the factor of two (to $538bn) and from the UK by the factor 
of 3 (to $175bn). 
When the US was decreasing its net debt to the non-PIIGS Eurozone (what is interesting 
the debt to PIIGS increased in the financial crisis and fell afterwards to the level which was 
in 2013Q1 still higher than in 2006Q1), its net payables to Japan and the group of Other 
countries grew significantly between the crisis and post-crisis period (from $677bn to 
$899bn in the former case, and from $283bn to $599bn in the latter). 
The last interesting finding revealed in this analysis of the network of cross-border 
exposures is that the block of Other countries in pre-crisis 2006Q1 was a net borrower, 
continued as such throughout the financial crises but concluded the post-crisis 2013Q1 as 
a net lender. 
To sum up, the main findings are: 
1) PIIGS were heavily indebted to the non-PIIGS Eurozone countries at the eve of 
the Eurozone crisis,  
2) PIIGS owe small share of debt to non-Eurozone economies. 
3) The role of extra-European financial systems like Japan and more peripheral like 
Australia, Canada, India, Turkey is growing in terms of cross-border lending 
capabilities, while the role of traditionally strong British and American systems 
is decreasing. 
The first two points suggests that there are basis to distinguishing between the core and 
periphery within Eurozone (Skaperdas, 2011).  
For the more detailed analysis of the cross-border exposures in the CGBSN please refer 
to the Appendix C. 
127 
 
Figure 4.9 The CGBS network presented with blocks of PIIGS, non-PIIGS Eurozone 
countries and other countries. Direction of arrows goes from borrowing country to 
lending banking system. Weight of arrows represent amount due. Colours of arrows 







Source: Own calculations; 
Notes: PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain; non-PIIGS Eurozone: Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria; Other: Australia, Canada, India, Turkey, Sweden; 
4.7 Stability Analysis of the Core Global Banking System 
Network 
4.7.1 Maximum eigenvalue and network stability65 
May (1972, 1974) derives a closed form solution for the maximum eigenvalue of the 
sparse random network, known as the May stability condition. A network is deemed to be 
unstable if its maximum eigenvalue is greater than 1, viz.  
√𝑁𝐶𝜎 > 1 ,    (4.13) 
where N is the number of nodes, C - connectivity, the probability that any two randomly 
selected nodes are connected, and σ, the standard deviation of the node strength. 
                                                          
65 This section extends the description of the section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3 and underlines again the most 
significant findings of seminal Sir Robert May papers (1972, 1974) 
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May showed that there is a trade off between heterogeneity in node strength, 
connectivity and network size. These three parameters cannot be increased simultaneously 
without contributing to the instability of the network. The above trade off was not 
sufficiently understood by economists in their studies of financial networks. The large 
networks such as the financial networks, which have fat tailed link distribution and a large 
standard deviation in node strength, would have to have very low connectivity to remain 
stable. Sinha (2005) extended the May’s findings to the real world networks and showed 
that the stability condition also holds for the small-world structures.  
In sum, the May stability condition in terms of the maximum eigenvalue of the weighted 
matrix representing the network system is an explicit function of network statistics 
regarding the number of nodes, connectivity and standard deviation of node strength (taken 
as row sums) indicating heterogeneity of weighted link distribution. All three cannot 
increase and the system remain stable with regards to maximum eigenvalue and a given 
threshold ρ often called the “cure rate” in the epidemic models where interconnectedness 
of nodes is key to the spread of contagion from infected individuals, while the cure rate 
allows them to stay healthy up to the point. 
The Markose (2012), inspired by May (1972, 1974), directly adopted the framework in 
Wang et. al. (2003) to determine the stability conditions in terms of a threshold rate of the 
policy variable, viz. equity capital.  In other words, the extant capital regulatory framework 
is analogous to a homogenous cure rate in the epidemic models. This has led to the so called 
eigen-pair method in which there is a simultaneous determination of the maximum eigen-
value of the networked system of bilateral liabilities of financial intermediaries adjusted for 
Tier 1 equity capital and the corresponding right eigen-vector centrality measure for who 
contributes to instability. We extend this framework from the level of financial 
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intermediaries to the level of country banking systems and cross-border exposures (see 
section 4.3.1). 
4.7.2 Stability analysis 
This section discusses the stability of the CGBS network in terms of systemic threat 
posed by banking systems to the solvency and equity capital of their counterparties. A 
banking system network is deemed to be stable if an adverse event (insolvency of a country 
which results in non-payment of debts) the contagion does not spread to the remaining 
banking systems. On the other hand instability of the banking system is judged by the 
susceptibility of the system to the contagion effects: the bigger the contagion effect, the 
bigger instability. The contribution of a banking system to the systemic instability is called 
systemic importance of the node and susceptibility of a banking system’s solvency to the 
adverse events in the network is called vulnerability of the node. 
Figure 4.10 Systemic Risk Index (maximum eigenvalue) of the CGBSN (2005Q4-
2013Q4) and Loss multiplier (Castrén and Rancan (2013)) in period (2005Q4-2012Q1) 
 
Source: Castrén and Rancan (2013); own calculations 
Note: For quarters between 2011Q4-2012Q4 the Systemic Risk Index is calculated for CGBS network 
















































































































































Figure 4.11 Systemic Risk Index (maximum eigenvalue) of the CGBSN and VIX (the 
last day of a quarter value) (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange; own calculations 
Note: For quarters between 2011Q4-2012Q4 the Systemic Risk Index is calculated for CGBS network 
without Greece, when it was virtually bankrupt with negative equity capital in banking system. 
The stability analysis of banking systems can be used in a macro prudential context (Gai 
et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2011) to search for early warning signals of global banking system 
instability (Markose, 2013; Minoiu et al., 2013). In this section the approach to the global 
banking system stability is based on eigen-pair method developed by Markose (2012) and 
Markose at al. (2012). The novelty of this systemic risk measure is that it is not market 
price based index, but relies on liabilities to capital ratio. As it has been noticed in the 
survey of systemic risk analytics in Markose (2013), the market price based systemic risk 
measures are unable to give early warning signals before the market crash.  
The degree of instability of the Core Global Banking System liabilities matrix adjusted 
for the equity capital buffers of the exposed national banking systems, captured by the 
maximum eigenvalue of the Θ matrix is pictured on Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 as a solid 
line. The maximum eigenvalue is called a Systemic Risk Index as it indicates the level of 
instability of the CGBSN.  It is seem to jump from 0.26 in 2006Q4 to over 0.45 in 2007Q1 









































































































































crisis of 2008 starting with BNP Paribas hedge funds collapse followed by Bear Sterns 
bankruptcy in the second half of 2007. After the financial crisis the Systemic Risk Index 
falls in 2009 persists at high level, between 0.35 and 0.42, until the end of 2012. Maximum 
eigenvalues of over 25% continue to persist until the last quarter of 2013 indicating that the 
system instability can trigger crisis with losses that can exceed 25% of a national banking 
equity buffer. 
The above results are contrasted with Castrén and Rancan (2013) loss multiplier measure 
(Figure 4.10) and VIX66 index of market volatility (Figure 4.11). The loss multiplier67 is 
defined as “the ratio between the final total loss of the entire system and the initial loss that 
was caused by the payment default of the triggering country” (ibidem). As can be seen both 
indices do not rise till the onset of the crisis in mid-2007 or even mid-2008. The VIX index 
returns to low values and spikes again in 2010 and 2011 when Eurozone crisis was already 
in place.  
4.7.3 Ex-post structural break test 
A statistical test for structural breaks in time series of maximum eigenvalue Systemic 
Risk Index is performed in order to provide a statistical insight of existence of structural 
breaks, which could be interpreted as points where crisis starts or finishes. The tested time 
series consists of 33 data points (quarters 2005Q4-2013Q4) plotted with solid line on Figure 
4.10. The test is performed ex-post (i.e. with data available for full period), so it is not taken 
for granted that the outcome can be interpreted in terms of an early warning signal. 
Statistical search for early warning signals would require different methods out of the scope 
                                                          
66 The VIX is the symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. Often referred to as the 
fear index, it represents one measure of the market's expectation of the volatility of S&P 500 index 
options over the next 30 day period. A high value corresponds to a more volatile market. 
67 The loss multiplier presented in Figure 4.10 is an average of loss multipliers for 11 countries calculated 
on confidential data of global flows (see Castrén and Rancan (2013), pp 21 and 29) 
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of this chapter. For a review of growing body of research for detecting early warning signals 
for critical transitions see Scheffer et al. (2009). 
The Break Point Chow68 test is used with a bootstrap modification proposed by 
Candelon and Lutkepohl (2001), which is performing better in a small sample. It is assumed 
that SRI time series follows the basic autocorrelation model with one lag: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,    (𝑡 = 1,… ,32)    (4.14) 
OLS estimation results of the above model are presented in Table 4.5, both terms: 
constant and legged coefficient are statistically significant. 
Test is run with a null hypothesis of parameter constancy of the above model before 
and after the brake (TB), where  TB ∈ (2006Q1, … , 2013Q3). The test is repeated for 
each quarter in the set. In order to achieve better test performance the number of bootstrap 
replications is set to 50,000. Test returns the p-value with which the null hypothesis of no 
structural brake at TB is rejected. 
Table 4.5 OLS results for AR(1) model (4.1) 









0.699 0.120 0.000 5.840 
R2 0.5320 
0.5164 Adjusted R2 
Source: own computation 
                                                          
68 The test is run with the JMulTi software accompanying Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004). 
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Figure 4.12 Bootstrapped p-values of break point Chow test for all quarters between 
2006Q1 and 2013Q3. Dashed lines represent the p-value = 0.1 (upper line) and 0.05 
(lower line). 
 
Source: own computation 
The results of the test are presented on the Figure 4.12. The test suggests the break points 
in 2009Q2 or 2009Q3 with 94% probability and in 2011Q4 with 96% probability. The 
former break indicates the end of the sub-prime financial crisis and the latter is the result 
of the removal of the Greece from the CGBSN, which was in dire straits in 2012 with 
negative total equity of its banking system.  The break point at the end of 2006 is not 
indicated with this statistical method, because the sample before this period is too short to 
give possibly significant results, nevertheless the jump in SRI value from 2006Q4 to 
2007Q1 is clearly visible on Figure 4.10.  
With a longer dataset available it would be possible to validate the 2006Q4 with the 
Chow test. Another method for providing early warning signals would be a threshold 
approach, where a dynamic threshold dependant on the quality of assets and availability of 
capital would indicate when the early warning signal is triggered. The example of formula 
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for such a threshold is given in the footnote 49, it is research is progress and the results will 
be presented in future publications. 
4.7.4 Systemic Risk Index with Greek bankruptcy 
For reference purposes the maximum eigenvalue Systemic Risk Index of the Core 
Global Banking System Network with Greek banking system included when it was 
technically bankrupt69 is plotted on Figure 4.13.  
The maximum eigenvalue reaches very high levels, well above 2.5, between 2011Q4 
and 2012Q4, when Greece is bankrupt. It indicates that the network is intrinsically unstable, 
a slightest perturbation can lead it to collapse.  
Figure 4.13 Systemic Risk Index Maximum eigenvalue of the CGBSN (2005Q4-
2013Q4). Greece is bankrupt between 2011Q4 and 2012Q4. 
 
Source: own computation 
In the matter of fact, had there been no bail-out of Greece the global banking system 
would have been certainly disrupted. The biggest four of Greek banks (National Bank of 
Greece SA, Eurobank Ergasias SA, Alpha Bank AE) had negative total equity at the time, 
                                                          
69 Between last quarter of 2011 and last quarter of 2012, Greek banks reported negative equity, which has 




























































































































and required recapitalization. The National Bank of Greece alone lost $12.7bn in 
restructuring of the Greek sovereign debt (CNBC, 2012) and the Eurobank, which lost 
$6.7bn, had to be split from the Swiss EFG Group (Reuters, 2012).  
4.7.5 Systemic importance and vulnerability of nodes in the Core Global 
Banking System Network 
The eigen-pair Markose (2012) method not only gives the systemic stability index in the 
form of the maximum eigenvalue of the stability matrix, but also simultaneously gives right 
and left eigenvectors corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue. The right eigenvector 
centrality gives the rank order of the systemically important countries who by their default 
on substantial segments of loans can cause damage to banking systems exposed to them. 
The left eigenvector centrality gives the rank order of those banking systems that are 
vulnerable to the contagion. It has been confirmed that the right eigenvector centrality is a 
good proxy of losses that the failure of the banking system can bring in a contagion wave 
and left eigenvector centrality is a good proxy for the losses incurred by the banking system 
when the contagion is triggered in another point in the network. 
The systemic importance index for the major economies and blocks of countries of 
CGBSN is captured on Figure 4.14. As expected the biggest systemic threat is posed by the 
United States, but the scale of the US importance may be surprising. The whole Core Global 
Banking System Network is basically dwarfed by the American liabilities. Not surprisingly 
the failure of Bear Stearns in 2007 and Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008 triggered waves 
throughout global financial system – the systemic importance index at the time was at the 
levels above 0.9. The index fell to around 0.8 during the Sovereign Crisis, with a visible 
tweak due to the Greek bankruptcy and bailout, but returned to almost 0.9 in 2013Q4. 
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Figure 4.14 Systemic importance index (right eigenvector centrality) of the US, the 
UK, Japan, Switzerland and averages for PIIGS, non-PIIGS Eurozone and other 
countries (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
Source: own calculations;  
Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity; PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain; Eurozone non-PIIGS: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria; Other: 
Australia, Canada, India, Turkey, Sweden 
Figure 4.15 Systemic vulnerability index (left eigenvector centrality) of the US, the 
UK, Japan, Switzerland and averages for PIIGS, non-PIIGS Eurozone and other 
countries (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
Source: own calculations;  
Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity; PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain; Eurozone non-PIIGS: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria; Other: 

















































































































































































































































The United Kingdom was ranked as the second most important country, but with 
systemic risk index at a third, or a half, of the US one. The British index increased twice in 
a aftermath of the subprime financial crisis and the closer then American relations with 
Eurozone did not permit it to return to pre-crisis values. 
The rest of the countries, including important players in Eurozone (Germany, France), 
are of a marginal systemic importance when compared with the above-mentioned financial 
systems, which can give insight of what mayhem would break loose, in case of financial 
failure of the US or the UK. The two financial systems are equivalent of “too interconnected 
to fail” (Markose et al., 2010) financial institutions. The block of “other” countries is less 
homogenous when it comes to systemic importance than in the case of systemic 
vulnerability. Turkey and India are most of the time in top 5 of the most systemically 
important countries, even though they have been dubbed members of the “fragile five” club 
(Financial Times, 2014b), it seems that their vulnerability in terms of cross-border 
exposures is much lower than the systemic threat they pose.  
An interesting insight is that the systemic importance of the PIIGS was higher than of 
the non-PIIGS Eurozone block until the late 2011. This is due to the high debts of PIIGS 
which after the Sovereign Crisis have been restructured and the main burden was taken by 
the rest of Eurozone, which led to the increase in systemic threat posed by the non-PIIGS 
Eurozone countries.  
Japan and Switzerland are main lenders in the CGBSN and are ranked the lowest when 
it comes to the systemic importance. The same is not true, however, when the vulnerability 
of these countries is discussed. Figure 4.15 gives paths of systemic vulnerability index (i.e. 
the left eigenvector centrality) and reveals that Switzerland is the most systemically 
vulnerable financial system in the CGBSN. Japan was ranked the third most vulnerable 
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financial system, after non-PIIGS Eurozone block, but, interestingly, after 2012 its 
vulnerability has increased to 0.25 and moved up in the ranking to the second position.  
When it comes to vulnerability the non-PIIGS Eurozone block is the second most fragile 
in the CGBSN, slightly overtaken by Japan in 2012-2013. Simultaneously the development 
of the PIIGS’s vulnerability reveals the how financial systems of these countries were 
damaged during the financial crises. Starting with minimal systemic vulnerability index, it 
experienced a jump in 2007Q1 then another in 2010Q2 when the Sovereign Crisis hit 
Eurozone. The high position of non-PIIGS Eurozone countries is a result of high lending 
of these banking systems, especially to the PIIGS, which become more vulnerable with the 
equity capital eroded by the losses incurred during the Eurozone crisis. 
The impact of the Sovereign Crisis in Eurozone is seen also in the case of the United 
Kingdom. Its vulnerability increased fivefold between beginning of 2010 and end of 2011, 
when it reached maximum. This can be a result of the UK acting as a hub for refinancing 
the PIIGS financial systems – borrowing money from financial systems from the outside 
of Eurozone and lending them to PIIGS.  The British vulnerability improved only in the 
last quarter of 2013. 
The US systemic vulnerability index is the lowest at all times, unfortunately the CGBSN 
captures only the cross-border banking exposures and there are others possible contagion 
channels, with which the American financial systems would probably be hurt. This fact 
underlines only the need of more granular mapping of actual financial interconnections to 
analyse the propagation of contagion in financial systems (Markose, 2013)70. 
                                                          
70 Although the mainstream macroeconomic tool box has not yet covered the Multi-Agent Financial 
Network (MAFN) modelling there is growing body of research aimed at the data-driven mapping of 
financial networks, presented on important conferences like the 2014 ESRC Conference “Diversity in 
Macroeconomics”, which was followed by the ESRC grant proposal “Diversity in Macroeconomics: New 
Perspectives from Agent-based Computational, Complexity and Behavioural Economics” with research 
team formed of leading economists like: Professor Paul de Grauwe (LSE); Professor  Michelle Baddeley 
(UCL); Professor Richard Werner (Southampton) and professor Sheri Markose (Essex) as a leader, with 
support of Dr. Simone Giansante (Bath). 
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4.7.5.1 Systemic importance and vulnerability of non-PIIGS Eurozone countries 
The most dangerous situation for the stability of the global banking system network is 
when the country of high systemic importance is at the same time, increasingly vulnerable, 
as the potential small adverse event can harm the financial system, which in turn can cause 
the huge damage to the global network. The example of such an instability was rise of the 
UK’s vulnerability (the second most systemically important country). In Figure 4.16 and 
Figure 4.17, the systemic importance and vulnerability the non-PIIGS Eurozone countries, 
and especially the biggest economies of the Eurozone: France and Germany is analysed in 
the context of the stability during the financial crises of 2008 and 2010. 
Figure 4.16 Systemic importance index (right eigenvector centrality) of France, 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 























































































































Figure 4.17 Systemic vulnerability index (left eigenvector centrality) of France, 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
Source: own calculations; Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity; 
The systemic importance of the all the countries in question was minimal before the rise 
of the financial crisis. An increase in systemic importance index was seen already in early 
2007, especially in case of Germany and Austria. Importance of the two financial systems 
was steadily increasing throughout and after the US financial crisis, whereas the Dutch and 
Belgic systemic importance grew just before the Eurozone Crisis. French ability to trigger 
contagion losses grew significantly in the midst of the Sovereign Crisis, the growth pattern 
seems to be disrupted between 2011Q4 and 2012Q4. This is not due to the removal of 
bankrupted Greece from the sample, as experiments conducted without Greece in the whole 
period of time shown no change in the French systemic importance index. At the same time 
France became the most vulnerable banking system of non-PIIGS Eurozone block after 
2009 overtaken only by the Netherlands in the last quarter of 2013. 
In 2013 Germany was the most systemically important country of the block, while 
France and the Netherlands posed the least threat of triggering the significant contagion in 
the CGBSN. The Netherlands saw a sharp increase in its vulnerability at the fourth quarter 






















































































































announcements of the ING repaying its debt to the government, the Netherlands remained 
vulnerable and grew to be the most vulnerable country in 2013Q4. 
The case of Belgic banking system is an interesting one, it was surprisingly vulnerable 
to the shocks in the CGBSN. In the matter of fact Belgium was the most vulnerable country 
in the whole Core Global Banking System Network until the second half of 2008, when its 
vulnerability was confirmed by the problems of Fortis group, eventually sold to BNP 
Paribas – which in its turn had an effect on French vulnerability. It can be seen on Figure 
4.17, that when the systemic vulnerability index for Belgium falls, it increases for France. 
At the same time the systemic importance of Belgium increased to the first position within 
the non-PIIGS Eurozone block (fifth overall) – and remained at high second place in 2013. 
This result would be difficult to detect without the eigen-pair method, only by looking at 
the raw data, as neither exposure of Belgium, nor change in its debt or the equity level 
shown changes dramatic enough to advocate the changes in systemic importance and 
vulnerability indices. The huge vulnerability of Belgium was indeed an indicator of the 
problems of its banking system a way before the financial crisis of 2008. 
4.7.5.2 Systemic importance and vulnerability of PIIGS 
The previous section documented the rise of systemic importance and of an even 
stronger increase in systemic vulnerabilities of non-PIIGS Eurozone countries during the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the Sovereign Crisis, which gives an evidence of the build-up 
of instability in the high income Eurozone countries at that time. Investigation of Figure 
4.18 and Figure 4.19 which illustrate respectively the systemic importance and systemic 
vulnerability of the PIIGS, shows, interestingly, that the right eigenvector centrality was 
higher and left eigenvector centrality measure was lower on average for PIIGS than for 
non-PIIGS Eurozone countries. In other words PIIGS posed more systemic threat and was 
less vulnerable than non-PIIGS Eurozone. 
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Figure 4.18 Systemic importance index (right eigenvector centrality) of Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
Source: own calculations; Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity; 
Figure 4.19 Systemic vulnerability index (left eigenvector centrality) of Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
Source: own calculations; Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity; 
As it has been argued before, a key factor contributing to the severity of crisis was the 
leverage in banking sector associated with strong credit growth (Lane and Mc Quade, 
2013). There has been a break of traditional relationship between deposits growth and credit 
growth as with globalisation, rise of complex financial derivatives and common currency 











































































































































































































































banking sector (see Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012; Allen et al., 2011). The Spanish case of 
the growth of cross-border banking is very illustrative. At the moment of adoption of the 
Euro, the bank lending could be almost fully financed by non-bank domestic creditors and 
when the subprime crisis commenced the deleveraging a half of the bank lending was 
financed by cross-border flows (Bruno and Shin, 2013). The huge part of the foreign 
financing came in through the securitization of debt (Carbó-Valverde et al., 2011).  
It has been shown section 4.6.1 shown that PIIGS were heavily indebted to the Eurozone 
countries before the Sovereign Crisis. The strong cross-border flows between PIIGS and 
non-PIIGS Eurozone countries could have been the channel of systemic risk spread, which 
lead to the vulnerability of high income Eurozone countries and subsequently led to the 
creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) after the €110bn bailout of 
Greece in May 2010, and help from the EFSF for Ireland (November 2010), Portugal (May 
2011) and again Greece in February 2012 (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012).  
With more than 400% growth of cross-border banking claims of countries like Ireland 
or Spain between 2003 and 2008 (consult figure 11 in Bruno and Shin, 2014), there is no 
surprise in growth of systemic importance of the PIIGS until the second half of 2009 as 
illustrated on Figure 4.18. At the eve of the Sovereign Crisis in 2010, the most systemically 
important country of a PIIGS block was Italy followed closely by Spain and Greece. In 
2010Q2 all PIIGS but Ireland, had a higher systemic importance ranking than Germany. 
The systemic importance index rose sharply for Ireland by the end of 2011 and in 2012, 
when it started to raise money through financial markets. At the end of 2013 the most 
systemically important were Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
Analysing the systemic vulnerability of PIIGS it can be noted that Ireland became very 
vulnerable before the financial crisis of 2008 but with the bail-out in the last quarter of 2010 
its vulnerability index falls to very low levels. Spain became the most vulnerable country 
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among PIIGS due to the Sovereign Crisis. Italian vulnerability increased already in 2007 
and was in a steady rise until the end of 2012. 
What is remarkable is that the recent vulnerability of the Portuguese banking system can 
be clearly seen in the second half of 2013. This eventually resulted in the collapse of the 
major Portuguese Banco Espirito Santo in August 2014, sparking fears of a second round 
of contagion in the Eurozone. The eigen-pair method shows that Portugal is becoming the 
most vulnerable banking system among PIIGS, which was not anticipated by other methods 
of analysis such as these given by the IMF71. 
4.8 Conclusion  
Financial network approach is becoming an important tool to assess the stability of 
financial systems, as statistical systemic risk measures are not accurate enough to capture 
the inherent collective behaviour of financial institutions. In contrast to standard financial 
network models, the recent empirical findings have strongly underlined that financial 
systems are neither random nor regular in terms of collective interactions of economic 
agents. These empirical studies mostly focus on interbank markets showing that the 
financial institutions are operating in a hierarchical fashion and the interbank markets are 
small-world networks. This study focuses on the topology of the global banking system and 
its contribution to global financial instability. 
This work confirms the tiered structure of the cross-border linkages and by using the 
eigen-pair method of Markose (2012) and Markose et al (2012), we identify systemically 
important countries and vulnerable banking systems considering the aggregate equities of 
banking systems and cross-border financial exposures. The results reveal that United States, 
                                                          
71 As stated in Financial Times (2014): “In a progress report on the rescue in January, the IMF said “the 
financial sector remains stable” thanks to capital increases in the previous two years, while “adequate 
provisioning levels are being safeguarded through periodical impairment reviews”. 
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United Kingdom, Germany should be seen among the most systemically important 
countries, but there are also smaller countries like Belgium or Ireland that at times become 
a systemic threat. More importantly French, Spanish, Dutch and Swiss banking systems are 
found to be most vulnerable banking systems as potent propagators. There can be also seen 
a growing systemic threat from other countries like India and Turkey. 
This work is the first to use the eigen-pair method in the cross-border context. An 
important value added of this research is that it confirms the usefulness of the used measures 
of systemic importance and vulnerability as a tool for macroprudential policymaking. The 
novelty of using the ratio of cross-border exposures to the equity capital in banking system 
shows to be valuable in providing the early warning signals of mounting systemic stress. 
In contrast to measures suffering from the “volatility paradox”, like the loss multiplier from 
Castrén and Rancan (2013), the Systemic Risk Index based on maximum eigenvalue of the 
stability matrix, peaks for example long before the subprime financial crisis occurred. Even 
more importantly with Systemic Vulnerability Index, we have been able to point at 
problems of Portuguese banking system more than a half year before the collapse of one of 
its major banks and indicate problems in Belgic financial system before its major financial 
groups had to be bailed out. 
Considering the recent approaches towards macro-prudential insights of financial 
stability policies, it is certain that the topological characteristics of financial systems should 
not be neglected (Krause and Giansante, 2012). In this framework, Bernanke (2009) argues 
that some sort of capital surcharges should be levied on financial institutions according to 
their systemic risks. Markose (2012, 2013) and Markose et al. (2012) propose that financial 
institutions should be taxed according to their corresponding eigenvector centralities.  
The future work includes widening the scope of the exercise by including exposures of 
sectors within countries and between sectors from different countries. This would require 
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more mapping of cross-border exposures of banking systems considering the limited 






Data sources and data manipulation 
 
Table A.1 Data sources for different variables       
Variable Source 
Foreign Claims of National 
Banking Systems, 2005-
2013 
Bank For International Settlements' Consolidated 
Banking Statistics. Table 9C 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm 
Aggregate Banking System 
Equity, 2005-2013 
Bankscope 
Source: Own compilation 
A.1 BIS Data 
Table A.2 presents the list of countries reporting to BIS the data fed into consolidated 
ultimate risk basis statistics. For the purpose of this research only countries for which 
sectorial breakdown is available are used (viz. countries in the BIS Table 9C mentioned in 
Table A.1). The reason for that is to keep comparability for the future reference with the 
ongoing research pursued by prof. Sheri Markose, where information on sectorial flows is 
used. 
Out of all 25 reporting countries no sectorial data is available for Chinese Taipei, South 
Korea, Singapore and Norway. Finland had to be removed from the sample as for this 
country data becomes available in 2010Q2. Due to problems with the Bankscope data 
availability Chile had to be removed subsequently from the sample as there was no 
information on equity of its banks before 2008. This resulted in final sample consisting of 
19 countries.  
There are 10 countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) belonging to Eurozone in the sample. It represents a subset 
of a full Eurozone consisting of 19 countries as of January 2015, but for the sake of 
simplicity it is called “Eurozone” within this thesis. 
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For Ireland banking system no data about receivables is available for the first quarter in 
the sample– 2005Q4. 
Table A.2 The BIS reporting countries for consolidated ultimate risk basis statistics as 









1 Australia 2004 X  
2 Austria 2005 X X 
3 Belgium 2004 X X 
4 Canada 2005 X  
5 Chile 2005 X  
6 Chinese Taipei 2004   
7 Finland 2005 X X 
8 France 2004 X X 
9 Germany 2004 X X 
10 Greece 2004 X X 
11 India 2005 X  
12 Ireland 2004 X X 
13 Italy 2004 X X 
14 Japan 2004 X  
15 South Korea 2013   
16 Netherlands 2004 X X 
17 Norway 2004   
18 Portugal 2004 X X 
19 Singapore 2005   
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20 Spain 2005 X X 
21 Sweden 2005 X  
22 Switzerland 2005 X  
23 Turkey 2004 X  
24 United Kingdom 2004 X  
25 United States 2004 X  
Source: Own compilation; http://www.bis.org/statistics/rep_countries.htm 
A.2 Bankscope data 
The Bankscope database was the most detailed source of data on banking systems and 
total equity of banks available. It has a significant advantage over other data sources – 
consistency. Using multiple data sources for different countries runs a risk of inconsistency 
between various data sources. In his paper, Bhattacharya (2003) indicates issues with 
coverage of small and local banks in Bankscope database, nevertheless in Financial 
Stability Review The Bank of England’s authors show that Bankscope covers more than 
90% of the total banking sector assets in most of the countries (Cunningham, 2001). 
In order to understand the quality of dataset, the percentage of reporting banks (see Table 
4.1 for numbers of banks for each country), for which data on total equity in a given year 
is available, is provided in Table A.3. Table A.4 also presents information on data quality 








Table A.3 Percentage of reporting banks given in Table 4.1, in each country for years 
2005-2013. Colours from red to green correspond to the increasing percentage. 
Country Percentage of reporting banks  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Australia 36% 74% 77% 81% 83% 94% 96% 98% 94% 
Austria 75% 84% 84% 87% 93% 96% 100% 100% 87% 
Belgium 69% 80% 77% 91% 89% 97% 100% 97% 86% 
Canada 10% 11% 12% 12% 13% 73% 96% 100% 92% 
France 68% 75% 80% 83% 86% 93% 99% 100% 91% 
Germany 86% 89% 90% 91% 94% 97% 100% 99% 88% 
Greece 87% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 93% 
India 71% 78% 82% 90% 92% 96% 98% 94% 89% 
Ireland 65% 68% 74% 71% 74% 82% 100% 100% 94% 
Italy 85% 88% 90% 92% 94% 97% 100% 99% 90% 
Japan 90% 91% 93% 93% 94% 97% 100% 97% 92% 
Netherlands 60% 60% 68% 83% 91% 92% 99% 95% 96% 
Portugal 56% 74% 74% 76% 85% 91% 100% 94% 97% 
Spain 71% 74% 62% 70% 82% 87% 94% 97% 88% 
Sweden 69% 78% 79% 83% 86% 92% 98% 100% 92% 
Switzerland 91% 91% 93% 93% 95% 96% 99% 100% 90% 
Turkey 35% 45% 50% 57% 60% 69% 93% 100% 86% 
Great Britain 67% 71% 76% 81% 85% 93% 99% 98% 93% 
United States 77% 76% 77% 78% 85% 88% 90% 96% 92% 
Total 78% 82% 83% 85% 89% 94% 98% 98% 90% 
Source: Bankscope 
Table A.4 Share of the assets of banks for which total equity is available (see Table 
A.3) in the total assets of a banking system for years 2005-2013. Colours from red to 
green correspond to the increasing percentage. 
Country Share of the assets of reporting banks  
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Australia 29% 96% 97% 97% 97% ~100% ~100% ~100% ~100% 
Austria 86% 96% 98% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100% 93% 
Belgium 95% 95% 95% 96% 99% ~100% 100% 99% 96% 
Canada 7% 8% 8% 8% 9% 96% 99% 100% 98% 
France 80% 84% 85% 98% 98% 99% 99% 100% 99% 
Germany 36% 63% 78% 79% 98% ~100% 100% ~100% 88% 
Greece 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% ~100% 
India 85% 90% 94% 96% 96% ~100% ~100% 99% 98% 
Ireland 90% 93% 94% 94% 94% 95% 100% 100% 94% 
Italy 76% 88% 90% 98% 97% 98% 100% ~100% 99% 
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Japan 68% 71% 89% 91% 98% 99% 100% 99% 98% 
Netherlands 76% 76% 78% 79% 98% ~100% ~100% 99% ~100% 
Portugal 90% 94% 94% 93% 95% 95% 100% ~100% ~100% 
Spain 66% 67% 68% 76% 77% 93% 96% 97% 98% 
Sweden 87% 96% 97% 97% 97% 99% ~100% 100% ~100% 
Switzerland 89% 88% 89% 90% 93% 96% 97% 100% 96% 
Turkey 47% 71% 84% 96% 96% 96% 98% 100% 89% 
Great Britain 90% 95% 95% 96% 98% 99% ~100% ~100% 98% 
United States 92% 92% 93% 92% 96% 97% 99% 97% 96% 
Total 75% 81% 87% 89% 94% 98% 99% 99% 96% 
Source: Bankscope 
Notes:  ~ - approximately 
The above tables primarily indicate that the Bankscope data quality is improving in time 
with exception of year 2013. The latter is due to the fact that not all data has been reported 
by the time the data has been downloaded from the Bankscope database.  
Data for years 2009-2012 is almost complete, which seems to be the result of increased 
reporting requirements introduced gradually after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. It can 
be expected that 2013 data will increase. Data on equity in Canadian banking system in 
years 2005-2009 is also problematic, from 2010, however, information on Canada is almost 
complete. Another country with initially low quality of data is Turkey, but it improves 
quickly and assets of banks for which information on equity is available exceeds 90% of 
total assets in 2008. On the other hand countries with the highest quality of data are Greece 
and Switzerland. Whereas in the Swiss case the high reporting standards can be a factor, in 
Greek case it is probably the small number of banks in the sample.  
In years 2005-2012 the overall number of banks for which information on equity is 
available falls below 80% only for 2005 and is higher than 94% in 2010-2012. In years 
2005-2012, with size of banks taken into account, the overall share of assets of reporting 
banks falls below 80% only for 2005 and is higher than 94% in 2009-2013. Only in 2013 
the share of banks dropped to 90%. 
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The analysis of the above tables can be concluded with statement that Bankscope 
database does not escape from quality issues, but as data become more and more reliable 









K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC
Australia 13 5 0.993 14 3 1 13 5 1 14 4 1 15 3 0.993 13 5 1 14 3 1 15 3 1 15 3 1
Austria 8 10 0.993 9 9 0.993 8 10 1 8 10 1 8 10 0.993 9 9 1 9 9 0.993 9 9 1 8 10 1
Belgium 3 15 0.993 3 15 0.993 3 15 1 3 15 1 3 15 0.993 2 16 1 3 15 0.993 3 15 1 3 15 1
Canada 10 8 0.993 9 9 0.993 9 9 1 10 8 1 9 9 0.993 9 9 1 9 9 0.993 8 10 1 10 8 1
France 4 14 0.993 4 14 0.993 4 14 1 4 14 1 4 14 0.993 4 14 1 4 14 0.993 4 14 1 3 15 1
Germany 5 13 0.993 5 13 0.993 5 13 1 5 13 1 5 13 0.993 6 12 1 6 12 0.993 6 12 1 7 11 1
Greece 14 4 0.993 16 1 1 17 1 1 17 1 1 16 2 0.993 16 2 1 16 2 0.993 16 2 1 17 1 1
India 12 5 1 12 6 0.993 11 7 1 11 7 1 12 5 1 13 5 1 13 5 0.993 14 4 1 14 4 1
Ireland 18 0 0.993 9 9 0.993 9 9 1 9 9 1 9 9 0.993 9 9 1 9 9 0.993 9 9 1 9 9 1
Italy 14 4 0.993 14 4 0.993 15 3 1 15 3 1 17 0 1 13 5 1 12 6 0.993 12 6 1 12 6 1
Japan 3 15 0.993 3 15 0.993 3 15 1 3 15 1 3 15 0.993 3 15 1 2 16 0.993 2 16 1 2 16 1
Netherlands 2 16 0.993 2 16 0.993 3 15 1 3 15 1 3 15 0.993 3 15 1 4 14 0.993 4 14 1 4 14 1
Portugal 12 5 1 13 5 0.993 15 3 1 15 3 1 12 6 0.993 14 4 1 13 5 0.993 13 5 1 13 5 1
Spain 10 8 0.993 11 7 0.993 11 7 1 11 7 1 12 6 0.993 10 8 1 10 8 0.993 10 8 1 10 8 1
Sweden 6 12 0.993 6 12 0.993 6 12 1 5 13 1 6 12 0.993 7 11 1 6 12 0.993 6 12 1 6 12 1
Switzerland 0 18 0.993 0 18 0.993 0 18 1 0 18 1 0 18 0.993 0 18 1 0 18 0.993 0 18 1 0 18 1
Turkey 15 3 0.993 16 2 0.993 16 2 1 15 3 1 13 5 0.993 16 2 1 15 2 1 16 2 1 14 4 1
United Kingdom 9 9 0.993 10 8 0.993 10 8 1 10 8 1 10 8 0.993 10 8 1 11 7 0.993 10 8 1 10 8 1
United States 12 6 0.993 14 4 0.993 13 5 1 13 5 1 13 5 0.993 14 4 1 14 4 0.993 14 4 1 14 4 1





Source: Own calculations 
Country
K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC
Australia 14 4 1 14 4 1 14 4 1 13 5 1 13 5 0.987 14 4 0.993 15 3 1 14 3 1 13 5 1 14 4 0.987 15 3 0.993 13 4 0.993
Austria 8 10 1 8 10 1 7 11 1 8 10 1 8 10 0.987 6 12 0.993 5 13 1 5 13 0.993 4 14 1 5 13 0.987 7 11 0.993 7 10 0.985
Belgium 3 15 1 3 15 1 3 15 1 4 14 1 5 13 0.987 5 13 0.993 6 12 1 8 10 0.993 9 9 1 9 9 0.987 8 10 0.993 8 10 0.98
Canada 9 9 1 9 9 1 11 7 1 13 5 1 12 5 0.993 11 7 0.993 12 6 1 11 7 0.993 11 7 1 9 9 0.987 9 9 0.993 8 9 0.985
France 3 15 1 3 15 1 3 15 1 2 16 1 1 17 0.987 1 17 0.993 1 17 1 1 17 0.993 1 17 1 3 15 0.987 1 17 0.993 2 16 0.98
Germany 7 11 1 7 11 1 7 11 1 7 11 1 7 11 0.987 7 11 0.993 7 11 1 6 12 0.993 6 12 1 6 12 0.987 6 12 0.993 6 12 0.98
Greece 17 1 1 17 1 1 16 2 1 16 2 1 15 2 0.993 14 3 1 16 2 1 16 2 0.993 15 3 1 14 3 0.993 14 3 1 14 2 0.992
India 14 4 1 14 4 1 15 3 1 15 3 1 14 3 0.993 14 3 1 14 4 1 13 5 0.993 14 4 1 14 3 0.993 14 3 1 13 4 0.993
Ireland 10 8 1 10 8 1 10 8 1 9 9 1 9 9 0.987 11 7 0.993 9 9 1 10 8 0.993 10 8 1 9 9 0.987 9 9 0.993 12 6 0.98
Italy 12 6 1 11 7 1 12 6 1 11 7 1 11 7 0.987 13 5 0.993 12 6 1 11 7 0.993 12 6 1 10 8 0.987 10 8 0.993 8 10 0.98
Japan 2 16 1 2 16 1 2 16 1 2 16 1 2 16 0.987 2 16 0.993 2 16 1 2 16 0.993 2 16 1 2 16 0.987 2 16 0.993 2 16 0.98
Netherlands 4 14 1 4 14 1 4 14 1 5 13 1 5 13 0.987 5 13 0.993 5 13 1 5 13 0.993 5 13 1 7 11 0.987 7 11 0.993 7 11 0.98
Portugal 13 5 1 12 6 1 11 7 1 11 7 1 12 5 0.993 12 6 0.993 12 6 1 12 6 0.993 12 6 1 10 7 0.993 10 8 0.993 10 8 0.98
Spain 10 8 1 11 7 1 10 8 1 11 7 1 11 7 0.987 11 7 0.993 11 7 1 11 7 0.993 11 7 1 10 8 0.987 10 8 0.993 11 7 0.98
Sweden 5 13 1 8 10 1 6 12 1 5 13 1 4 14 0.987 6 12 0.993 7 11 1 8 10 0.993 7 11 1 6 11 0.993 8 10 0.993 6 12 0.98
Switzerland 0 18 1 0 18 1 0 18 1 0 18 1 0 18 0.987 0 18 0.993 0 18 1 0 18 0.993 1 17 1 1 17 0.987 0 18 0.993 0 18 0.98
Turkey 16 2 1 14 4 1 16 2 1 14 4 1 15 3 0.987 14 4 0.993 13 5 1 13 4 1 14 4 1 15 3 0.987 15 3 0.993 16 2 0.98
United Kingdom 10 8 1 10 8 1 10 8 1 11 7 1 11 7 0.987 11 7 0.993 11 7 1 11 7 0.993 12 6 1 12 6 0.987 12 6 0.993 11 7 0.98
United States 14 4 1 14 4 1 14 4 1 14 4 1 14 4 0.987 13 5 0.993 13 5 1 13 5 0.993 12 6 1 13 5 0.987 13 5 0.993 14 4 0.98
2008Q32008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4
Country
K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC K out K in CC
Australia 13 5 1 13 5 1 13 5 1 13 5 0.993 13 5 1 11 6 1 12 6 0.987 11 7 0.98 13 5 0.987 11 7 0.98 12 6 0.993 10 8 0.987
Austria 7 11 1 8 10 1 7 11 1 6 12 0.993 9 9 1 7 11 0.993 8 10 0.987 10 8 0.98 10 8 0.987 10 8 0.98 9 9 0.993 9 9 0.987
Belgium 10 8 1 9 9 1 10 8 1 10 8 0.993 10 8 1 10 8 0.993 10 8 0.987 10 8 0.98 11 7 0.987 11 7 0.98 11 7 0.993 9 9 0.987
Canada 9 9 1 10 8 1 9 9 1 9 9 0.993 9 9 1 8 10 0.993 8 10 0.987 5 13 0.98 8 10 0.987 7 11 0.98 11 7 0.993 11 7 0.987
France 2 16 1 3 15 1 3 15 1 4 14 0.993 3 15 1 4 14 0.993 6 12 0.987 2 16 0.98 4 14 0.987 3 15 0.98 3 15 0.993 2 16 0.987
Germany 6 12 1 6 12 1 6 12 1 6 12 0.993 5 13 1 7 11 0.993 5 13 0.987 6 12 0.98 7 11 0.987 6 12 0.98 6 12 0.993 6 12 0.987
Greece 16 2 1 16 2 1 14 4 1 12 5 1 11 7 1 10 8 0.993 8 9 0.993 8 9 0.985 10 7 0.993 10 7 0.985 10 7 1 9 8 0.993
India 13 5 1 12 6 1 13 5 1 13 4 1 12 6 1 12 6 0.993 12 5 0.993 13 4 0.985 12 6 0.987 12 5 0.985 12 5 1 12 5 0.993
Ireland 13 5 1 13 5 1 13 5 1 17 1 0.993 17 1 1 18 0 0.993 17 1 0.987 17 0 0.993 18 0 0.987 17 0 0.993 18 0 0.993 17 0 0.993
Italy 8 10 1 9 9 1 8 10 1 8 10 0.993 9 9 1 10 8 0.993 8 10 0.987 9 9 0.98 8 10 0.987 9 9 0.98 8 10 0.993 9 9 0.987
Japan 2 16 1 2 16 1 2 16 1 2 16 0.993 2 16 1 1 17 0.993 1 17 0.987 1 17 0.98 1 17 0.987 1 17 0.98 1 17 0.993 0 18 0.987
Netherlands 7 11 1 7 11 1 7 11 1 7 11 0.993 8 10 1 8 10 0.993 8 10 0.987 8 10 0.98 7 11 0.987 7 11 0.98 5 13 0.993 4 14 0.987
Portugal 9 9 1 10 8 1 10 8 1 11 7 0.993 9 9 1 9 8 1 10 7 0.993 10 7 0.993 11 6 0.993 11 6 0.993 11 7 0.993 9 9 0.987
Spain 10 8 1 10 8 1 10 8 1 8 10 0.993 8 10 1 8 10 0.993 8 10 0.987 8 10 0.98 7 11 0.987 8 10 0.98 7 11 0.993 6 12 0.987
Sweden 5 13 1 5 13 1 6 12 1 5 13 0.993 6 12 1 8 10 0.993 6 12 0.987 7 11 0.98 5 12 0.993 8 10 0.98 8 10 0.993 8 10 0.987
Switzerland 1 17 1 1 17 1 1 17 1 1 17 0.993 1 17 1 2 16 0.993 2 16 0.987 3 15 0.98 2 16 0.987 1 17 0.98 1 17 0.993 9 9 0.987
Turkey 17 1 1 17 1 1 17 1 1 17 1 0.993 17 1 1 17 1 0.993 16 1 0.993 16 0 0.992 16 1 0.993 15 1 0.992 17 1 0.993 16 1 0.993
United Kingdom 11 7 1 9 9 1 10 8 1 10 8 0.993 11 7 1 9 9 0.993 12 6 0.987 12 6 0.98 10 8 0.987 10 8 0.98 10 8 0.993 11 7 0.987
United States 12 6 1 11 7 0.5 12 6 1 11 7 0.993 11 7 1 11 7 0.993 12 6 0.987 12 6 0.98 9 9 0.987 11 7 0.98 10 8 0.993 12 6 0.987




Table B.2 Network statistics for 2005Q4-2013Q4. CC – clustering coefficient; Connect – connectedness; Mean in/out – mean for in/out 




Source: Own calculations 
2005Q4 2006Q1 2006Q2 2006Q3 2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4
Nodes 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Edges 170 170 171 171 170 171 170 171 171 171 171 171 171 169 170 171 170
CC 0.994 0.994 1 1 0.994 1 0.994 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.988 0.994 1 0.994
Connect 0.994 0.994 1 1 0.994 1 0.994 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.988 0.994 1 0.994
Mean in 8.947 8.947 9 9 8.947 9 8.947 9 9 9 9 9 9 8.895 8.947 9 8.947
Mean out 8.947 8.947 9 9 8.947 9 8.947 9 9 9 9 9 9 8.895 8.947 9 8.947
Std in 5.158 5.169 5.088 5.11 5.126 4.933 4.938 4.978 4.967 5.077 4.807 4.989 4.853 5.065 4.87 4.83 4.743
Std out 5.082 5.027 5.088 5.11 4.994 4.933 4.801 4.978 4.967 5.077 4.807 4.989 4.853 4.852 4.743 4.83 4.624
Kurt in -1.102 -1.184 -1.136 -1.241 -1.03 -1.07 -1.081 -1.126 -1.037 -1.102 -0.826 -1.098 -1.05 -1.099 -1.029 -0.895 -0.687
Kurt out -1.008 -1.212 -1.136 -1.241 -1.09 -1.07 -1.076 -1.126 -1.037 -1.102 -0.826 -1.098 -1.05 -1.037 -1.015 -0.895 -0.623
Skew in 0.172 0.169 0.076 0.123 0.062 0.276 0.242 0.175 0.237 0.179 0.325 0.237 0.385 0.419 0.523 0.466 0.543
Skew out -0.145 -0.238 -0.076 -0.123 -0.121 -0.276 -0.31 -0.175 -0.237 -0.179 -0.325 -0.237 -0.385 -0.483 -0.595 -0.466 -0.603
2010Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4 2011Q1 2011Q2 2011Q3 2011Q4 2012Q1 2012Q2 2012Q3 2012Q4 2013Q1
Nodes 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Edges 171 169 170 168 171 171 171 170 171 170 169 168 169
CC 1 0.988 0.994 0.983 1 1 1 0.994 1 0.994 0.988 0.983 0.988
Connect 1 0.988 0.994 0.982 1 1 1 0.994 1 0.994 0.988 0.982 0.988
Mean in 9 8.895 8.947 8.842 9 9 9 8.947 9 8.947 8.895 8.842 8.895
Mean out 9 8.895 8.947 8.842 9 9 9 8.947 9 8.947 8.895 8.842 8.895
Std in 4.583 4.383 4.624 4.682 4.546 4.346 4.256 4.552 4.359 4.223 4.267 4.682 4.408
Std out 4.583 4.254 4.49 4.451 4.546 4.346 4.256 4.453 4.359 4.183 4.108 4.311 4.306
Kurt in -0.981 -0.801 -0.376 -0.564 -0.551 -0.255 -0.364 -0.52 0.019 0.806 0.07 -0.044 0.175
Kurt out -0.981 -0.838 -0.294 -0.52 -0.551 -0.255 -0.364 -0.336 0.019 0.989 0.175 -0.2 0.225
Skew in 0.604 0.305 0.459 0.34 0.147 0.113 0.227 -0.084 0.018 -0.211 -0.077 -0.179 -0.169




Cross-border exposures of  Eurozone countries 
 
Figure C.1 captures the development in time of gross payables and net exposures of 
PIIGS and the remaining (non-PIIGS) Eurozone countries to the CGBSN network as a 
whole (solid line), to all the European countries in the network (dashed line) and to the 
Eurozone countries (dotted line). All the payables lines are following the same pattern, 
with a steep growth before the US financial crisis, then a collapse concluded with a 
downwards trend, disturbed by the Eurozone crisis in 2010-2012.  
The first insight is that the non-PIIGS Eurozone block is more indebted than the 
countries belonging to PIIGS, at the same time it is the net lender (i.e. its receivables 
are greater than payables), while PIIGS are net borrowers.  
The second is that PIIGS borrow more from the Eurozone countries than from the 
remaining European countries (which is represented by the distance of dotted and 
dashed line). The exposure of the remaining CGBSs (non-European countries) to PIIGS 
is small, both before and after the crises.  
The same is not true for the non-PIIGS Eurozone countries (i.e. mainly Germany 
and France), their debt to the non-European countries (viz. distance of the solid and 
dashed line) is far larger than the debt of the PIIGS. Moreover it grows after the US 
financial crisis and remains high (in 2013 the share of payables to non-European 
countries is higher than 25%). 
In net terms (see Figure C.1, lower graph) trends are even more visible. Although 
the non-PIIGS Eurozone remains the group of net lenders, its lending position become 
five times smaller in 2012, than at the beginning of 2007: the eve of financial crisis. 
The reversal of the trend tends starts in 2013, but it is difficult to judge if it is a 
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permanent change. Their net exposure to Eurozone is far smaller than to the full 
CGBSN, and what is more, after the US financial crisis the gap between exposure to 
Eurozone and European countries began narrowing, which basically means that the net 
exposure of non-PIIGS Eurozone to the UK decreasing. 
Figure C.1 Gross payables and net exposures of PIIGS and the remaining 
Eurozone countries to the full CGBSN, European countries and Eurozone 
countries, in $bn. (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
 
Source: Own calculations; BIS 
Notes: PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain; Eurozone non-PIIGS: Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria; 










































The net borrowing of PIIGS from Eurozone countries is greater than of the rest of 
the world. The non-European countries exposure to PIIGS started to drop the after the 
US financial crisis and the drop accelerated with the Eurozone crisis. 
The third observation is that the PIIGS at the eve of the Eurozone crisis in 2009 owed 
to Eurozone countries not much less than the remaining Eurozone countries to the 
whole Eurozone (see Figure C.1, upper graph). Taking into account the fact that size of 
the PIIGS economies is just more than a half of the size of the remaining Eurozone, the 
level of debt owed within the Eurozone is stunning72. 
To confirm the above findings and to render the analysis more complete Figure C.2 
presents the gross receivables and net exposures of the top banking systems (the US, 
the UK, Japan, Switzerland) and other banking systems (Australia, Canada, India, 
Turkey, Sweden) not belonging to Eurozone. 
Figure C.2 Gross receivables and net exposures of the top banking systems and 
other countries to the full CGBSN, European countries and Eurozone countries, 
in $bn. (2005Q4-2013Q4) 
 
                                                          
72 The combined GDP of PIIGS in 2009 was $4,3tn, while the remaining Eurozone countries from the 

























Source: Own calculations; BIS 
Notes: Top banking systems: US, UK, Japan, Switzerland; Other: Australia, Canada, India, Turkey, 
Sweden; 
Net exposures = Payables – Receivables 
Firstly, the upper chart in Figure C.2 confirms that Eurozone (and to lesser extend 
European countries) borrow mainly from Eurozone, as the top banking systems 
receivables come mainly from non-European countries (mostly the US – the biggest 
debtor). Secondly, the lower chart with net exposure, reveals the extent to which the 
top banking systems cross-border borrowing has fallen as a aftermath of the US 
financial crisis. The fall in net borrowing from European non-Eurozone countries is 
much bigger than from the Eurozone or full CGBSN, this reflects to a certain point the 
credit crunch of the UK banking system. 
To sum up, the main findings are: 
1) Eurozone borrows mainly from Eurozone, 
2) PIIGS were heavily indebted to the Eurozone countries at the eve of the 
Eurozone crisis,  
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This suggests that there are basis to distinguishing between the core and periphery 





Table D.1 Availability of Datastream data on CDS spreads 
Name of the Sovereign The Date of Data Availability 
Greece Starts from 09/01/2004 
Italy Starts from 20/01/2004 
Portugal Starts from 26/01/2004 
Ireland Starts from 01/01/2004 
Spain Starts from 27/04/2005 
The UK Starts from 13/11/2007 
France Starts from 16/08/2005 
Germany Starts from 08/01/2004 
The U.S. Starts from 13/12/2007 
Source: Own calculations 
 










mean 254.44 101.65 111.28 151.5 99.06 61.71 39.1 29.09 33.97 
max 
1125.8
1 244.7 461.32 489.77 274.58 175 99.97 91.85 
100 
min 20.2 20.2 17.7 12.6 17 7.3 6.5 4.5 5.8 
standard 
deviation 259.47 56.72 96.5 103.32 64.38 37.65 25.45 18.53 
 
20.14 
skewness 1.48 0.41 1.5 0.5 0.93 0.31 0.48 0.72 0.8 
kurtosis 1 -0.92 1.29 -0.02 0.05 -0.33 -0.93 0.73 0.66 




Table D.3. Unadjusted correlations before the Greek bailout (November 2009 - 
April 2010) 
Country Greece Italy Portugal Ireland Spain UK France Germany 
Greece 1 0.762 0.781 0.807 0.767 0.632 0.676 0.623 
Italy 0.762 1 0.856 0.794 0.895 0.789 0.779 0.716 
Portugal 0.781 0.856 1 0.825 0.888 0.708 0.76 0.724 
Ireland 0.807 0.794 0.825 1 0.812 0.65 0.649 0.64 
Spain 0.767 0.895 0.888 0.812 1 0.748 0.725 0.704 
UK 0.632 0.789 0.708 0.65 0.748 1 0.72 0.707 
France 0.676 0.779 0.76 0.649 0.725 0.72 1 0.834 
Germany 0.623 0.716 0.724 0.64 0.704 0.707 0.834 1 
Source: Own calculations 
Table D.4. Unadjusted correlations after the Greek bailout (May - September 
2010) 
Country Greece Italy Portugal Ireland Spain UK France Germany 
Greece 1 0.756 0.86 0.795 0.792 0.611 0.701 0.607 
Italy 0.756 1 0.857 0.894 0.905 0.766 0.773 0.782 
Portugal 0.86 0.857 1 0.908 0.889 0.744 0.761 0.721 
Ireland 0.795 0.894 0.908 1 0.917 0.753 0.767 0.758 
Spain 0.792 0.905 0.889 0.917 1 0.716 0.749 0.773 
UK 0.611 0.766 0.744 0.753 0.716 1 0.725 0.724 
France 0.701 0.773 0.761 0.767 0.749 0.725 1 0.822 
Germany 0.607 0.782 0.721 0.758 0.773 0.724 0.822 1 

















Greece-Italy -0.264 24/01/2007 0.933 24/06/2009 
Greece-Portugal -0.174 20/12/2004 0.892 16/06/2010 
Greece-Ireland -0.49 08/11/2007 0.896 08/07/2009 
Greece-Spain -0.583 24/05/2005 0.9 25/06/2009 
Greece-UK -0.001 28/04/2008 0.811 29/07/2009 
Greece-France -0.193 02/12/2005 0.827 04/06/2009 
Greece-Germany -0.34 17/10/2007 0.826 04/06/2009 
Italy-Portugal -0.29 10/05/2005 0.913 08/05/2009 
Italy-Ireland -0.325 19/05/2004 0.885 26/05/2010 
Italy-Spain -0.952 23/05/2005 0.946 15/07/2009 
Italy-UK 0.002 28/04/2008 0.848 17/09/2009 
Italy-France -0.344 15/12/2005 0.873 05/01/2010 
Italy-Germany -0.299 15/06/2004 0.839 03/06/2009 
Portugal-Ireland -0.263 30/08/2004 0.919 21/06/2010 
Portugal-Spain -0.59 16/05/2005 0.931 08/05/2009 
Portugal-UK -0.079 04/04/2008 0.853 12/08/2009 
Portugal-France -0.257 01/06/2007 0.842 08/06/2009 
Portugal-
Germany 
-0.3 13/07/2007 0.805 11/06/2009 
Ireland-Spain -0.252 27/07/2006 0.94 18/06/2010 
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Ireland-UK 0.139 18/03/2008 0.818 12/01/2010 
Ireland-France -0.577 07/10/2005 0.824 22/05/2009 
Ireland-Germany -0.505 27/05/2004 0.781 23/06/2010 
Spain-UK -0.478 22/11/2007 0.834 09/02/2010 
Spain-France -0.476 17/08/2006 0.851 25/11/2008 
Spain-Germany -0.852 16/05/2005 0.849 11/06/2009 
UK-France 0.005 24/03/2008 0.798 22/07/2009 
UK-Germany -0.29 21/11/2007 0.811 09/04/2010 
France-Germany -0.531 15/09/2005 0.888 06/04/2010 
Source: Own calculations 
Table D.6. EWMA correlations regressed on their lagged values and crisis dummy 
coefficients (significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%) 
 
1D  2D  3D  4D  





      0.0042***  0.0019* 
t-statistics 0.6892 -1.0786 
 
3.701 1.7929 
p-value 0.4908 0.2809 0.0002 0.0732 
Greece - Portugal  























Greece - UK  
coefficient 0.0003      0.0031*** 
 
          0.0009 
 
* 
















    1.0206e-11 
 
 
Greece - France 
coefficient 0.0002 
 
  0.0024* 
 





















Italy - Ireland  
coefficient       0.005***      0.006***    0.003***     0.0032*** 
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t-statistics 4.5967 2.9771 3.8381 3.2644 
p-value    4.598e-06 0.0029 0.0001 0.0011 
Italy - Spain 
coefficient 0.0025 0.0029    0.0025**  0.0019* 
t-statistics 1.5164 1.1413 2.0061 1.6745 
p-value 0.1296 0.2539 0.045 0.0942 
Italy - Germany 
coefficient      0.0073*** 0.0011      0.0026***      0.0049*** 
t-statistics 6.1582 1.3293 4.7622 2.6043 
p-value 9.1e-10 0.1839    2.07e-06 0.0093 
Portugal - Ireland  
coefficient 0.0002 0.0010    0.0019**      0.0063*** 
t-statistics 0.1403 0.9704 2.2573 3.1898 
p-value 0.885 0.3320 0.0241 0.0014 
Portugal - France 
coefficient 0.0007     0.004*** 0.0016      0.0028*** 
t-statistics 0.8817 4.7806 0.7659 3.77 
p-value 0.3781  1.89e-06 0.4439 0.0002 
Portugal - Germany 
coefficient 0.0006     0.004***  0.0031* 0.0012 
t-statistics 0.5963 2.779 1.7184 1.4538 
p-value 0.5511 0.0055 0.0859 0.1462 
Ireland - France  
coefficient     0.0034***       0.0025*** 
*** 
     0.0047***      0.0027*** 
t-statistics 4.2802 4.126 6.4777 4.3173 
p-value   1.97e-05   3.86e-05   1.21e-10   1.68e-05 
Ireland - Germany  
coefficient       0.0041***        0.0059***       0.0026***       0.0048*** 
t-statistics 3.4738 5.8321 4.1873 6.9951 
p-value 0.0005     6.502e-09    2.96e-05    3.75e-12 
Spain - Germany  
coefficient      0.0029***      0.0035***       0.0039***  0.0011* 
t-statistics 4.3113 4.4781 3.5753 
 
1.9049 
p-value  1.71e-05  8.02e-06 0.0004 0.057 
UK - France 
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coefficient     0.0035*** 0.0012 
 
0.001      0.0018*** 
t-statistics          3.4128 1.0828 0.9313 2.6491 
p-value 0.0007 0.279 0.3518 0.0081 
 
Source: Own calculations 
Table D.7. Granger causality p statistics for pre-crisis period (90% confidence 
interval, number of lags = 3) 
Variable Greece Italy Portugal Ireland Spain France Germany Is Granger- 
caused by 
Greece 0.00 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0 countries 
Italy NaN 0.00 NaN NaN NaN NaN 0.07 1 countries 
Portugal 0.00 NaN 0.00 NaN 0.05 NaN 0.01 3 countries 
Ireland NaN NaN NaN 0.00 NaN 0.03 NaN 1 countries 
Spain 0.00 0.03 NaN NaN 0.00 NaN NaN 2 countries 
France NaN NaN NaN 0.04 0.00        0.00 0.00 3 countries 
Germany NaN NaN 0.07 0.01 NaN 0.00 0.00 3 countries 
Granger-
causing 
2  1 1 2 2 2 3 13  
Note:  NaN refer to probabilities greater than 0.1; Source: Own calculations 
Table D.8 Granger causality p statistics for crisis period (90% confidence interval, 
number of lags = 6) 
Variable Greece Italy Portugal Ireland Spain UK France Germany Is Granger- 
caused by 
Greece NaN 0.03 0.01 NaN NaN NaN NaN 0.08 3 countries 
Italy NaN 0.00 0.08 NaN 0.07 NaN NaN NaN 2 countries 
Portugal 0.08 0.00 0.00 NaN 0.10 NaN NaN NaN 3 countries 
Ireland 0.04 NaN 0.01 0.01 NaN NaN 0.07 0.00 4 countries 
Spain 0.05 NaN 0.00 NaN 0.00 0.00 NaN 0.03 4 countries 
UK NaN 0.00 0.07 0.00 NaN 0.00 NaN 0.01 4 country 
France NaN NaN NaN 0.06 0.00        0.00 0.00 0.01 4 countries 
Germany NaN NaN NaN 0.00 NaN 0.09 0.07 0.00 3 countries 
Granger-
causing 
3  3 5 3 3 3 2 5 27 























628 JP Morgan Chase 4,166.76 4,199.10 100.61 130.33 3.53 663.90 12.75 
7213 Citibank 1,397.55 1,290.31 70.98 54.47 0.11 563.24 10.81 
3510 Bank of America 1,028.65 1,004.74 88.50 212.68 0.16 712.32 13.68 
57485 Goldman Sachs  651.35 614.40 13.19 0.00 0.00 4.04 0.08 
57890 HSBC  457.09 473.63 10.81 20.92 0.01 83.25 1.60 
33869 Wachovia  150.75 141.96 32.71 32.83 2.44 384.99 7.39 
32992 Morgan Stanley 22.06 0.00 5.80 0.00 0.00 14.85 0.29 
27374 Merrill Lynch  8.90 0.00 4.09 3.00 0.00 24.59 0.47 
17534 Keybank  3.88 3.31 8.00 8.09 0.00 77.39 1.49 
6384 PNC  2.00 1.05 8.34 24.98 0.00 75.91 1.46 
6557 National City  1.29 0.94 12.05 11.95 0.71 102.40 1.97 
639 
The Bank of NY 
Mellon 1.18 0.00 11.15 29.29 0.00 2.85 0.05 
3511 Wells Fargo  1.04 0.49 33.07 60.15 0.59 348.35 6.69 
867 SunTrust  0.59 0.20 12.56 14.85 0.00 131.06 2.52 
913 
The Northern 
Trust Company 0.24 0.00 4.39 1.37 0.00 18.98 0.36 
14 
State Street Bank 
and Trust 




Americas 0.10 0.00 7.87 0.00 0.00 12.86 0.25 
12368 Regions Bank 0.08 0.41 9.64 14.30 0.21 98.73 1.90 
6548 U.S. Bank  0.06 0.00 14.56 29.34 0.42 183.76 3.53 
24998 Commerce Bank 0.02 0.03 1.37 2.33 0.00 11.64 0.22 
22953 
Mercantil 
Commercebank  0.01 0.00 0.54 1.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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5296 Associated Bank  0.01 0.12 1.58 4.08 0.10 16.13 0.31 
983 Comerica Bank 0.01 0.05 5.66 7.86 0.00 50.54 0.97 
57053 Signature Bank 0.00 0.00 0.76 2.78 0.00 3.69 0.07 






0 0.05 0.696 0.53 0 2.57 
0.049 
  Aggregate 7,893.7 7,730.8 480.1 709.8 8.3 3,686.8 70.8 
*     For Charge offs we use the 1.92% given by the FDIC in 2009.  





 Table F.1 Initial matrix of bilateral CDS buys (B) sell (G) obligations of US Banks ($bn)   











































































































































































JPMorgan 0.0000 743.4323 547.1959 346.4871 243.1515 80.1912 11.7339 4.7330 2.0623 1.0642 0.6837 0.6250 0.5511 0.3113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2216.8815 4199.1040
Citibank 681.0997 0.0000 168.1436 106.4693 74.7161 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 259.8813 1290.3100
Bank of America 530.3574 177.8840 0.0000 82.9053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 213.5894 1004.7361
Goldman 324.3167 108.7771 80.0643 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 101.2440 614.4020
HSBC 250.0088 83.8539 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 139.7667 473.6293
Wachovia 74.9341 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 67.0249 141.9590
Morgan Stanley 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Merrill Lynch 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Keybank 1.7468 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5625 3.3093
PNC 0.5566 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4979 1.0545
National City 0.4979 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4453 0.9432
Mellon 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0020
Wells Fargo 0.2576 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2304 0.4880
SunTrust 0.1034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0925 0.1958
Northern Trust 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
State Street 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Deutsche Bank 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Regions 0.2149 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1922 0.4070
U.S. Bank 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Commerce 0.0160 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0143 0.0304
MERCANTIL 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Associated 0.0637 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0570 0.1206
Comerica 0.0240 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0215 0.0456
Signature 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
RBS 0.0293 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0262 0.0555
Mitsubishi 0.0264 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0236 0.0500
Outside Entity 2302.8540 288.7168 234.8135 114.6832 149.1978 70.1353 0.4551 0.1836 1.6425 0.5392 0.4719 0.0252 0.2518 0.1045 0.0049 0.0030 0.0021 0.1938 0.0013 0.0147 0.0002 0.0571 0.0216 0.0001 0.0262 0.0236 0.0000 3164.4227
B 4167.1083 1402.6640 1030.2173 650.5449 467.0653 150.3265 12.1890 4.9166 3.7047 1.6033 1.1555 0.6502 0.8029 0.4158 0.0049 0.0030 0.0021 0.1938 0.0013 0.0147 0.0002 0.0571 0.0216 0.0001 0.0262 0.0236 3001.5520
Appendix G 
Random network algorithm 
 
The algorithm that creates a random network of CDS obligations proceeds using the 
following steps: 
1. An adjacency matrix A (NxN) is created where each element has value 1 with 
probability p (this probability is set to be equal to the connectivity of the empirical network 
we want to compare with), 0 otherwise. 
2. A matrix R (NxN) of random numbers is created where each element is drawn from 
an uniform distribution U[0,1] 
3. The matrix B (NxN) of random values is generated as follows: for i, j between [1,N] 
bij=aij*rij (element by element multiplication). The matrix B is now a sparse matrix with 
many zero elements. 
4. The final adjacency matrix of CDS obligations M (N x N) is defined as: 








Here, TC is the total CDS cover in the market as required by the empirically constructed 
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